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Regional integration processes play an important role in international politics. The 
spread of regional organizations in the aftermath of the Cold War exemplifies the 
importance of studying the causes and impacts of those organizations in international 
politics. According to the WTO (World Trade Organization), 546 regional trade 
agreements have been notified until January 2013 (compared to 265 in 2003), and only 
three WTO members were not part of such agreements (Macau, Mongolia and Taipei)1. 
However relating only to trade agreements these numbers represent the increasing 
importance of regionalism and regional integration to international politcs. In fact, the 
existence of trade agreements shows that the parties are keen to have peaceful 
relations. Moreover, many trade agreements have a political background. These 
regional organizations vary greatly in their institutional form and performance. The most 
notable example of a highly institutionalized region in terms of overlapping governance 
mechanisms is the European Union (EU). The EU member-states are much more prone 
to transfer political authority to supranational institutions, even in highly sensitive areas 
such as human rights (Acharya and Johnston, 2007). While the European Union is the 
leading example of an advanced regional integration process, it has to be remembered 
that it was influenced by, built with, and merged to other institutional dynamics in the 
European continent such as the Council of Europe (CoE), Western European Union 
(WEU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. In this sense, 
this intertwinement with other institutions influences the high level of institutionalization 
of EU politics. These other European institutions contributed in security and defence 
issues in the EU with expertise, and this culminated in the development of the EU’s 
second pillar2 (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP/ European Security and 
Defence Policy – ESDP). The EU is also the oldest regional integration experience of its 
                                                          
1
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
2
 The pillarization structure of the EU started with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and was abolished with the 2009 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
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genre3. Some other regional organizations follow the European experience more 
explicitly such as the African Union (AU), Southern Common Market (Mercosul), Central 
American Integration System (SICA), and Caribbean Community (CARICOM), etc. 
Other integration processes follow a different pattern which is less institutionalized, 
more open and sometimes exclusively commercial, such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), etc. The emerging importance of those regional integration 
processes for international politics and their contribution to promote peace and stability 
in their respective regions and beyond are not to be underestimated.  
 
Regional integration processes that have developed a political dimension (generally 
referred to as new-regionalism4) are characterised by a “multidimensional form of 
integration which includes economic, political, social, and cultural aspects and therefore 
goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security 
alliances, and instead, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence and 
identity seems to be of primary importance” (Hettne, 1999: XVI). In this sense we 
observe how regional integration processes move beyond simply commercial/economic 
regimes and security alliances and learn why and when regional organizations develop 
political integration. Moreover, we are interested in investigating why and how this 
integration occurs in areas of high-politics where sovereingty should be playing an 
exclusive role. Therefore, in order to answer these questions we focus on political 
                                                          
3
 Especially if we start counting the beginning of the European integration process with the creation of the Council 
of Europe in 1949.  However, for Historians the European integration begins with the Rome Treaties in 1957, and 
the exclusive political coordination forum started in 1970 with the Luxembourg Treaty. 
4
 See also Telo, Mario (2001) European Union and New Regionalism, Aldershot, Ashgate; and von Langenhove, L., 
and Costea, A. (2007) The EU as a Global Actor and the Emergence of “Third-Generation” Regionalism, in Foradori, 
P., Rosa. P., and Scartezzini, R. (2007) Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy – the EU in International Affairs, 
Lexington Books. 
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integration in the areas of Foreign and Defence policies of member-states and how 
these policies became increasingly entangled and mutually dependent.   
 
1.1 The research puzzle 
 
Political integration, especially in the field of security and defence, is a very rare 
phenomenon. Security and defence traditionally represent the hard core of national 
sovereignty. Historically we can observe a great variety of cooperation in this area, most 
commonly in ad hoc military alliances to counter a common external threat. However, 
not many of these military alliances remained alive and were deepened enough to be 
called integration. The dawn of European integration was irradiated mainly from two 
former historical rivals: Germany and France. Besides, in Europe the political integration 
process achieved its main drive in the aftermath of the Cold War when the Soviet threat 
was already part of the history books. The integration process in South America is no 
different. Argentina and Brazil, two former historical rivals, put aside their rivalry in order 
to deepen their economic and political ties, albeit with the inexistence of a common 
external threat.  
 
In these two cases in Europe and South America we can observe the evolution of 
regional security governance. The establishment and development of mechanisms for 
regional security governance constitute one of the main research puzzles in IR Theory 
and Integration Studies in the 21st Century (Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini; 2007). 
According to Risse and Lehmkuhl (2006), this puzzle is raised by the fact that most 
research on governance in Social Sciences is done by taking into account modern and 
highly developed democratic States. In this sense: “The inapplicability of one of the key 
terms of social sciences to two thirds of the states in this world, however, creates not 
only theoretical but also eminently political and practical problems” (Risse and 
Lehmkuhl, 2006: 4). We therefore want to understand regional security governance 
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beyond Europe. Looking to how South Americans organize their issues of security and 
defence may shed a light on how a regional security governance approach works 
beyond Europe. For this purpose we understand regional security governance as:  
“formal and informal structures of authority that manage collective security problems of 
states in a delineated region or common efforts of these states to promote security and 
stability outside their region. The uni-, bi-, and multilateral structures of authority can be 
codified in formal and binding institutional forms, but they may also be found in norms of 
behaviour and action informally accepted amongst the regional states” (Flemes and 
Radseck, 2009: 7). 
 
However, the study of systems of regional security governance focuses mainly on the 
EU and ignores similar processes in other regions. But how can we explain the 
development of similar phenomena in other parts of the world? Most Integration Studies 
(also known as EU Studies) argue that each integration process in the world is so 
specific that they have to be analized with their own body of semi-hermetic theories. If 
that is the case it shows the impossibility to compare the findings of an inter-regional 
comparison. The idea that a separated, semi-hermetic body of theories is needed in 
order to study the EU has hindered theoretical progress by closing its doors to analytical 
innovations in the field of International Relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP).  
 
During the 20th Century, the IR Theory debate centered in the rationalist debate 
between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism. While the theoretical approaches emanating 
from the liberal camp were more able to deal with the questions of integration due to its 
focus on international cooperation and transnational links, realists tried to explain 
integration in terms of the geopolitical interests of major states and as a result of a 
specific historical moment. In this sense regional integration has been a challenge in IR 
theorizing, both in explaining why states give up their sovereingty and whether 
integration is a good thing (Diez, Bode and da Costa; 2011: 189). For Steve Smith 
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(2000: 34), 20th Century IR theorizing was either not able or not willing to grasp the 
complexity of the emerging and developing dynamics of regional institutions, with the 
rationalist mainstream debate focusing on the materialistic and atomized units in an 
anarchic international system by measuring the theories according to their ability to 
inform the relationship between empirical realities. Moreover, the study of the European 
foreign policy cooperation and its contribution to understanding the international system 
was neglected. Only some specialized literature in IR tried to tackle how the 
international system influenced the foreign policy coordination in Europe. Therefore 
most of the IR field in the 20th Century took axiomatic or radical positions on EU foreign 
policy, thereby oversimplifying it at the maximum level possible. When combined, those 
two perceptions led to a divide between IR and European Studies that was only recently 
overcome, mainly due to the convergence between the neoliberal – constructivist 
debate in IR and the new institutionalist approaches in European Studies. The result is 
the development of multilevel governance approaches that are fit to grasp the subtleties 
of such complex phenomena. Nevertheless, multilevel governance approaches have 
mainly been used to understand the European integration process, and the approach is 
broad enough to capture the dynamic in other regions in the world. 
 
In this sense we look beyond the dichotomical debate between intergovernmentalists 
and supranationalists to observe the causes and impacts of political integration. 
Studying the drivers behind the integration process in two different regions with different 
characteristics may present generalizable factors to explain other integration processes 
around the world. In the light of this inter-regional comparision, how can we explain 
political integration emerging in two different regions with a strong history of rivalry in 
the absense of a common external threat? To answer this question we have to look 
beyond the regular interstate relations and try to grasp what is underneath the surface 
of regular meetings. In this sense this study will look not only to the policy outputs of the 
integration processes in Europe and South America, but we will mainly observe the 
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daily interaction of individuals responsible for influencing the paths of integration in both 
continents. 
 
In Europe the integration process started in the 1950’s with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Those three 
Communities were merged in 1967 under the name of the European Communities (EC). 
Although we understand that one of the factors motivating the initial drive for integration 
in Europe was the Soviet threat, this external threat is not strong enough to explain why 
the political cooperation in the EU only started in 19705 in a period where the Soviet 
threat was not so strong anymore6. Moreover, the main drive for political integration in 
the EU with the institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was only carried out after the 
end of the Cold War.   
 
In South America the foundations for the establishment of a sustainable integration 
process were laid by the newly elected civilian Presidents of Argentina and Brazil in 
1985 with the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu. The Southern Common Market (Mercosul) 
was established in 1991, and although painted as an economic/commercial integration 
project since the beginning it had very clear political motivations. In 1996 the 
Mechanism for Political Consultation was created, and in 1998 this was institutionalized 
in the Forum for Consultation and Political Cooperation (FCCP). In South America we 
also observe the existence of other integration processes: the Andean Community and 
                                                          
5
 Political cooperation in Europe started with the Luxebourg (Davignon) Report in 1970 after the failed attempts of 
the European Defence Community (EDC), the European Political Community, and the Fouchet Plans.  
 
6
 The US-Soviet détente started in 1969 with the SALT I and Helsinki Accords and later on with SALT II, and it ended 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent US boycott to the 1980’s Olympic Games in Moscow. 
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the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). The Andean Community was 
established in 1969 (named Andean Pact from 1969 to 1996) and has a very complex 
institutional structure, however due to strong political divergences, border conflicts and 
economic limitations the development of this integration process was not very 
successful. The Union of South American Nations (Unasul) was created in 2008, and it 
is an attempt to unify the two separate integration processes in the region, namely 
Mercosul and the Andean Community. Moreover, Unasul has a very strong political 
component and even aims to organize the security and defence integration in the 
region.      
 
To investigate the logic behind political integration in two different regions this study 
therefore seeks to analyze and explain the role of transgovernmental networks in 
pushing forward each integration process. Transgovernmental networks are defined by 
Keohane and Nye (1974: 43) as: “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different 
governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or 
chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top leaders as our 
benchmarks of official government policy.” A more comprehensive definition is provided 
by Slaughter (2004: 7): “National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed 
in networks of personal and institutional relations. They would each be operating both in 
domestic and the international arenas, exercising their national authority to implement 
their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing the interests of 
their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to 
disseminate and distil information, cooperate in enforcing national and international 
laws, harmonizing national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems.” 
We argue that those transgovernmental networks play a major role in areas where 
governments are not keen – or find it difficult – to reach an agreement. This is especially 
seen in the area of security and defence, where national sovereignty is the rule. In this 
sense the fundamental research question guiding this study therefore asks: what is the 
effect of transgovernmental networks in integration processes?  
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1.2 The analytical framework 
 
In order to explain the impact of transgovernmental networks in regional integration we 
will use the tools and concepts present in IR Theory and Integration Studies. We use 
these tools and concepts to analyse the institutionalization processes in Europe and in 
South America, in particular in regard to the development of transgovernmental 
networks. We also observe whether these transgovernmental networks remain in 
informal, non-institutionalized settings or if they are necessarly institutionalized. We 
argue that there are many factors influencing the establishment and evolution of 
regional integration processes, but we defend the idea that transgovernmental networks 
play an important role in areas where the positions of States are divergent and 
commitments are difficult. For the purpose of a comprehensive understanding of why 
and how regional integration occurs, in the next chapter we will overview the state of the 
art both in IR theory and Integration Studies. In the final part of the chapter an analytical 
framework which sketches and compares the most plausible drivers for regional 
integration in Europe and in South America will be presented. It will be observed that 
the policy outcomes of the integration processes have an indirect impact (through 
feedback mechanisms) in not only the international environment but also in the 
integrations own dynamic. 
 
In a nutshell, this study seeks to uncover the elite reproduction through networks of 
personal relationships and how those relationships affect the process of integration in 
two different regions. We draw a number of sub-questions from the classic question of 
socialisation research formulated by Fred Greenstein: who learns what from whom 
under what circumstances, and with what effects (1968; 1970). Our sub-questions are: 
what differentiate States from their representatives? What motivates the representatives 
from flexibilizing their national position? Why and how do individuals engage in 
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networking? In order to answer these questions this study will analyze the development 
of transgovernmental networks responsible for security and defence issues in Europe 
and in South America. 
 
In the EU the discussions for the establishment of an institution for political integration 
started to take place with the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1950 (which 
failed in 1954). The learning process and networking between the representatives 
responsible for negotiating the agreement started to occur and culminated with the 
establishment of the European Political Cooperation in 1970 (Nuttall, 1992). The 
creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) gave rise to a semi-
institutionalized body where interactions between the representatives started to intensify 
with the codification of substantive and procedural norms, and this culminated with the 
institutionalization of the CFSP and ESDP.             
 
In this sense, due to its longevity and complexity we view the EU as the most advanced 
case of regional security governance in the world. In the EU system of governance 
member states not only share cultural, historical, and political features, they also share 
risks, the acquisition of legitimacy and distribution costs (Smith, 2003). Moreover, 
“habits and customs of interaction on EU foreign and security policy matters have 
matured over time into rules of behavior and institutionalized patterns, as illustrated by 
the evolution from the EPC to CFSP and ESDP” (Kirchner, 2003: 29). The slow 
evolution of political integration in Europe with the development of common habits and 
customs of interaction generated the first stages of a learning process, which Aggestam 
(2004) calls the development of “we” feelings. In turn, these “we” feelings resulted in the 
development of what Nuttall (1992) calls “automatic reflex of consultation”, meaning that 
national foreign policy actors ask for opinions and consult with each other before 
reaching a final national position on one issue. 
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In South America it will be observed that while in the Southern Cone the evolution of 
political integration has been taking place since the redemocratization process in the 
1980’s, in the Andean region political integration has been harmed by political 
instabilities, border disputes and economic assymetries. We argue that due to the 
peaceful solution of border disputes, political stability, and economic development 
transgovernmental networks were able to develop in the Southern Cone. We also argue 
that the development of these transgovernmental networks was a relevant factor for the 
success of the regional integration process in the Southern Cone. Moreover, it is 
observed that the Southern Cone aims to contribute to the stability of the Andean region 
by putting political weight into the creation of the Union of South American Nations 
(Unasul). Particularly with the forum to debate and coordinate security and defence 
issues, the South American Defence Council may represent a step forward in solving 
the remaining border disputes and enhancing the relationships between the Andean 
countries. In the South American case it will be observed that unlike in Europe issues of 
security and defence are still dominated by the military. In this sense we argue that 
while in Europe the security and defence integration is carried out by a civilian 
transgovernmental network (Diplocom), in South America it has been mainly achieved 
with a military transgovernmental network (Milicom). These networks in Europe and 
South America will be scrutinized in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
1.3 Limits of this study 
 
In order to clearly delineate the contours of this research it may be useful to outline what 
falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. To start with, this study only focuses on the 
political dimension of the integration process. The economic and commercial aspects of 
the integration processes will be mentioned only when necessary. More specifically, this 
study is interested in the security and defence aspects of political integration. Security 
and defence has always been understood as being within the exclusive domain of 
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States and strongly bounded by sovereignty, however the evolution of political 
integration in Europe demonstrates that even in this area of “high politics” decisions can 
be taken jointly (even without unanimity) using the CFSP/ESDP as an institutional 
framework. Also, the different levels of governance have to be taken into account when 
we analize security and defence within the EU. 
 
In focusing on security and defence aspects of political integration this study also 
considers that security and defence is just one resource in the wider range of 
instruments in joint foreign policy making. In this sense we leave aside other diplomatic 
or coercive foreign policy measures such as aid conditionality, trade agreements and 
multilateral negotiations, collective demarches and declarations, or sanctions, all of 
which may complement or substitute the joint action in security and defence. We will 
mention those aspects of joint foreign policy making where necessary in order to 
describe the evolution of political integration in Europe and South America. These 
limitations are not be interpreted in such a way as to imply that security and defence 
should or even can be analyzed separately from the other aspects of political 
integration. In the research questions raised in the last section we observe the general 
impact of transgovernmental networks on political integration, yet links between security 
and defence and other political instruments are only touched upon when they are 
relevant to understand the role of transgovernmental networks in the integration 
process. 
 
Whether the EU is therefore incomparable with other integration processes depends on 
what question is being asked and the related research design (Caporaso, Marks, 
Moravcsik and Pollack, 1997). Some defend the notion that the uniqueness of the EU 
resides in its history, institutional complexity and unique form of political authority 
(Rosamond, 2000: 16; Wallace, 1994: 9). However, over-emphasizing exceptionality 
and historical contingency seems like a way to present an insurmountable obstacle in 
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order to prevent fruitful comparisons and foster a hermetic body of theories which are 
exclusively created to analyze each integration process individually. This study does not 
share the opinion that each integration process should be analyzed by a hermetic body 
of theories. We defend the idea that inter-regional comparison is possible once we 
bridge the theoretical divide between IR and EU Studies. In order to reach beyond the 
divide of IR and EU Studies we draw on the neoliberal – constructivist debate in IR 
Theory and the analytical frameworks of new institutionalism and multilevel governance 
in EU Studies7. This study also compares two integration processes that are not located 
in Europe, namely the Mercosur and the Andean Community. We also rely on a within-
case comparison when we observe how diverse institutional settings in the European 
Union are influenced differently by transgovernmental networks. 
 
Inquiring into the influence of transgovernmental networks in the political outcomes of 
integration nonetheless relates to the broader questions of actorness and presence. 
The policy outcomes reached as a result of the interactions of national representatives 
enmeshed in transgovernmental networks reflect how and if the regional integration 
process interacts with the rest of the World – ie: the tools and norms it uses in its 
international relations and which issues or areas of the regional organization will be 
present. In EU Studies these questions raise a hot theoretical and methodological 
debate on how to generalize the premises of European integration and the type of 
power the EU represents: civilian, normative, transformative, post-modern or super-
power.  
 
                                                          
7
 For other perspectives on how to bridge the theoretical divide between IR and Integration Studies see: Verdun, 
A., (2003) An American/European divide in European integration studies: bridging the gap with international 
political economy, in: Journal of European Public Policy 10:1, pp. 84-101; Tonra, B. and Christiansen, T. (2004). The 
Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies. In Tonra, B. and Christiansen, 
T., (eds.) (2004) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, pp. 1-9. See 
also: Hix, S. (1994). The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics. In: West 
European Politics 17, 1: 1-30. 
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Questions about actorness and presence bring us to the impact of policy outcomes both 
in the international evironment and in the internal integration dynamic. Since the notion 
of “civilian power” was brought to light by Francois Duchene (1972), the concept has 
been under heated debate with some defending the “normative” or “ethical” impacts of 
the EU policy outcomes in the international environment (Manners, 2002; 2008; Diez, 
2005; Aggestam, 2004), while others challenge this view by arguing about the self-
serving nature of EU political outcomes (Bailes, 2008; Youngs, 2004). This study does 
not take part in this discussion, arguing only that the policy outcomes of the integration 
process have an impact of the international environment. This study also defends the 
idea that the policy outcomes have an impact in the institutionalization process by 
relating institutions with political cooperation (Smith, 2004; Keohane and Martin, 1995; 
Smith, 2000). These effects are related not only to successful integration attemps but 
also failed attempts play a role in devising new forms of cooperation/institutionalization. 
Learning from past mistakes on a trial-and-error basis is also an important characteristic 
of political integration in both Europe and South America. Moreover, the 
institutionalization of habits and customs of transgovernmental networks play an 
important role in fostering integration (Kirchner, 2003; Smith, 2004; Nuttall, 1992). 
 
1.4 The rest of the dissertation 
                       
In seeking to elucidate the role of transgovernmental networks in integration processes 
this dissertation will proceed as follows. In the second chapter the theories of European 
Studies and International Relations will be assessed in order to observe the evolution of 
theoretical thinking on regional integration processes. In this chapter we will also 
present the progressive convergence between both theoretical fields which enables the 
argument for the development of a comprehensive theory to compare political 
integration in different parts of the world (and not understand each of them as sui 
generis). In the last part of the second chapter we will also present two models to 
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observe political integration in Europe and in South America based on the theoretical 
convergence. Based on a comparison of these models and guided by the research 
questions presented above we will draw the causes of integration which are common in 
both regions.  
 
The third chapter starts with a discussion about the definitions of transgovernmental 
networks and socialization processes. We also include a brief presentation of social 
network theory, its basic concepts, and how this approach will help us to understand the 
establishment and development of transgovernmental networks. Then we proceed with 
the first case study of the European Union. In this case study we will assess how the 
transgovernmental networks influenced the creation of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), its codification with the Single European Act (SEA), and its 
institutionalization in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The institutional 
settings of political cooperation in the contemporary European Union will also be 
observed by looking at the within-case variance and clarifying the role of 
transgovernmental networks in the Council Working Groups (CWG), Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) and in the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). 
 
In the fourth chapter we will assess the existence of and measure the influence of 
transgovernmental networks in South American politics. Differently from the EU, South 
American networks are stronger among the military (Milicom). This will have an impact 
on the integration process, and it will be shown that the military have a strong influence 
on the paths of security and defence cooperation in South America. However, the 
military in the region are still feeling the backlash of their participation in the 
dictatorships and thus facing increasing controls, budget cuts and a loss of prestige. 
Institutionalization is also viewed as a way to control and constrain those 
transgovernmental networks by assuring civilian control over the military. In this chapter 
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we will focus on the development of Mercosul as the most successful integration 
experience in the region by contrasting it with the Andean Community and the 
developments of the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). We will also observe 
the importance of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and the development of 
institutional settings for political coordination in Mercosul and especially the South 
American Defence Council (CSD) of Unasul. 
 
The fifth chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation. The conclusion chapter 
will be divided into general theoretical implications, future research possibilities, and 
policy prescriptions. From the theoretical perspective we expect that this dissertation will 
help to shed light on the emergence and development of regional institutions. Besides, 
this dissertation is also contributing to the debate about whether the South American 
experience is similar to the European integration process or not. It also contributes to 
broadening the literature on the political implications of integration for South America. 
This dissertation also aims to be readable to policy-makers in order to present new 
insights on not only how to foster cooperation but also on the role and impact of this 
political “steering community”, namely transgovernmental networks. This leads to 
questions of sovereignty, which is praised by South American governments. It also 
brings us to a reflection on democracy, accountability and regulation. 
 
1.5 Case study selection 
 
There are a number of regional integration processes in the world; some of them were 
already extensively studied such as the African Union or the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), so why did we select the European and South American 
experiences as case studies? There are many reasons for the case study selection, as 
we will present here. We suppose that transgovernmental networks have an impact on 
institutionalization processes. Europe is the most institutionalized regional integration 
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process in the World, and therefore it is quite obvious to choose the EU as one of the 
case studies.  According to the literature, South America has integration processes 
which are most similar to the EU. Also, South America has integration processes with 
different characteristics and functionality, thus offering us the possibility for intra-
regional comparison. Nevertheless, the literature on political integration in South 
America is very scarce, and therefore the research would be contributing to spreading 
the knowledge on political integration in the subregion. Besides the above mentioned 
reasons for case selection there are some other scientific explanations for why we 
specifically decided to choose these two case studies.  
 
Following the case selection criteria proposed by van Evera (1997: 77), in both case 
studies we have 1. data richness; 2. extreme values on the independent variable; 3. 
large within case variance in values on the study variable; and 4. the cases are 
appropriate for controlled comparison and the method of agreement. In the first criterion 
we observe the large number of publications and data available for the study of 
European integration and the access to policy-makers to carry out interviews. In the 
South American case we do not have as much literature available as in the European 
case, but we do have good access to policy-makers in order to conduct interviews. 
Those factors are extremely important because we will infer and test our causation 
using process tracing and the delphi method. The second criterion refers to the extreme 
values on the level of integration in both cases. Those values are higher in both cases 
than in other regional organizations around the World, therefore it will be possible to 
observe that if we have higher values on the dependent variable the causes should be 
present in a higher level as well. In the third criterion we observe a large within-case 
variance in the value of the study variable (transgovernmental networks). We observe 
that transgovernmental networks in both cases are composed of sub-units of 
governments’ bureaucracy. We also note that those sub-units form alliances with each 
other in order to favor or facilitate policy objectives. In this sense the previous personal 
contacts between the persons involved in the network play an important role. When 
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those networks are embedded in an institution the socialization processes move into 
norms and values and peer-pressures play a fundamental role. We also observe that 
the nature of those networks can vary according to the region or field. For instance, we 
observe a European diplomatic community playing an important role in issues of 
foreign, security and defence policy in the EU. On the other hand, in South America we 
observe a strong relationship between the military in the region that helps to foster 
integration in the field of defence. The transgovernmental network can also vary 
according to the field under negotiation, for instance environment, labor or economic 
issues.  
 
In the European case it is easier to spot the variances between the independent and the 
dependent variables across time, thus shedding light on the causation. This is possible 
due to the fact that in Europe institutionalization is observed in a larger time span. 
Therefore the dependent variable is supposed to show a high value when the 
independent variable is also at a high level. In the fourth criterion we choose the case 
studies due to the appropriateness of allowing their pairing for controlled comparison 
and Mill’s method of agreement. Because both cases have similar values on the study 
variable but have different characteristics, it makes it easier to spot the candidate 
causes because they will announce themselves as similarities in the characteristics in 
both cases. 
 
We recognize the importance of fulfilling the scientific parameters for case study 
selection; however we also highlight the importance of the case studies for the real 
world politics. In this sense the case studies are also selected according to real world 
problems. Both in Europe and in South America integration processes have paved the 
way for a more cooperational environment, avoidance of war and the fostering of 
democracy. As we will see in the next two sections, the choice for Europe and South 
America as study cases has a very ideational component: the idea that fostering 
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cooperation with the development of institutions leads to a stable peace. The European 
example is emblematic. After two World wars and widespread bloodshed the Europeans 
learned to manage their relationship in a civilized way with the help of institutions. 
Before the dawn of the European integration the Europeans had never had 60 years of 
continuous peace among themselves8. This 60 years of peace was not easily managed, 
and it included periods of euro-optimism, euro-pessimism, euro-scepticism and even 
paralysis. Despite its difficulties the Europeans remained faithful to the idea of its 
integration founding fathers, never gave up on the process, and adapted it to the 
challenges of the times, and most of all the political will. On the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean, notwithstanding its constant diplomatic crises South America has enjoyed a less 
conflictive environment and longer periods of peace9. Also, the conditions for integration 
are strong in the region as there are only two major official languages (Spanish and 
Portuguese), and they are very similar; the countries in the region enjoy not only similar 
legal and political systems but also have strong similarities (and compatibility) in their 
values, religion, and cultural heritage, etc. However, despite all those similarities the 
successful integration processes in South America only started to develop in the 1990’s 
with the redemocratization period experienced by most of the countries in the region, 
and therefore the role played by democracy and rule of law is strongly emphasized. 
Nonetheless, the region is still marked by past military dictatorships, strong personality 
politics, and a weird combination of inflamed and empty rhetoric. In this sense regional 
institutions in South America can be very useful to not only promote peaceful 
settlements of disputes and stability in the region but also to foster democracy and 
reinforce political commitments among its member-states and beyond, and also 
maximizing the economic gains of integration to the region.         
 
                                                          
8
 Considering conflicts involving more than one member of the current formation of the European Union. 
9
 It is not our task to reflect on why South Americans have enjoyed a more peaceful environment than the 
Europeans. Actually this fact can be explained in many ways, the most popular explanations put emphasis on the 
young age of South American nations compared with the Europeans and its lack of capabilities to wage a full scale 
conflict. 
33 
 
     1.5.1 Regional institution in Europe 
 
After the Second World War, western European countries realized that Europe needed 
a strong institutional setting with supranational powers in order to assure that relations 
between them would be peaceful while cementing the economical interdependences of 
the member-countries. As a result we can argue that first and foremost the European 
integration was, from the beginning, a project designed to preserve peace and avoid 
another intra-European conflict. The integration was even more stimulated with the 
dawn of the Cold War, the Soviet atomic bomb, the spread of euro-communism, and the 
importance of a strong, revitalized Western Germany for the security of the West. 
 
With a devastated economy, Western Europe was a weak adversary to the Soviet 
expansionism, and therefore the US not only supported the plans for a united Europe, 
but also financed the economic recovery of Europe with the Marshall Plan10. The 
Schuman Plan in 1950, was the first step towards the development a supranational 
European institution11. According to the plan, the French and German coal and steel 
industry (also used as war industry) were to be placed under a common High Authority. 
This Plan led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
was signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands 
and Luxemburg).  
 
                                                          
10
 To organize the financial aid the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created, which in 
1960, was transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
11
 It is worth remembering that the Council of Europe was created in 1949 and also influenced the further 
development of the European integration, especially with the signature of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. However, the Council of Europe has a broad membership and the political objectives of the Council of 
Europe and the European Union are quite similar, and some of its institutions are intertwined (like the Convention 
of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights).   
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With further plans to enhance economical development and the increasing importance 
of nuclear energy, the Europeans created two further institutions. The European 
Economic Community (EEC) was designed to promote the development of a customs 
union, thus fostering economic relationships among its member states. The European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was designed to promote cooperation in the area 
of nuclear power. Both communities were created with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and 
they represent the cornerstone of the European integration process. Those three 
communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were merged ten years later, in 1967, under 
the name of European Communities (EC).  
 
In this dissertation the beginning of European economic integration is taken as given. 
The main reason for this is that we are interested in analyzing the political integration in 
Europe, and until the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) very little 
was achieved in this area. We will of course refer to the previous attempts to coordinate 
the foreign policies of member states in areas other than economic affairs in order to 
observe the emergence of transgovernmental networks and its impact in this area. As a 
result we will observe the trial-and-error character of the political cooperation in Europe, 
pointing to the learning processes taken from the failed experiences of the European 
Defence Community (EDC), the European Political Community (both in the 1950’s), and 
the Fouchet Plans (in the 1960’s). In this sense we will observe how those failed 
experiences impacted the creation of transgovernmental networks and how those 
networks influenced the agreement over the European Political Cooperation (EPC), thus 
shaping its institutional design. 
 
Our study in the European case starts with the 1969 Luxemburg Report (also called the 
Davignon Report). This report created a loose institutional form to discuss and 
coordinate the foreign policies of its member states. This “talk-shop” was named 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). With the establishment of the EPC it was 
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recognized that a forum to debate and coordinate foreign policies was utterly important 
in order to avoid internal disruption due to extremely different political views. 
 
The loose EPC framework developed in such a way that by the mid-1980’s it was a tool 
of preventive diplomacy in the East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern 
Europe, thus giving voice to the member states (actorness) in the international arena. 
As a result, in the EPC we can observe how community-building practices, norms, 
values and rules of behaviour developed and were further codified in reports and acts 
(such as the Copenhagen Report of 1973, the London Report of 1981, and especially in 
the Single European Act of 1986); and institutionalized (1993’ Maastricht Treaty, 
Amsterdam Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty) as the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
    
     1.5.2 Regional institution in South America 
 
The most important steps towards the development of a sustainable regional institution 
in the Southern part of South America were taken in 1985 by the former Presidents of 
Brazil, Jose Sarney, and Argentina, Raul Alfonsin. The Foz do Iguacu Declaration 
established the Brazilian-Argentinian Integration and Cooperation Program (PICAB). 
This Declaration was the fist major international contract between the two former rivals 
after the redemocratization process in both countries. It laid down the basis for the 
institutionalization of the region and cemented the peace between the two most 
powerful countries in the region. In this sense, the Foz do Iguacu declaration can be 
compared to the 1957’ Rome Treaties which laid down the foundations of the European 
integration process. 
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While in Europe the integration process started after the experience of two devastating 
World Wars and under the shadow of the communist threat, in South America12 the 
process was mainly an answer to economic concerns, and it was especially designed to 
achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment after decades 
of military dictatorships (Sotomayor, 2004; Oelsner, 2009). In South America, the idea 
of regional institutions was related to the increase of the levels of economic 
development and to political oversight of the military establishment.  
 
These ideas of enhancing cooperation among South American countries with the 
development of regional institutions following the European model were carried further 
by the elected Presidents of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello; and Argentina, Carlos 
Menem. Despite many internal troubles caused by economic crises and political 
instability – including a failed military coup d’Etat attempt in Argentina in December 
1990  - both Presidents together with the Presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay, signed 
the Assunsion Treaty in 1991 that created the Southern Common Market (Mercosul). 
Also in 1991, both Presidents signed the Agreement for the establishment of the 
Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). 
Those two institutions, following the European institutional model while keeping the 
South American specificities, offered the basis for sustainable political cooperation 
among the two most important countries in the region. This axis relationship between 
Brazil and Argentina can be compared to the French-German relationship for the 
development of the European Union. In this sense it is correct to argue that the efforts 
to organize the relationships between the two regional leaders led to reactions in the 
whole region, firstly through agglutination processes as happened in Mercosul and in 
the European Union (Cervo, 2008).  
                                                          
12
 It is important to highlight the difference between the terms South America and Latin America. South America 
refers to the geographical area between the Isthmus of Panama and the Tierra del Fuego. Latin America refers to 
American countries that speak languages derived from Latin, mostly Portuguese and Spanish, but also French. Thus 
the term Latin America excludes Canada, the United States, most of the Caribbean, Surinam and Guyana. In this 
sense those two terms are not used interchangeably here. 
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Therefore it is correct to say that in both South America and in Europe the development 
of regional institutions were the means found by the regional leaders to produce 
sustainable cooperation and stable relations in the long term. The two institutional 
settings in South America and Europe, despite their similar development path, share 
more differences than similarities. Those differences are due to the contexts in which 
those institutions were created. In this sense we observe completely different inputs in 
both institutional settings. If we also take a more constructivist approach, the values, 
norms and identity-formations are quite different in Europe and in South America. While 
the Europeans were prone to give away part of their sovereignty to supranational 
institutions, the principle of sovereignty is very strong in South America, thus making the 
development of a supranational institution in the region almost impossible (Kacowicz, 
2005), and the level of interdependence and the influence of external actors in the 
region are very different in Europe and in South America. 
 
In this sense we will observe the development of Mercosul as the most successful 
integration process in South America, and the prospects that Unasul (Union of South 
American Nations) will develop as the main locus of political and military cooperation. 
The choice of Unasul is a complementation to Mercosul’s analysis. As will be seen in 
chapter 4, Unasul is an attempt to merge the two South American subsystems, namely 
the Andean Community and the Southern Cone. The main locus of political coordination 
in Unasul is the South American Defence Council (CDS), and therefore we will observe 
the impact of transgovernmental networks to the development of those institutions and 
its policies and how far those institutions potentialize socialization processes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
Theorizing political integration: towards a convergence of European Studies and 
International Relations 
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This second chapter oversees the theories being used to analyse integration in both 
International Relations and European Studies. In the last part of the chapter we will use 
the convergence of both fields to elaborate on a new theoretical model that might 
account for not only the dynamics of integration in Europe and Latin America but which 
could also be used in other parts of the world as well.  
 
There is a discussion among students of European political13 integration on which body 
of theories, or more properly schools of thought, provides better insights into the 
European Political Integration in general and the evolution of the Common European 
Foreign Policy in particular. While many hold that the EU is unique and should be 
studied within the field of European Integration Theories, others defend the analytical 
value of theories of International Relations. 
 
In one hand, scholars working on the European political integration from an IR 
perspective have mainly focused on empirical questions of decision-making, policy-
making and regional or issue-area specific governance processes in the EU (Wessels, 
1997; Nutall, 1992; Holland, 1991 and 1997, Ginsberg, 1989; 1999), with special 
emphasis on  foreign policy (White, 2001; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008), “security community” or zone of peace (Adler, 
1997; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000, Schimmelfennig, 2003), identity and order (Kelstrup 
and Williams, 2000) and regionalization/regionalism (Telo, 2001). Even though some of 
these works also suggest to combine EU Studies with IR Theory (especially Kelstrup 
and Williams, 2000; Adler; 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2003 and Telo, 2001) most of IR 
Research remained empirical and did not develop new theoretical concepts. In this 
sense, the empiricism in the IR perspective on the EU avoids the development of a 
general theory to compare different regional integration processes around the world. On 
                                                          
13
 In this dissertation I use the terms “political integration” and “foreign policy integration” interchangeably. I 
understand that integration of national foreign policies into the EU sphere started with the EPC (European Political 
Cooperation) and culminated in the CFSP/ESDP (Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and 
Defence Policy). I also understand that this political integration includes the role played by the EC in cross-pillar 
issues.  
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the other hand the EU Integration literature fails to grasp the specific circumstances of 
foreign policy by mainly focusing on the internal development of the EU and forgetting 
about its external relationships (Hix, 1997; Nugent, 1989; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; 
Rosamond, 2000; Beach, 2005; Moravcsik, 1998). While those studies shed some light 
on how European integration has changed expectations among its member states and 
societies, they do not grasp the emerging actorness of the EU and fail to see that the 
EU is more than just an arena for the coordination of the national foreign policy making 
of member states (Hill and Smith, 2005: 5).  
 
We therefore agree that the EPC/CFSP is not well served by theory (Hyde-Price, 2004: 
99), and consequently the “state of the art” of the European political integration is still at 
the pre-theoretical stage (Holland, 1994: 129; Hill 1993, Tonra and Christiansen, 2004), 
although the beginning of the 2000’s presented us with some bright insights and may 
represent the beginning of a generalizable theory of political integration (Tonra and 
Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2004; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000; Diez, Albert and Stetter, 
2008).  
 
This chapter aims to present an overview of the main theoretical and analytical 
frameworks that try to explain the dynamics and outcomes of the European political 
integration. The first approaches to European Integration14 constituted a big challenge 
to IR theory, which at that time was dominated by realism. The first EU approaches 
stressed that anarchy could be overcome and that a focus on power relations could be 
replaced by a focus on governance. They also stressed the potential of cooperation and 
learning. IR Theory reacted by explaining that EU integration was “low politics” of a non-
state actor, and therefore when it becomes “high politics” or turns into a state then 
realism would be a strong explanatory theory. However, the emerging overlap between 
neorealism and neoliberalism has been very well caught in the EU literature. The 
neoliberal emphasis on the role played by international institutions and the 
                                                          
14
 For instance: Haas, 1958; 1964; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; 1971; Lindberg, 1963; Mitrany, 1966 and 
Pentland, 1973. 
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developments in the EU challenges the neorealist focus on relative gains. (Smith, 2000) 
In this sense, overlapping approaches between European Studies and International 
Relations are observed in this chapter. In the final part we will propose an analytical 
model for the study of political integration which draws from the inflexion between IR 
and European Studies since the 1990´s and which might be applied to other integration 
processes around the world. 
 
2.1 European integration Studies 
 
The field of European integration studies is puzzled by two main questions: 1. What is 
understood by integration? and 2. Is European integration unique and can it not be 
replicated anywhere else in the world? (Øhrgaard, 2004: 26; Long, 1997: 187, Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 7-10, Rosamond, 2000: 10)    
 
Karl Deustch, one of the first integration scholars, defines integration as “the probability 
that conflicts will be resolved peacefully”. As such, integration appears to achieve some 
sort of a final state of a process, thereby leading to a situation where conflicts among 
members are settled by peaceful means. (Deutsch, 1957: 69). Another classic scholar, 
Ernst Haas, argues that integration as a condition fails to offer a clear distinction 
between the situation before the integration started and the situation during the process. 
Therefore, for Haas integration as a condition does not shed light on the role of social 
change. In this sense, Haas defines integration as “the process whereby political actors 
in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 627). As such, Haas sees 
integration more as a process towards a new political community. The third perspective 
advanced by Leon Lindberg argues that integration is “the development of devices and 
processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous actions 
by national governments” (Lindberg, 1963: 5-6). This definition agrees with Haas´s view 
of integration as a process, but it foremost refers to the practices of sharing and 
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delegating decision-making and does not necessarily lead to a new “political 
community” as proposed by Haas (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 8). 
 
Strong self-criticism of the European integration theorists refers to the fact that they 
could not agree on a definition of both the process and outcome of integration, and 
therefore it turned out to be impossible to compare their findings, meaning that what 
represents a clear indication of integration in one model is viewed as irrelevant to the 
other. This difficulty to agree on the dependent variable recalls the tale of a group of 
blind men trying to discover what an elephant looks like. Each blind man touched a 
different part of the animal and each concluded that the elephant had the shape of the 
part he had touched. As a result they all reached very different conclusions about its 
appearance and they began a heated debate (Puchala, 1972: 268). At the time of 
Puchala´s critique, the field was dominated by a small number of “grand theories,” with 
a small number of basic assumptions that completely disagreed with each other on how 
to study integration. Nowadays, in the field of European integration studies the 
competing “grand theories” gave way to “middle range theories” that are more flexible 
and try to grasp specific processes and outcomes. 
 
The second question to be answered is whether the European integration a 
phenomenon which cannot be replicated. According to those who view the EU as a 
singular phenomenon, the EU is a product of specific geopolitical and historical 
circumstances, a unique adventure which requires its own specialized body of theories. 
Most of the studies that take the European integration as a phenomenon not replicated 
anywhere else in the world are devoted to the study of the Commission with its specific 
institutional design, decision-making procedures and supranational legal identity 
(Milward, 1992), however some also defend the uniqueness of the European political 
integration (Øhrgaard, 2004: 26). This perspective raises many methodological 
problems however. First of all it raises the problem of testing hypotheses on a single 
case, often referred to as the n=1 problem (Pollack, 1997; King, Keohane and Verba, 
1994). If the EU is a singular form of cooperation then how could we test theoretical 
45 
 
propositions on it? Therefore the theories generated to explain European integration 
would not be suitable to explain the same phenomenon in other parts of the world, 
meaning that those theories would not be generalizable beyond Europe.  
 
In order to address such a methodological challenge theorists identified three ways to 
conceptualize European integration as part of a larger class of phenomena. The first 
approach, defended by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues at Princeton, conceptualizes 
regional integration as an instance of nation-building, meaning that the end of both 
processes would be the development of joint perspectives and identities, and therefore 
it would be useful to compare cases of nation-building and regional integration 
(Deutsch, 1953a, 1953b, Deutsch et al. 1967). The second approach observes the EU 
as a kind of international organization or regime, which means it could be compared at 
the macro level with other international organizations. (Puchala, 1997; Mattli, 1999; 
Schimmelfennig, 2003) In this sense, the guiding questions would be why do states 
cooperate? and what factors explain specific cooperative outcomes? A third possibility 
analyses the EU as a “polity” in the sense the EU has developed a complex institutional 
structure that resembles the modern nation state more than an international regime. 
Those who view the EU as a “polity” focus their research on the interaction of related 
actors and the process of agenda setting, policy formulation, legislation, interest 
intermediation and policy implementation. They focus their attention on formal and 
informal processes and the locus of power within the institution (Rosamond 2000: 15; 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 11).  
 
The incompatibility among those three approaches to integration obstructed the 
development of a single theory to analyse European integration. Moreover, the inability 
of most approaches to look at the European impact on international politics and to go 
“beyond Europe” in comparing different regional integration processes hindered 
interaction with the IR field, thus preventing mutual theoretical exchanges that could 
help the development in both fields. In this sense EU integration was viewed with a 
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particularistic lens, and the research agenda was mostly focused on the internal 
dynamic of the EU.  
   
The more the EU was treated as being unique, the more integration studies became to 
be viewed as a separated part of IR. One of the consequences was that it hindered the 
theoretical advancement on European integration by closing its doors to helpful 
approaches and theoretical developments in the field of IR and Comparative Politics. 
Mainly due to positive developments of regional integration processes in other parts of 
the world (ASEAN, CARICOM, Mercosul, etc.), and the enhancement of European 
political cooperation with the CFSP, since the mid 1990´s scholars are trying to bring IR 
approaches back to European studies (Mattli, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack 1997).    
      
2.1.1 Pre-theories of Integration 
 
The three classic early theories of integration were developed after the First World War 
and tried to create strategies to move away from international anarchy and to fashion a 
kind of international society that regulates interaction between States. The early 
theories of integration were developed based on the tradition of the Enlightment´s 
models of perpetual peace15 (Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant) as well as on the US 
example (Deudney, 1995; Andreatta, 2005: 20)     
 
Federalism 
 
Federalists believed that national independence should be abolished in favour of a 
supranational form of government. Some federalists proposed a constitutional revolution 
initiated by political elites. This revolution should lead to the establishment of formal 
rules (constitution) to be accepted by all countries (Pentland 1975: 12). Other federalists 
argued on a more bottom-up approach on which a federal union would be built on a 
popular movement that pressures the elites to share (or transfer) power with a higher 
                                                          
15
 See Hinsley, 1963. 
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authority (Spinelli and Rossi, 1944), yet other so called “incremental” or “functional“ 
federalists defend the idea that political integration is a result of a gradual process of 
mutual adaptation of national institutions. This approach of gradual integration is close 
to neofunctionalism (see below), and is often associated with Jean Monnet. This view 
gained popularity amongst federalists with the failure of the European Defence 
Community (EDC) and the European Political Community in 1954. For all federalists 
however, integration is a constitutional process which is established by formal rules and 
agreed among political elites. Federalism received great criticism from functionalists due 
to its emphasis on formal political and constitutional change, not recognizing that the 
growing cooperation in specific fields out of political oversight (economic, social and 
technological) could trigger political integration (Spinelli, 1966: 11).  
 
As a theoretical approach, federalism lacks descriptive and interpretative power. It 
concentrates on the end product instead of the process which leads to integration. It has 
been interested in the design of the federal institution instead of trying to understand the 
dynamics of the integration process, meaning that in the federalist approach there is no 
clear understanding of the antecedent conditions or causal factors that contribute to 
integration (Haas, 1970: 624). 
 
Functionalism 
 
Functionalism, as developed by David Mitrany in the 1930´s, is intellectually based on 
the classical liberal economic philosophy of the 19th Century (Norman Angell, Hobhause 
and Laski). It argues that in an interdependent world states are unable to provide 
essential services to their citizens, and therefore they would have to rely on international 
(functional) organizations. These organizations would naturally undermine the traditional 
Westphalian state. These organizations would also win the allegiance of domestic 
societies and replace the balance of power. In this new system proposed by 
functionalists the units are non-territorial, functional and technocratic. (Mitrany, 1975) 
According to Groom and Taylor (1975: 1), functionalists, like their federalist 
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counterparts, do not present a theory of integration but a formula for international 
organization.  
 
Most criticism to functionalism reflected its apolitical and mere technocratic nature. It 
relies on technical and economic matters to solve political problems, however these 
issues are not always non-controversial and are also subject to cultural and political 
conflict (Haas, 1964: 11-13; Claude, 1956: 387). Another critique is that functionalism 
ignores the significance of political boundaries, and it is naïve to believe that the 
performance of international organizations will lead people to abandon their loyalty to 
the State (Morgenthau, 1948: 335). Federalists also criticised functionalism for the lack 
of democratic oversight. According to federalists the idea of a “government by experts”, 
ruled by technocrats would be undemocratic and would mainly lack accountability to the 
generation and representation of interests (Sewell, 1966: 42; Mayall, 1975: 254). 
 
Transactionalism 
 
Developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues at Princeton in the 1950´s, 
transactionalism defends the idea that integration is a process of cultural assimilation 
which leads to the development of “security communities” where war would be no 
longer considered feasible due to linkages of mutual trust and identification among 
peoples. Integration as a development of security communities draws into Deutsch´s 
notion that processes of social-psychological learning are trigged by international 
transactions (such as communication, migration, military collaboration, etc.) and 
produces common identities and trust among social actors. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 
29) 
 
According to the transactionalists’ view, integration has two dimensions. Firstly, it is a 
process of social integration which would lead to the development of pluralistic security 
communities. In those communities international relations would be defined according to 
feelings of “we-ness” and “dependable expectations of peaceful change”, however 
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states would still maintain their power and independence (Deutsch, 1969: 122; van 
Wagenen, 1965). Secondly, integration is a process of political integration. In this sense 
political elites can decide to build common (supranational) institutions once a pluralistic 
security community is established. In the transnactionalist view the objective of 
integration is not the development of supranational institutions. Integration was first and 
foremost seen as an assimilation of common social standards, loyalties and cultural 
characteristics which lead to deeper political integration. (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6; 
Deutsch, 1969: 122). Deutsch and his colleagues find that the creation of a community 
depends more on the development of mutual sympathy, trust, loyalties (we-feeling), 
mutual responsiveness and value systems than on formal structures of joint decision-
making and geopolitical factors (such as a common external threat) (Deutsch et al., 
1957). Transactionalism gained support mainly due to its scientific character. Integration 
is viewed as a quantitative concept that could be measured by a statistical tool called 
the “index of relative acceptance”. Also, the idea of a state managing its international 
relations without giving up their sovereignty was well received by policymakers and 
scholars (Pentland, 1975: 13).  
 
The critique received by transactionalism was mainly due to its failure to specify the 
theoretical relationship between both transaction flows and social assimilation and 
political change. The causal relationship between social assimilation and political 
change is not specified (among the critics: Fisher 1969; Haas, 1970; Hoffmann 1963; 
Inglehart, 1968; Nye, 1968). According to Puchala (1970: 762), transaction flows may 
only reflect regional integration and not cause it, while contrary to this transaction flows 
may be caused by integration.  
 
2.1.2 Neofunctionalism 
  
As the first comprehensive theory of regional integration developed by Ernst Haas and 
others in the 1960´s, neofunctionalism aims to offer a systematic predictive theory of 
international political integration. The main focus of this theory rests on the relationship 
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between economic and political integration. Neofunctionalism observes that in the first 
moment integration in economic areas generate problems. These problems are related 
to the increase of trade and transactions across borders. While governments are unable 
to solve those problems they need to create a supranational bureaucracy to deal with 
them. The premise of neofunctionalism is that “integration in economic and functional 
sectors will lead to pressure for political integration due to ‘spillovers’ and ‘unintended 
consequences’ that occur when states discover that integration in one functional area 
impacts upon their interdependent activities in other related areas” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 90).  
 
The neofunctionalist view of integration is therefore an incremental and spontaneous 
process by which integration in one area creates pressures to integrate in contiguous 
areas. In this sense, “spillover” refers to a process when the initial drive for integration 
triggers endogenous economic and political dynamics which are essential to further 
integration. In Haas´s words (1961: 396): “earlier decisions … spill over into new 
functional contexts, involve more and more people, and call for more and more inter-
bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favour of later 
decisions, meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow out of 
the earlier compromises”. Neofunctionalists differentiate between several types of 
spillover. The functional spillover refers to the problems originated by the economic 
integration in some sectors that can only be solved with the further integration of other, 
related sectors. The political spillover happens when economic integration starts to 
influence the political aspirations of some societal groups in states that are part of the 
integration process. Those actors recognize that their interest cannot be completely 
represented at the national level, and therefore they organize across borders with 
others with the same interest. The cultivated spillover refers to the integrative incentives 
promoted by supranational institutions. Those incentives increase the pace and areas of 
integration. Supranational actors represent the general interest, advance impartial 
compromise proposals, and upgrade common interests. For neofunctionalists, 
supranational institutions leave controversial issues aside and focus on the issues that 
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could be agreed. Neofuntionalists also defend the idea that integration can follow a non-
linear path. The concepts of “spill around”, “buildup”, “retrenchment” and “spill back” 
developed by Schmitter (1970) in his seminal article on the development of a general 
theory of integration, clarifies the view that integration can stagnate or even recede.  
 
One of the flaws of this theory is that it gives too much attention to the background 
conditions for integration limiting its scope. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006: 96) explains, 
neofunctionalism was designed to explain integration “among a regional grouping of 
liberal democratic polities with advanced industrial economies that also found 
themselves closely allied in security terms”. This limited scope reduced the applicability 
of the theory to other parts of the world (see also Øhrgaard, 2004: 36 - 41; Rosamond, 
2000; Andreatta, 2005: 20 – 22; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). 
 
Due to its focus on “low politics”, neofunctionalists relegate foreign policy to a secondary 
position. According to neofunctionalist logic, the EU Foreign Policy is the result of 
economic and social integration spilling over into the political sphere. In this sense they 
see the failures of EDC and the Fouchet Plan as a result of not waiting for the economic 
and social integration be completed and to spillover into the political dimension. They 
see the EU Foreign Policy as being based on the impulse provided by non-state actors 
(Commission, Council Secretariat) and as a functional and political spillover. However, 
the developments in the EPC during the 1970´s seem to contrast with the 
neofunctionalist view. In the 1970’s there was no Secretariat responsible for the EPC. 
The role of the EC in EPC affairs was also very limited, with very little influence of EC 
issues in the EPC meetings. Also, the main drive of economic integration only occurred 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s. This may show that other actors outside the integration 
process enhance the prospects of political integration. Actors from outside the region 
pressure the region to negotiate as a single partner instead of as each individual 
member state (the process known as ‘externalization’). It can also mean that the pure 
functional logic is unable to grasp how the changing norms, preferences and values of 
transgovernmental actors influence the process of political integration. It is also 
52 
 
important to highlight that the influence of other actors (the Commission in a higher and 
the High Representative to a lesser extent) in the foreign and defence policy is very 
weak. Member states have been very careful in organizing the EU Foreign Policy pillar 
in a strict intergovernmental fashion. Even though this strict intergovernmental 
organization sacrifices the political outcomes, it guarantees national control over foreign 
policy and defence issues. Nevertheless, the inter-pillar structure present until the 
Lisbon Treaty provided a clear break to the influence of the EC in the political issues. 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 330-332; Andreatta, 2005: 22)  Another critique is 
that in most cases the implicit neofunctionalist divide between supranationalism vs. 
intergovernmentalism poses a difficulty to understand the EPC/CFSP as a part of the 
integration process since no supranational institution which would have control over the 
member states foreign policies has emerged, and nor has the CFSP led to the 
emergence of a political community according to Haas definition (Haas, 1958: 5). In this 
sense the neofunctionalist view of European political integration fails to separate the 
processes that characterise the integration from the institutional framework and the 
outcome (Jørgensen, 1997; Øhrgaard, 1997; 2004: 36).  
 
2.1.3 Intergovernmentalism 
 
Intergovernmentalism was developed first of all as a critique to neofunctionalism. 
Drawing from the rationalist intellectual tradition, intergovernmentalists based their 
critique on two key assertions. Firstly they reaffirmed the importance and dominance of 
the national governments on the integration process, which was against the 
neofunctionalist view that non-state actors would provide the drive for integration. 
Secondly they rejected the notion of spillover. For them the integration is a result of 
decisions taken exclusively by states that calculate the likely results of alternative 
arrangements. Therefore those arrangements that are judged not to fit the interests of 
the national state will not be celebrated. For intergovenmentalists the cause and timing 
of integration relies only on the member states (Hoffmann, 1963; 1964; 1965; 1966 and 
1982; Ginsberg, 1999; Scully, 2006).  
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The strongest critiques of intergovernmentalism were on the role of spillover and the 
neofucntionalists’ failure to observe the wider context (both domestic and international) 
where the integration takes place. According to intergovernmentalists’, states suffer 
from different external pressures and each calculates how to answer those challenges 
differently. Also, in the domestic realm neofunctionalists fails to recognize the effects of 
political divergence on integration. For instance, the French positions during de Gaulle’s 
administration demonstrate that sometimes the empowered groups or individuals of 
democratic societies may not share the same views of elites in other member-states. 
(Hoffmann, 1966). We can see that neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism diverge 
on the role of supranational institutions versus state interest and that neofunctionalists’ 
view integration as a gradual process of exchanges among different actors, while 
intergovernemtalists’ view integration as a bargain among executives of member-states 
that results in treaties. Also, while for neofunctionalists the whole idea of European 
integration is about building a new political community, intergovernemtalists observe it 
as an international regime designed to reduce transaction costs among member-states. 
(Hoffmann, 1966; Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998) 
 
The debate of neofunctionalism - intergovernmentalism can be translated into the 
question of whether supranational institutions are capable of pushing their own agenda 
or whether they are exclusively developed to serve the interests of the nation-states and 
would cease to exist when states so decide. This debate between “supranationalists” 
and “intergovernmentalists” still represents the main divide in European Studies. The 
same discussion about the causal significance of international institutions takes place in 
the wider IR field between neoliberals and neorealists. (Mearshimer, 1995; Keohane, 
1989; Young, 1986; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006)    
 
Realist intergovenmentalism 
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This branch of intergovernmentalism draws from the classic realist tradition of Carr and 
Morgenthau. They seek to clarify the relationship between international cooperation and 
national security interests. They see the EU as a forum in which governments get 
together from time to time to discuss new contracts and enhance their interests and 
power.  
 
One version of realist intergovernmentalism sees the integration in Europe as a natural 
response to intra-European geopolitical concerns, like the reintegration of West 
Germany. For them, the stimulus behind integration is the guarantee against new armed 
conflicts among European states. Some see integration as a “soft hegemony strategy” 
(Pedersen, 1998), or a way of “binding” emerging regional powers (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
and Verdier, 2005). A second version views integration as a direct result of the bipolar 
conflict. For those the integration is viewed in terms of “a western alliance against the 
Soviet threat,” and this could only be developed with the “protective mantle” of the 
“shadow cast by the superpowers” without the fear that the advantage of one would be 
translated by the use of force against the others (Grieco, 1995, Mearshimer, 1990; 
Waltz, 1986). In Pijpers (1991: 31) words: “[European political integration is]… not a 
new phenomenon… but an updated version of old-style alliance diplomacy … It is 
difficult to discover original aspects of EU approaches to world politics. An idealized EU 
should be avoided and (CFSP) should be put into the framework of realpolitik”. 
 
Realist intergovernmentalism bases its view on the notion of state rationality and argues 
that states have fixed preferences for wealth, security and power. Therefore all states’ 
actions are rationally directed to achieve clearly ordered objectives. Also, for the realist 
intergovernmentalists the European integration would fade in the absence of a powerful 
external threat and a bipolar international structure. 
 
The realist intergovernmentalist argument was heavily hit by the developments in the 
EU in the aftermath of the Cold War. They foresaw the debacle of the European political 
project with the end of the East-West divide, however with the end of bipolarity the EU 
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developed new political structures, including a Defence component (CFSP/ESDP). 
Even in the absence of a clearly defined external threat the EU continues to strengthen 
its political and military tools. Therefore, according to Ginsberg (1999: 441) the realist 
intergovernmentalist argument lacks the explanatory power required for it to be 
considered consistent enough to analyse the European political integration.    
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism also argues that the integration is controlled by States. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism observes that States preferences are translated into 
Treaties, and the negotiations among States are dominated by national governments 
and based on national interest. There are three main characteristics that distinguish 
liberal intergovenmentalism from rational intergovernmentalism. First is the idea that 
national interests are defined primarily by domestic economic factors and by national 
leaders seeking economic advantage, meaning that they recognize the importance of 
domestic politics in the development of States preferences. Secondly, they see 
international institutions as necessary for international cooperation, while thirdly they 
view integration as a result of economic interdependence and not as a product of 
geopolitical concerns, thus playing down the influence of international politics and 
systemic change on interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1998: 18; Ginsberg, 1999; Scully, 
2006). 
 
Two general assumptions drawn from IR-rationalist institutionalism guide liberal 
intergovenmentalists: firstly that states are rational actors that aim to maximize their 
individual utility by calculating the utility of alternative courses of action and selecting the 
one that gives maximal utility in regard to other actors’ preferences and actions. That 
means that international institutions will exist for as long as states perceive them as 
useful to converge preferences in order to achieve self-interested goals (institutional 
cooperation > unilateral action). Secondly, it sees states as unitary actors which act 
exclusively and with a single voice through its executive in international negotiations. In 
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this sense governments pursue stable interests during the negotiations (Milward, 1992; 
Mattli, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998; Scully, 2006).  
 
One of the most insightful views on liberal intergovernmentalis is proposed by Andrew 
Moravcsik. Moravcsik understands European integration as an intergovernmental 
regime developed to reduce negative economic externalities caused by changes in the 
global economic sphere through negotiated policy coordination. He argues that IR-
Theories have a great potential to analyse European integration and aims to combine 
the approaches of IR with those of European Studies. He develops an elegant three 
stage model: national preference formation (how domestic preferences combine with 
international interdependence to produce foreign policy outcomes); inter-state 
bargaining (national executives as exclusive actors); and institutional choice (states 
create institutions to reduce transaction costs and to embed “credible commitments,” 
thereby overcoming problems of monitoring and enforcement and enhancing credibility 
of inter-state bargains). With his insight Moravcsik was able to account for the changes 
of state preferences over time and across issue areas. This was the biggest contribution 
of Moravcsik’s approach. He also explained the institutional design better when he 
recognized that institutions are not merely a reflex of great power alliances but are 
developed due to the need to enhance the credibility of inter-state bargains. However, 
with his focus on institutions Moravcsik insists that States are the main actors in the 
integration. He sees supranational institutions as useless because they do not provide 
enough incentives for successful bargaining. Successful bargaining depends of the 
leadership and incentives of national states and not of supranational institutions. He 
also denies the idea of integration developing through unintended consequences. In his 
account governments have full control of the integration process and are completely 
able to predict its implications. (Moravcsik, 1998; Scully, 2006; Mattli, 1999) 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalisms main innovation rests on the use of domestic preference 
formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice theories to explain European 
integration. Its critics argue that even tough liberal institutionalism offers a good starting 
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point to observe how states behave during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), and 
especially in the EPC/CFSP formal decision-making rules it fails to grasp the smaller, 
day-to-day functioning of the EU Foreign Policy which some argue set the motion for 
formal treaty bargains (Smith, 2003: 64; Hix, 2005; Rosamond, 2000). The IGCs are the 
main locus for intergovernmental bargaining, but there is some evidence that 
governments are not the only players in intergovernmental negotiations (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 331; Beach, 2005). According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 
(2008), the EU institutions play a major role in reducing bargaining costs and 
coordination problems while pushing forward their own agenda and providing 
institutional leadership to the CFSP far beyond the lowest common denominator 
bargaining position which is presumably practiced by governments. Another critique is 
that liberal intergovernmentalism is strongly biased to economic issues, recognizing that 
government preferences are shaped exclusively according by economic concerns. To 
address this criticism, Moravcsik (1998: 486) argues that political integration may 
sometimes not be driven by economic interdependence but by broader strategic or 
ideological issues. In this sense he sees the EPC/CFSP as a process pushed by 
governments when domestic constraints are weak. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 192)  
 
2.1.4 Delegation and agency 
 
In recent years many studies in European integration aimed to answer the question of 
why political leaders in Europe have been keen to delegate substantial prerogatives to 
EU institutions like the ECJ, ECB, and, to a different extent, the High Representative for 
the CFSP (HR/CFSP). (Scully, 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008) This 
question was accompanied by two other related questions: 1. How far is the 
independence of those agents related to their principals? and 2. What is the role of 
those agents in further processes of political formulation? (Pollack, 1997; Hawkins, 
Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006)  
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According to Pollack (2003: 142), the delegation of power is primarily motivated “to 
lower the transaction costs of policy-making, in particular by allowing member 
governments to credibly commit themselves to international agreements and to benefit 
from the policy-relevant expertise provided by supranational actors”. He identifies four 
reasons why delegation occurs. Firstly, agents are responsible for monitoring 
compliance with existing agreements by acting as independent referees and providing a 
shield against cheating and defection. Secondly, the institutions are important for 
solving problems of “incomplete contracting”, meaning that it leaves the institutions with 
powers to proceed within areas when no specific decision was made, for instance the 
Commission to produce secondary legislation and the ECJ to produce law. Thirdly, 
Pollack observes that agents have more influence when principals do not have a deep 
knowledge on the subject and are biased. In this sense, besides their monitoring 
functions institutions have a more direct role in areas where governments are unfit to 
control due to a lack of expertise. Fourthly, he argues that the agenda-setting power 
might be delegated to agents in order to avoid problems of legislative instability. 
Nevertheless, Pollack highlights the fact that governments do not delegate excessive 
powers to agents without creating control mechanisms. (Pollack, 2003; Scully, 2006) 
 
Even though principal-agent frameworks are powerful and persuasive we can point to 
some limitations. As recognized by Pollack (2003), principal-agent frameworks are 
difficult to test empirically, and the next step in this area will be to test their claims 
rigorously against concurrent explanations. Another criticism is that principal-agent 
approaches lack the ability to articulate why governments delegate powers in some 
areas and not do delegate in other areas with any precision. (Scully, 2006: 27) 
 
2.1.5 New institutionalism 
 
New institutionalism tries to explain integration by using general theories of domestic 
and international institutions. As observed by Jupille and Caporaso (1999: 430), it 
transcends the divide between comparative politics and international relations, thus 
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improving the scholarship on EU integration and making it more integral of the discipline 
of political science. It is generally divided into three types: rational-choice 
institutionalism; historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The greatest 
innovation presented by new institutionalism is that it not only tries to explain the origins 
and design of EU institutions, but it also sees EU institutions as being independent or 
intervening variables that influence state strategies and goals (Jupile and Caporaso, 
1999: 436-437).  
 
Rational-choice institutionalism  
 
Rational-choice institutionalism views states as unitary and rational actors concerned 
with credible commitments. Like liberal intergovernmentalists, rational-choice 
institutionalists argue that states create institutions in order to benefit from their 
functions. Accordingly, the main functions of institutions are the reduction of transaction 
costs, monitoring and enforcement, and solving problems of contracting. For rational-
choice institutionalism preference formation is exogenous to the institution, which 
means that institutions provide constraints and opportunity structures for actors to 
perform their goals but do not shape them. However, it is wrong to view institutions as 
only a reflex of national preferences and power. They are fundamental to distributing 
decision-making power among actors. In this sense, agenda-setting and veto power in 
institutional procedures are seen as important tools of institutional influence. (Tsebelis 
and Garrett, 1996: 294; Pollack, 2001) 
 
 The main strength of rational-choice institutionalism is that it accounts for a careful 
empirical study of EU institutions and their interactions (Council, Commission, 
Parliament and Court). The critics of rational-choice institutionalism attack the 
assumption of exogenous preference formation. They hold the view that member-states 
do not develop their preferences isolated from each other but that those preferences 
evolve and are negotiated through interstate bargaining and constant interaction among 
participants. Another criticism is that it focuses the attention exclusively on formal 
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institutions instead of also taking the informal, transnational policy networks into 
account. (Sandholtz, 1996; Pollack, 2001) 
 
 
 
Historical institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism starts with the observation that institutions influence decisions 
of states in ways that are undesired or unintended by their creators. It recognizes the 
basic premise of intergovernmentalism that states are the main actors in international 
politics who decide when and how to create international institutions, meaning that 
institutions are developed by states in order to serve their collective interests. One key 
assumption to historical institutionalism is the difficulty to change or reform institutions 
over time due to its “increasing returns” and “lock-in effects” which prevent states from 
stepping back on their previous commitments. Some analysts even feel that state 
preferences could be shaped by prior institutional choices. (Jupile and Caporaso, 1999: 
438; Pierson, 2000; Pollack, 1996) Historical institutionalism argues that institutions 
encourage positive feedback processes in such a way that a change of rules and 
defection becomes very unattractive over time. This happens due to two factors: firstly, 
the complexity of institutional decision-rules (which are mostly driven by unanimity) is a 
legal inducement to avoid reform, and secondly, actors learn from the new rules set by 
the institution and calculate their actions based on the fact that those rules will be 
maintained, therefore increasing the costs of policy change. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 
2006: 198; Rosamond, 2000: 116) 
 
Those positive feedback processes induced by institutions develop a dynamic called 
“path-dependence,” which means that “once a country or region has started down a 
track the costs of reversal may be high and will tend to increase over time” (Pierson, 
2000: 252). In this sense the effect of path-dependence is that decisions taken in the 
past have a preponderant influence over (and even shape) decisions taken in the 
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present. Due to high costs of change the first choice towards a “path” will constrain later 
choices, or “path” changes. This idea is highly compatible with the concept of bounded 
rationality. According to the concept of bounded rationality actors have certain self-
serving goals when they decide to join the institution (EU Foreign Policy for instance), 
but they do not have all of the information needed to make optimal decisions or are too 
overwhelmed with information to process it all. In this sense actors are unable to predict 
future outcomes of the institution precisely, and therefore they become hostages to 
future institutional developments (March and Olson, 1989: 10; Pierson, 1996; Smith, 
2003: 31; 2000). 
 
Even though historical institutionalism offers a good account for why previous decisions 
constrain present actions it lacks the understanding of why and how institutions were 
created. It also does not shed light on why and how institutions change over time. Due 
to its germane focus on endogenous reasons for institutional stability and change it is 
unable to observe exogenous sources of preferences. In short, historical institutionalism 
is well suited to analyse the endurance and stability of institutions, but it lacks the 
capacity to explain change. It is also important not to overstate the consequences of 
institutional lock-in because many institutional decisions expire or can be amended by 
qualified majority. (Pollack, 1996: 448) 
   
 
Sociological institutionalism 
 
Sociological institutionalism and constructivism (see below) share a number of core 
premises. For sociological institutionalists the informal rules, norms and shared systems 
of meaning shape actors interests and are fundamental to explaining institutional policy 
outcomes. They also argue that institutions can change not only material incentives but 
also shape the identities, self-images and preferences of actors. As a result actors 
follow the rules because they have internalized the obligations and duties that constitute 
the identity of the institution. In this sense the institutions have not only a regulative role 
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but also a constitutive one, and therefore institutions have a “symbolic guidance 
function” that provides actors with a shelter in a turbulent world and contributes to the 
actors´ sense of who they are and what their interests must be. (Wendt, 1999; Checkel, 
1998: 325; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Rosamond, 2000: 119; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 
130) 
 
Sociological institutionalists argue that there are two main instruments through which 
the constitutive effects of institutions operate. Firstly, actors internalize rules and norms 
which influence how they see themselves and how they define their interests through 
socialization processes. Socialization, as Checkel (2007: 5-6) defines it, is:  
 
“[…] a process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given community. Its 
outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In 
adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a 
logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time 
and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.” 
 
Secondly, actors gain new interests through processes of “social learning” in which 
argumentation, deliberation and persuasion play an important role. (Risse, 2000; 
Checkel, 1998; Aggestam, 2004) In this sense actors interact in the European 
institutions and get in contact with new ideas and arguments. These can change their 
view of an actors´ own role and interests, meaning that actors can alter their behaviour 
based on the influence and interactions with other actors in ways that are not explained 
by material incentives. Therefore they consider actors´ preferences as endogenous as 
opposed to rationalist views that preferences are exogenous and fixed.   
 
In the European political integration this process of socialization was strengthened by 
what Allen (1998: 54) called “Brusselization,” which in his words means: “a gradual 
transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from the 
national capitals to Brussels”. With the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 the working 
groups meetings that were organized sporadically in the capital of the member holding 
the Presidency started to meet more constantly and moved to the rooms of the 
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Secretariat based in Brussels, thus enhancing socialization among diplomats (a more 
detailed explanation of the European political integration will be given in the next 
chapter) (Regelsberger, 1997; Øhrgaard, 2004; Allen, 1998).  
 
The concept of “Europeanization” (or “EU-ization”) also represents the interaction 
between national and European levels on foreign policy. (Radaelli, 2006; Aggestam, 
2004) As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 142) presents, Europeanization refers to 
four interrelated processes known as national adaptation, meaning that when states 
change their national policy-making instruments, policies, values and identity to adapt to 
the EU level, the national projection of each states national foreign policy objectives to 
the EU level increasingly pursues foreign policy on the EU level and the export of EU 
structures and values to third party countries/regions. Combined with the concepts of 
Socialization and Brusselization, this concept helps us to understand how national 
actors´ gradually change their world view, values and norms, role conception and 
identity, and those concepts also shed light on the incentives of member-states to 
participate in the EPC/CFSP/ESDP by demonstrating that through the EU foreign policy 
member-states with no power (or with historical constraints) to influence or act in a 
country or issue can operate. This process of Europeanization can also be understood 
as a process of the modernization of foreign policy once member-states are forced or 
allowed to expand and update their foreign policy toward new issues/parts of the world. 
(Tonra, 1997: 190; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 144)   
   
Another important concept for sociological institutionalists is the “logic of 
appropriateness”. This concept runs against the “logic of consequences16” and 
underlines norms and identities as the basis of action. According to March and Olson 
(1998: 11): 
 
                                                          
16
 Logic of consequences derives from the realist/intergovernmentalist tradition that actors act as rational utility 
maximizers on the basis of stable, consistent and exogenously determined preferences. According to March and 
Olson (1998: 11), the main problem with the logic of consequences is that it seems to ignore the role of identities, 
rules and institutions in shaping human behaviour.   
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“Within the tradition of a logic of appropriateness, actions are seen as ‘rule-based’. 
Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate identities to particular 
situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities 
between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and 
situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of 
that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with 
identities more than with interests; and with the selection of rules more than with 
individual rational expectations.” 
 
In this sense March and Olson (1989: 23) argue that decisions driven by a logic of 
appropriateness are made with reference of three distinct questions: What kind of 
situation is this? Who am I? How appropriate are different actions for me in this 
situation? According to these questions and their corresponding answers, actors will 
behave according to what they feel is the most appropriate course of action given their 
socially defined roles. (March and Olson, 1989) 
 
In the foreign policy domain we observe that through processes of socialization political 
actors tend to act in accordance to this logic of appropriateness. This means that those 
actors are steered by what is appropriate in terms of their institutional roles. 
Expectations about the outcomes of their own actions and other’s opinions also play a 
role in the actor’s behaviour. (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 132; Smith, 2003; Hyde-
Price, 2004) In Tonra´s (2001: 12) words: 
 
“[consultation reflex in foreign policy issues suggests]… that the policy-makers see 
themselves not as emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters. They are, 
in effect, seeking to internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as to thereby see 
that their own positions are at least complementary.” 
 
In sum, the sociological-institutionalist contribution to European Studies and IR Theory 
is represented by the approaches that focus on ideas and discourses. According to 
Rosamond (2000: 120): “[ideas and discourses] are treated as cognitive institutions that 
shape the ‘boundaries of the possible’ for actors in the European context… [in this 
sense] … discourses should be seen as institutions in their own right insofar as they can 
guide political action by denoting appropriate or plausible behaviour in the light of an 
agreed environment.”  
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Discourse analysis emphasizes the need to focus on the language used in social life. 
There is no meaning residing outside language. Even if this meaning would exist, it 
would be impossible to study the meaning beyond language. Discourse analysis 
observes how language both constrains and constructs social processes, meaning how 
language constrains the choices of agents and how it generates agents and social 
processes (Larsen, 2004; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 399). Studies on how national 
foreign policies are influenced by the EU compose an important feature of the literature 
on sociological institutionalism (Tonra, 2001). Sociological institutionalism also has a 
research agenda that focuses on how communication and argumentation influence 
views, consensus building, and policy-making. These research points have gained 
importance in the study of European political integration. They draw from Habermas´ 
theories of communicative action and point out the reasons for actions. They observe 
that actors are filled with intersubjective understandings of procedures and policy-
making processes and that those issues and understandings guide actors’ behaviour 
(Diez, 2001; Risse, 1996; Müller, 2004: 425; Jørgensen, 2004: 12). 
 
2.1.6 Comparative Politics 
 
The scholars of Comparative Politics are radical in their rejection of International 
Relations Theory as an analytical tool to the study of the EU. They argue that the EU 
institutional structure is more similar to a modern (or postmodern) state than to an 
international regime or international organization. Therefore general understandings of 
the main processes in domestic political systems should be applied to the study of the 
EU. (Hix, 2005) 
 
Some consider/understand the EU as a quasi-federal polity and therefore aim to 
compare the EU political system with other federal states. Others argue that the EU 
cannot be studied in accordance to the federal systems typology because it has no 
clear division of authority between a central government and its constituents units, and 
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therefore the study of the EU should be carried out according to the study of 
government and policy-making in domestic political systems in general and not 
specifically in federal systems. (Hix, 2005) 
 
Comparative politics scholars have been criticized for overstating the state-like nature of 
the EU and for ignoring the importance of member-state governments in EU decision-
making. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 330; Hurrel and Menon, 1996) 
 
2.1.7 Multilevel Governance 
 
Multilevel governance also sees the EU as a political system, but in contrast to the 
comparativist perspective they argue that the EU is not similar to a domestic political 
system (whether unitary, federal or quasi-federal). For them, the EU is more equivalent 
to a new form of polity: intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational. 
(Smith, 1998; 2004). They aim to combine both approaches of IR theory and public 
policy to explain the EU politics.  
 
The basic assumption of Multilevel Governance is that sovereignty of the member-
states has been eroded in different forms. Interdependence externally, collective 
decision making regionally, delegation to supranational agencies, and the reallocation of 
power subnationally all disperses decision-making power across different locations. This 
main argument of Multilevel Governance that the state power is eroded by the 
dispersion of authority toward supranational, regional and local powers distinguishes 
multilevel governance from intergovernmentalist approaches (Marks, Hooghe and 
Blank, 1996: 358). Nevertheless, the protagonists of Multilevel Governance argue that 
while supranational institutions play an important role in many policy areas state 
executives are still in control of many others. However, multilevel governance helps to 
avoid a strict intergovernmental approach on EU political integration, which on the one 
hand may shed light on high-level negotiations about formal treaty reforms like the 
Integovernmental Conferences (IGC), but on the other hand it is not able to explain 
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normal day-to-day policy outcomes and how norms reorient member states toward 
“problem-solving” instead of bargaining (Smith, 2004: 741). The result is the emergence 
of a complex and pluralistic system neither entirely under the control of member-states 
nor fully understandable under the logic of supranational entrepreneurship (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, 2008: 31). There have been some efforts to combine multilevel 
governance with other approaches (see Smith, 1998; Smith 2004 and Marks, Hooghe 
and Blank, 1996). Those efforts aim to build a consistent body of theory to explain 
regional integration, yet nevertheless multilevel governance provides a good descriptive 
approach to the EU political system. They draw from rational institutionalism to explain 
delegation to supranational institutions and explain how collective decision-making 
affects the control of member-states to the process of integration. Multilevel governance 
also invokes federalists to explain how authority is diffused among multiple tiers. They 
also draw from the public policy analysis on how governance works, not only at the 
national level but also at the interaction between national and international areas. 
Finally, multilevel governance is also based in constructivist premises, especially when 
observing the normative effects of European institutions. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 
332; Rosamond, 2000: 173). 
 
Most authors on multilevel governance focus on the specific practise of the coordinating 
activities of different levels: regional, supranational, transnational, local and national. 
They study how this interaction works at different levels of the decision-making process, 
and therefore they typify EU decision-making as “policy network”, “expert committees”, 
“regulatory agencies”, “open methods of coordination” and “directly deliberative 
polyarchy”. (Rosamond, 2000; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 333; Keukeleire, 2006: 1-2; 
Juncos and Reynolds, 2007) For many scholars, Multilavel Governance took the 
position of neofunctionalism as the main contester of intergovernmentalism. We can 
observe several links between multilevel governance and neofunctionalism. Firstly, as 
neofunctionalism, multilevel governance agrees that supranational institutions and 
transnational policy networks play an important role in regional integration. Secondly, 
multilevel governance holds that day-to-day policy outputs sometimes represent 
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important feedback loops enhancing/decreasing integration, meaning that the way in 
which policy is made and its impact have an important effect on the shape of the 
institutional framework and change the overall structure of the European governance 
system. (George, 2004: 112; Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini, 2007)              
 
Multilevel governance aims to explain how common general interests are defined, 
prioritized, and translated into institutionalized behaviours at both the EU and domestic 
levels and produces concrete policy actions. According to Smith (2004: 742), the key 
question to understand why political integration in Europe is more advanced than in 
other regions is about “how the EU has managed to both institutionalize and 
Europeanize its multilevel governance of foreign policy while still respecting national 
sovereignty.…  Answering this question could also shed light on why most other 
regional organizations have failed in this goal.” In this sense, multilevel governance can 
provide the theoretical tools to answer this question. According to Webber (2004: 4), 
governance is defined as: 
 
“… co-ordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate 
authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors, formal and informal 
arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed 
toward particular policy outcomes.” 
 
Therefore we can understand multilevel governance as “the sharing of this authority 
across an institutionalized, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of 
unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources.” (Smith, 2004: 743). 
In this regard the European multilevel governance of foreign policy is argued to impact 
on four elements. Firstly it increased the coherence of policy-making and leads to a 
rationalization of the policy process. Secondly, it is legally binding on member-states 
with the inclusion of some compliance mechanisms. Thirdly, it comprises some 
authoritative decision-making rules, applying Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on some 
occasions (even though it is almost not used, the QMV presents a threat of a potentially 
embarrassing vote and may stimulate member states to reach a consensus). Finally, it 
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presents a greater degree of autonomy of EC organizational actors in European foreign 
policy. (Smith, 1998; Smith, 2004)  
 
 
The weaknesses of multilevel governance approaches are mainly related to the difficulty 
to clearly grasp the complex administrative system of the EU. Such a complex 
administrative system that ranges across multiple and intersecting spaces and 
jurisdictions permits optimal flexibility but presents high transaction costs of coordinating 
such a complex system (reducing the impact of negative externalities of one policy 
domain into the other). Also, problems of democratic legitimacy or “governing in the 
shadow” pose a problem to multilevel governance (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; 
Scharpf, 1997). Multilevel governance represents a move away from the “grand 
theories” of integration in order to build middle-range theories of specific policy 
processes and phenomena (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Scharpf, 1997). Multilevel 
governance also provides the change of theorising beyond Europe, solving the n=1 
problem present in most studies of European integration (Tonra and Christiansen, 
2004).   
 
2.2 International Relations and the EU 
 
Theoretical works on international relations are highly heterogeneous. The field is 
divided according to the paradigmatic lines of realism, which is pessimistic in relation to 
the cooperation and progress in political relationships, and liberalism, which is more 
optimistic in its view of cooperation and the avoidance of conflict. There are also many 
alternative approaches which refuse the realist and liberal views about the centrality of 
states in international relations or their mostly rationalist ontology. In this section we will 
present how integration is viewed by (neo)realists, (neo)liberals, reflectivists and 
constructivists. 
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According to Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008), there are two main axes of division in IR 
theory. The first one distinguishes critical from problem-solving approaches. Problem-
solving perspectives, according to Robert Cox (1986: 208-210), “takes the world as it 
finds it, with the prevailing social and political power relationships and the institutions 
into which they are organized as the given framework of action”, while critical theories 
“allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the 
prevailing order; but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible 
transformations of the existing order.” The second division is the one between formal 
mathematical and interpretative approaches. While formalists defend the necessity of 
quantitative methods, interpretativists base their analysis on observation and qualitative 
methods. Another strand of dispute in IR is between positivists’ and subjectivists’ views 
of what constitutes social knowledge. According to Katzenstein and Sil (2008: 111-112): 
“positivists generally gravitate towards a view of social inquiry in which patterns of 
human behaviour are presumed to reflect objective principles, laws, or regularities that 
exist above and beyond the subjective orientations of actors and scholars, and that can 
be deduced, inferred, or falsified through the rigorous application of replicable methods 
and logics across a specified universe of cases.” On the other hand, subjectivism 
recognizes social knowledge as fluid favouring interpretative approaches. This view 
points to the meanings that different actors attach to practices in their social 
environment. Subjectivists generally look for critique and praxis over explanations or 
understandings (Katzenstein and Sil, 2008).  
 
In the last century the mainstream theoretical debate in IR focused on rationalist 
assumptions. Those assumptions are based on a positivist research agenda and 
postulate that, “When faced with several courses of action, people (States) usually do 
what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome (for the national interest)” 
(Elster, 1999: 22, see, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003: 11). Therefore the 
mainstream theoretical debate during the last century focused mostly on the positions of 
(neo)realism in one hand and (neo)liberalism in the other hand (see below). At the 
beginning of the 21st century IR theorizing confronted the mainstream view with a stark 
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contestation of those rationalist models. There is a great distinction between rationalists 
on one side and reflectivists (critical theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory and 
normative theory) on the other, with social constructivists occupying a middle ground17 
(Lapid, 1989; Adler, 1997; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000: 11; Smith, 2000: 34)  
 
Fundamental to the IR theory applied to the EU foreign policy integration process is the 
question of how we can understand the evolution of the EU if not by looking into its 
international dimension. In the literature of international relations, the impact of the 
international system on political integration has been neglected to a second plan. 
Moreover, IR Theory has not been able to grasp the causes for European political 
integration beyond the Cold War (Haas, 1964; Moravcsik, 1998; Hoffmann, 1995). Only 
experts on EU political integration such as Ginsberg (1989; 2001), Weiler (1999), M. E. 
Smith, (1998; 2003; 2004), and Smith (2000) etc. have aimed to explain this 
relationship. Most scholars in IR, especially in the United States like Mearshimer (1990; 
1994), have taken axiomatic, rather radical positions on EU foreign policy with no regard 
to the specialized literature on the EU. In this sense we observe the necessity to study 
the increasing importance of the external face of regional integration processes. This 
external face is represented by the impact of different dimensions of regional integration 
processes (economic, political and military), not only in the immediate neighbourhood 
but also in the international system. Therefore the academic studies of international 
relations should put more emphasis on the external role of regional organizations in the 
centre of the debate, possibly while promoting institutional research combining different 
fields of political science18. Political integration processes have gained international 
weight and helped to shape the external environments of most other actors, thus 
influencing its own international environment. By incorporating the study of the EU into 
                                                          
17
 I am aware that some scholars see it as a mistake to differentiate Constructivism from Rationalism (for a 
discussion, see Hurd, 2008), however I follow Michael Bartnett (2005) and agree that rationalism and 
constructivism are not the same. 
18
 In this sense, see the interesting use of Comparative Politics and International Relations to analyse the European 
integration: (2003) Jupille, J., Caporaso, J., and Checkel, J., “Integrating Institutions: rationalism, constructivism and 
the Study of the European Union, in Comparative Political Studies, 36:7, Sage. 
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its Weltanschauung, IR theory will be able to better understand the processes of 
international (regional) organization, political economy, the impact of domestic politics, 
ethical foreign policy, human rights, conflict prevention/management/resolution, and 
identity, etc. As we will see in this section, the study of the political integration fits into 
the general categories of IR scholarship, be they realism, liberalism, structuralism or 
different kinds of post-positivism (Hill and Smith, 2005). For the purposes of this 
research we will observe the division of IR theory following the lines of rationalism, 
social constructivism and reflectivism. (Smith, 1995; 1996; 1997; 2000; Eilstrup- 
Sangiovanni, 2006; Rosamond, 2000; Hill and Smith, 2005, Tonra and Christiansen, 
2004) 
 
2.2.1 Rationalism 
 
As observed above, this part overlaps with European Studies approaches. In IR Theory 
the mainstream rationalist debate was carried in the 20th Century, mainly between 
realism and liberalism. For most of the century both approaches diverged over their 
understanding of international politics, however since the 1980´s they have started to 
converge considerably. (Smith, 2000: 35; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 8; Kelstrup and 
Williams, 2000) 
 
Realists and liberals share very similar views of the social world. Indeed, in their 
neorealist and neoliberal versions they agree on most premises of what constitutes the 
international environment. Both share the ideas that states are the main actors in the 
system, they act rationally, and anarchy is the major force driving international relations. 
They also share the same methodological individualism to analyse social reality. They 
view international relations through the lens of power as being mechanistic and material 
aggregations of individual states. Both observe a positivist logic and agree on the 
ontology of the social world and on the methods and epistemology for studying it. They 
differ on whether the anarchical nature of the international system can be eased by 
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international institutions and whether sovereignties pursue absolute or relative gains. 
(Smith, 2000: 36; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2004; Andreatta, 2005) 
 
(Neo)Realism 
 
We can observe that the core assumptions of realism are: 1. States are the dominant 
actors and interact under conditions of anarchy; 2. International anarchy is 
characterised by the lack of hierarchy among states which leads them to self-help and 
shapes the states’ behaviour; 3. Survival is the vital interest of the states, therefore it 
needs strong military forces to defend its interests and behave as instrumentally 
rational, unitary actors; 4. In anarchy, politics are dominated by survival, power and 
security and by the fragility of trust and cooperation, while war is always an option; 5. 
International institutions tend to be shaped by conflicting states` interests while only 
marginally affecting cooperation. (Smith, 2000: 35) 
 
According to realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflicts among 
States, therefore even when States share common interests they will avoid cooperation. 
Not even international institutions can mitigate the effects of anarchy, however the 
European integration and the development of European political integration posed a big 
challenge to the way realists see international cooperation (Grieco, 1997: 184). For 
Waltz, integration is an epiphenomenon resulting from States seeking to maximize their 
national power. In Waltz’s view, States will try to maintain their relative position in the 
international system while increasing their security and autonomy (Waltz, 1979: 105). In 
this sense, for many realists including Waltz, European integration is seen as a States 
rational response to maximizing their national interest according to particular systemic 
situations, balancing, and war exhaustion.  
 
To understand integration, realists analyse the interests of European countries in the 
international system on the eve of integration. They see the role of American hegemony 
as a fundamental precondition to European integration. They argue that international 
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cooperation is only possible when one state is capable of imposing order in the 
international anarchic system due to its incontestable power. According to this view, 
when there is an actor with enough power to impose its will over the others there are 
few or no armed conflicts (Gilpin, 1981). Other authors highlight the role of the bipolar 
structure of the international system to explain European integration. They argue that in 
bipolar systems alignments are structurally determined, thus favouring the stability and 
durability of agreements between states. Those structurally determined alignments 
therefore offer a higher degree of cooperation and trust among units forging alliances 
(for instance: NATO, or Warsaw Pact) (Gowa, 1989). On the other hand, multipolar 
systems are less stable and can change over time because alignments are based on 
the choice of multiple options. In this sense, in multipolarity cooperation tends to occur 
very rarely due to the fear that today’s friend will become tomorrow’s enemy 
(Mearshimer, 1990: 46). Those approaches argue that the end of Cold War and the 
decline of American hegemony in Europe would deteriorate the transatlantic ties and 
could put an end to NATO while spurring the Europeans into a more active role in the 
world, or even an attempt to balance the United States. According to realists, a stronger 
Europe would unavoidably weaken the transatlantic ties and could represent a major 
challenge to the United States (Kissinger; 1966: 232; Kaplan, 1996: 29). Besides this, 
for (neo)realists the end of the Cold War would increase concerns over relative gains, 
even among Europeans partners. This problem of relative gains would then represent 
barriers to cooperation even among close allies such as the Europeans (Grieco, 1995; 
Smith, 2000: 40). Also, according to Mearshimer (1995: 82) institutions could not 
overcome this issue of relative gains because they “reflect state calculations of self-
interest based primarily on concerns about relative power, and as a result institutional 
outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not 
have significant independent effects on state behavior. 
 
Other realist approaches focus less on broader systemic conditions and instead 
concentrate on the Western European system instead. Drawing from Morgenthau’s 
(1973: 509) insights, Grieco (1995: 34) argues that the containment of Germany, 
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especially after its unification, was the main drive for European political integration. 
Others argue that the CFSP is better understood as a strong and permanent form of 
alliance. In this sense integration is seen as a dramatic loss of autonomy in order to 
considerably enhance the capacity for mutual control and common capabilities (Snyder, 
1997; Caporaso, 1996). 
 
The (neo)realist claims make sense when we observe the issues of survival or hard 
military power in the EU agenda superficially (like the foreign policy split during the Iraq 
War, the silence over the situation in Chechnya, or the largest states side-lining the 
CFSP in the Iran crisis). In these examples the realist lenses can offer an account for 
the outcome and the inaction of the EU in regard to the international balance of power 
and uneven distribution of capabilities between member states (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 329). However (neo)realist explanations cannot account for the 
density and quality of cooperation within the CFSP. Additionally, they cannot grasp the 
impact of this cooperation on member state’s perceptions of what constitutes their 
national interests. This problem is even bigger when we observe the realists complete 
rejection of institutional impact on national interests. This issue will be addressed by 
neoliberal institutionalists. (Øhrgaard, 2004: 35; Andreatta, 2005: 27)          
 
(Neo)Liberalism 
 
In contrast to realism, liberalism’s core assumptions are that 1. International 
organizations and non-state actors play an important role in some areas but states are 
still central in many other (vital) areas; 2. States are not unitary nor instrumentally 
rational actors due to different views of what constitutes national interest to different 
bureaucracies. Therefore state behaviour is not only determined by international 
anarchy; 3. International anarchy can be transcended by the development of networks 
between states themselves and other types of actors; 4. International politics is not 
entirely determined by the distribution of military capabilities, while economic issues 
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play an important role; 5. Cooperation and international institutions matter and can help 
to ease the effects of international anarchy. (Andreatta, 2005: 24; Smith, 2000: 36) 
 
The liberal paradigm relaxes the question of the actors in international politics, therefore 
allowing other actors than the state to play a role19. Another important feature is that 
liberals are more prone to accept interstate cooperation in the international system than 
realists. Following the division suggested by Andreatta (2005: 28), we divide the liberal 
group of theories into three: republican, commercial and institutional. 
 
Influenced by the Kantian tradition, “republican” liberalism stresses the role of domestic 
regimes in the development of foreign policy. In this sense democracies act differently 
from non-democracies at the international stage due to electoral concerns at home, a 
complex institutional system and an orientation towards the peaceful resolution of 
conflict. Therefore it is argued that democracies do not go to war with each other. In this 
sense, the European integration is to be seen as a consequence of the democratization 
process of Western Europe in the second half of the 20th Century (Olson, 1982; Doyle, 
1983; Hasenclever, 2001; Lipson, 2003). The prominence given to domestic structures 
influenced the development of the intergovenmentalist school (Moravcsik, 1998) in 
European Studies, as can be seen above.  
 
The so called “commercial” tradition on liberalism highlights the importance of the 
International Political Economy as an academic discipline to focus on the economic 
processes in international relations. It argues that the modern societies are attached to 
each other in an unprecedented way due to the growth of transnational economic flows. 
The development of those interdependent societies changed the traditional conception 
of national interest. The high level of complexity and difficulty to control transnational 
interdependence forced the national states to pool political resources in order to create 
                                                          
19
 We are aware of the discussion between neoliberal institutionalists, regime theory, and new liberals on the 
concerns over distribution of information, “functional differentiation”, and treatment of states preferences; 
however for simplification purposes we treat all “liberal” theories in this section. For a detailed discussion on the 
differences among them see Moravcsik, 1997: 536-538, and Keohane, 1990.  
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international institutions that could deal with those new issues. (Keohane and Nye, 
1977; Rosencrane, 1986) The argument borrowed from the functionalist logic seen 
above is that European integration is a by-product of this process due to the dense web 
of transnational economic relations in Europe and the small dimension of the states. 
Foreign policy integration is also viewed as dependent if interdependence creates 
pressures to develop a unified European voice to defend its economic interests. 
(Andreatta, 2005: 30) 
 
The third group of liberal theories observes the importance of the development of 
international institutions, and therefore they are called neoliberal institutionalists. They 
argue that the lack of trust between states living in an anarchical system is the main 
reason for conflicts. Moreover, international institutions can enhance the commonality of 
interests, reduce the number of uncertain variables by increasing information, and 
reinforce the interaction among states in a structured setting, thus reducing uncertainty 
and mistrust in interstate relations. Integration is an option when transaction costs are 
prohibitive and ad hoc institutions are not economical (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and 
Keohane, 1985; Hasenclever, 1997; Martin, 1992). 
 
The Western European cooperation has challenged neorealist assumptions about 
anarchy and relative gains. Even though neoliberals acknowledge the argument about 
states’ fears about relative gains they see that this logic does not apply to Western 
Europe. Most important is the neoliberal argument that the absence of threats of force 
among European partners enhances the prospects of cooperation among the states. 
According to Powell (1993: 229 see Smith, 2000: 41), “If the use of force is no longer an 
issue then a state’s relative loss will not be turned against the state. Relative gains no 
longer matter, and cooperation now becomes feasible.” In this sense Powell explains 
that states’ fear about relative gains cannot account for the difficult negotiations among 
close partners (like Europeans) when those states do not represent a military threat to 
each other. Keohane addresses the issue of differentiating fears about relative gains 
from hard bargaining. He argues that in order to distinguish one from another we must 
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look for evidence of whether one State’s gains are used against its partners in the 
longer term. He observes that in Western Europe this behaviour does not exist.  For 
Keohane, “states evaluate intentions as well as capabilities” (ibid 1993: 276) and they 
see no such “motivation” to use relative gains derived from cooperation against the 
partners in Western Europe. Therefore “concern(s) for relative gains in these 
relationships may be of minor significance”. Nonetheless, neoliberals argue that the 
level of institutionalization also plays a very important role for states to overcome 
obstacles to cooperation. They observe that international institutions do not eliminate 
the condition of international anarchy, meaning that they do not exert hierarchical 
authority over the member states, yet they still offer opportunities and incentives for its 
member states to pursue common interests through cooperation. What is more, 
institutions present ways to alleviate their member’s expectations about other members’ 
behaviour and intentions. (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000: 42)           
 
When analysing the CFSP it is argued that European institutions are useful to solve 
collective action and distributional problems, especially those derived from cooperation 
in foreign policy. (Tams, 1999; Andreatta, 2005) It is observed that the EU can act and 
influence the behaviour of third states and therefore has an impact on the international 
environment. According to Keukeleire and McNaughtan the EU has proved that it can 
influence and act autonomously in the international system (2008: 329): “[…] it was the 
EU and not individual member states (even the most powerful) that played the pivotal 
role in one of the West’s major foreign policy successes of the last decades: the 
sustainable transformation and stabilization of ten Central and Eastern European 
countries and, since the end of the 1990’s, of the Balkan countries […]”. Although most 
neoliberal institutionalists observe the role played by international institutions in 
enhancing cooperation and solving problems of collective action, they do not recognize 
that those institutions influence the interests and preferences of the states. They do 
defend the idea that states are “rational egoists” driven primarily by their own 
exogenously defined self-interest which use institutions only instrumentally in order to 
achieve those interests. (Øhrgaard, 2004: 35; Howorth, 2005; 2007; Mayall, 2005) 
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However some authors have already observed that in the longer term institutions may 
play a role in influencing how states view their interests (Smith, 2004; 2005; 
VanHoonacker, 2005). As Keohane and Nye (1993: 9, 15-16 see Smith, 2000: 52) 
argue:  
 
“The issue is whether states view institutions purely instrumentally – as a means to a 
given ends – or whether they come to redefine their own interest in light of the rules and 
practices of the institutions. We expected that instrumental uses of institutions would 
predominate, as indeed they have. But we also found, […] some interesting instances of 
institutions helping to define state preferences.” 
 
Finally, we can observe that more generally speaking, institutions matter for neoliberals 
for five major reasons: 1. They stimulate cooperation by providing the shadow of the 
future; 2. They encourage issue-linkage between diverse issue areas; 3. They increase 
transparency and enhance the level of information available to the actors; 4. They 
reduce transaction costs; and 5. They increase the amount of gains polled together, 
thus making absolute gains all round more likely. (Smith, 2000: 42-43; Hill and Smith: 
2005; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004)      
 
2.2.2 Reflectivism 
 
Reflectivist approaches share much in common with contructivism (see below), 
therefore some authors consider it a part of (radical or hard) constructivism (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006; Checkel, 2007). We make a distinction here between reflectivism 
and contructivism in order better explain the usefulness of both approaches to 
integration processes and international relations in general.   
 
Reflective approaches (such as critical theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory and 
normative theory), argue that theory is constitutive of the social world. This means that 
the material world only gains meaning through the structure and shared knowledge and 
understandings in which it is rooted. In this sense the social world can only be 
understood through the study of what gives it meani
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language and communication. Despite differences among the diverse reflectivists’ 
approaches they all share the opposition to the rationalists’ positivism and empiricism. 
They also share a rejection to the rationalist focus on the unitary state within a network 
of aggregative power relations. Instead they concentrate on an explanation “from inside 
out” by reconstructing the objective and the subjective setting in which decisions were 
taken. Therefore they consider an actor’s motives as an “endogenous variable 
dependent on certain cognitive conditions” (Smith, 2000: 37; Andreatta, 2005: 31; Hollis 
and Smith; 1991).  
 
Reflectivist approaches have offered important insights in some areas of European 
integration, especially those who focus on questions of identity, discourse and 
governance (Smith, 2000; Andreatta, 2005; Larsen; 2004; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). 
For instance, Critical theory (see Booth, 2004) presents a focus on the nature of the 
relationship between state and civil society in one hand and inclusion and exclusion 
within the new political community of Europe on the other. They also offer good insights 
on the nature of how democracy is created and defended and on the political economy 
of the “new Europe”. Feminist theory (see Sylvestor, 1994) has good prospects to 
explain gendered aspects in the “new Europe”, both with the effects of integration and 
enlargement on women and the role of the EU in building new forms of gendered 
identities. Postmodern theories present an interesting approach to deal with integration 
as a factor of modernization by observing how identities and subjectivities are formed 
and transformed through the different phases of the integration process (Best and 
Kellner, 1991). 
 
Reflectivist approaches mainly differentiate from other approaches in the International 
Relations discipline on their view of what constitutes politics. Reflectivists do not answer 
the same questions as those set by the rationalist approaches. In short, reflectivism 
does not delineate the political realm to be explained and presents very subjective 
accounts of the reality (Smith, 2000; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004).      
 
81 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Constructivism 
 
Contrasting with the materialism and methodological individualism of rationalist 
approaches, constructivism focuses on an actor’s subjective and intersubjective beliefs 
as causes for political outcomes (how norms, values, identities and cultures influence 
political outcomes). Opposed to the rationalist’s view, they argue that actors do not 
make decisions based only on calculations of individual utility or material benefit but that 
they act according to socially defined rules and norms. In this sense the focus of 
constructivists rests on how these collective rules and norms that guide political 
behaviour are socially constructed. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; Checkel, 2007) 
 
According to some authors constructivism is an attempt to “seize the middle ground” 
between rationalism and reflectivism (see Smith, 2000; Adler, 1997; Christiansen, 
Jørgensen and Wiener, 2001; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998; Wendt, 1992). 
Constructivism, it is argued, stands at the intersection of the two grand debates in social 
sciences, namely the one between materialism and idealism and the one between 
agency-based and structure-based understandings of the social world. Constructivism 
understands the difference between ideas and material factors differently from both 
rationalists and reflectivists. As seen above, for rationalists ideas play a secondary role 
in respect to the primary role played by material causes. Reflectivists see material 
causes as meaningless outside discourse. For constructivists ideas are collective 
understandings. They also do not favour either agency or structure but instead prefer a 
structurational approach to the social world (Giddens, 1984). According to Smith (2000: 
38): “[Constructivist]… importance to International Relations is that its emphasis is on 
‘the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and 
methodological implications of this reality.” In this sense constructivists contribute to a 
general theory for regional integration in exploring the questions of identity and 
governance. Constructivists’ accounts offer a better perspective than rationalist 
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approaches to observe how ideas and norms are part of European integration. 
However, those accounts must be empirically grounded, otherwise constructivism fails 
just as much as reflectivism in its efforts to establish a debate with mainstream theories 
of rationalism. Adler suggests five focal research topics: change as cognitive evolution, 
epistemic communities and the construction of social facts, the emergence of security 
communities, national security and social construction, and the social construction of 
democratic peace. (Adler, 1997: 334)  
 
Constructivism offers a good perspective to advance the theoretical debate in IR by 
engaging with neoliberalism in empirical studies on the norm-based account of 
institutions. According to Smith (2000: 49-50), once neorealism seems increasingly unfit 
to fully grasp contemporary international relationships and while we see the emerging 
convergence between constructivism and neoliberalism, this may represent the 
beginning of the next grand debate in the discipline.   
 
However, we can already observe some convergence between rationalists and 
constructivists with regard to the role of ideas (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Snidal, 
2002), and strategic rationality (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The supposed irreconcilable 
differences between rationalists’ causal theory and constructivists’ constitutive theory 
are also overstated. According to Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008:16), “…rational choice’s 
central equilibrium concept is a constitutive statement that a set of elements are in 
harmony with each other; equilibrium analysis becomes causal only by asking what 
happens when one element is displaced and harmony disrupted. Conversely, 
constructivist theorizing about norms has been increasingly used as the theoretical 
underpinning for causal relations and empirical testing” (Checkel 1999; Ruggie 2005). 
  
As far as the study of European integration is concerned, constructivism plays an 
important role in analysing how far an institutionalized, dense environment such as the 
EU has a “socializing effect” on actors. (Checkel, 2007; Jupile and Caporaso, 1999) As 
we showed above, many constructivists are interested in “Europeanization”, meaning 
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the study of “how interaction with and within European institutions socializes domestic 
agents and alters their behaviour over time.” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 397) In this 
sense, Glarbo (1999: 635) argues that political cooperation in Europe is socially 
constructed in the sense that “national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally 
communicate their intents and perceptions of political co-operation to themselves and to 
each other.”  
 
The constructivist focus on the immaterial dimensions such as ideas, values, norms and 
identity contributes to a discussion about not only effective institutional frameworks but 
also the constitutive elements of political integration. In this sense we can observe that 
in the development of the CFSP/ESDP the pursuit of identity objectives were just as 
important as the will to realize external objectives. By first consolidating its values 
internally (such as cooperation, peaceful resolution of conflicts, democracy, rule of law, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms) and then establishing these values as focal 
points on its relationship with the external world the EU defined its identity. This popular 
approach sees the actions of the CFSP/ESDP as being driven by identity and values 
rather than exclusively based on egoistic self-interests. The idea that the EU is a 
normative power in the international relations (especially due to the increasing role of 
political conditionality, social clauses, and environmental clauses in agreements with 
third party countries) in contrast to a military or hard power raises many questions about 
whether the EU has the “ability to shape conceptions of the normal [in international 
relations]20. (Manners; 2002: 239) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Lucarelli and 
Manners, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2003; Diez, 2005) 
 
Constructivists’ focus on ideas and identities shed light on many aspects of the 
CFSP/ESDP, thereby providing insights into its most pronounced successes and 
failures. Firstly, it is better suited to explain the success of redefining the identity and 
easing the political transition of Central and Eastern European countries (the same is 
                                                          
20
 Similar to the notion of “soft power” coined by Joseph Nye in (1991) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power, New York, Basic Books.  
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being done in the Balkans). In this sense, EU Foreign Policy is understood as a way to 
transform the identity of other actors and shape ideas and values. Critics of 
constructivism argue that we should not overestimate the role played by identity and 
values on the CFSP. For them, member-states continue to diverge in terms of their 
world views, role conception, and identity. In this sense, while member states converge 
on soft-policy issues, when it comes to their national interest States answer in terms of 
narrow self-interests and geostrategic concerns (such as the Artic policy, relationship 
with China, and especially with Russia). For those critics constructivism fails to address 
the issue when States behave egoistically when they should be following the norms and 
identity established by the institution. Others go further in their criticism against 
constructivism by arguing that even though it draws attention to the key aspects of 
institutionalized cooperation it frequently suffers from “empirical ad hoicism”, meaning 
that they have problems in generalizing about “when, how and why [social construction] 
occurs, thereby clearly specifying the actors and mechanisms bringing about change 
[and] the scope conditions under which they operate” (Checkel, 1998: 325 see 
Øhrgaard, 2004: 36). In this sense, constructivism is criticised as being unable to offer 
the CSFP an account beyond “rich empirical descriptions” and “generalizations which 
already abound” (Øhrgaard, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). 
   
2.3 Drawing from experience – toward a general framework 
 
Until now we have tried to present the theoretical debate over European integration in 
both International Relations and European Studies. The summary of this debate can be 
seen in table 1 below. It was observed that both fields have tended to converge since 
the 1990’s, thus enabling the development of a general theory for political integration. 
This theory, which is drawn from the actual grand debate between neoliberals and 
constructivists, aims to be general enough to understand the integration processes 
beyond the European Union.  
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Table 1 – Theoretical debate in IR and EU Studies: 
 
Approach Main Themes Integrative dynamic End product 
- EU Studies: 
Pre-theories of integration: 
a) Federalism Federal State; 
Constitution; 
Popular/Elite 
movements 
Intergovernmental 
bargaining; 
Constitutional 
revolution  
Federal State 
b) Functionalism Non-state 
Organizations 
(functional and 
technocratic); 
Economy  
Obsolescence of 
Nation State; New 
functional 
transnational 
organizations  
Depolitization of the 
debate; Transnational 
functional agencies 
c) Transactionalism International 
transactions; 
Identities; Social 
and Political 
integration 
Cultural assimilation; 
communication; 
socialization; 
learning 
Security Community 
Neofunctionalism Economic and 
political 
integration; Non-
state actors; 
Spillovers; “Low 
Politics” 
Spillover from 
technical to political 
sectors 
Supranational political 
community 
Intergovernmentalism Nation-State; 
Rationality; 
National interests 
Intergovernmental 
bargaining; 
Convergence of 
national interests   
International Organization 
Delegation and Agency Institutions; 
Agenda Setting; 
Policy Making 
Relations between 
principal and agents; 
Delegation to lower 
transaction costs; 
Expertise of agents. 
International Organization 
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New institutionalism approaches: 
a) Rational 
Institutionalism 
Nation-State; 
Interests; Agenda 
Setting; 
Institutions 
Institutions enabling 
actors to reach their 
goals but not shaping 
the interests. 
International Organization 
b) Historical 
institutionalism 
Institutions; 
Interests; Designs 
Path Dependences; 
Lock-in effects; 
Institutions 
constraining/defining 
actors’ preferences 
International/Supranational 
Organization 
c) Sociological 
institutionalism 
Institutional rules, 
norms and values; 
Identities;  
Individuals; 
“Brusselization”;  
“Europeanization”;  
Appropriateness 
Institutions shape 
actors’ behaviour 
and preferences; 
Socialization; Social 
learning 
International/Supranational 
Organization; 
Transgovernmentalism 
Comparative Politics Domestic political 
system; 
Government; 
Policy-making 
EU as quasi-federal 
polity; Internal 
institutional 
dynamics 
Federal State; 
Supranational Organization 
Multilevel Governance Public policy; 
Decision-making; 
“Policy network”    
Eroding sovereignty;  
Complex and 
puralistic system 
International/Supranational 
Organization; 
Transgovernmentalism 
- International Relations Theory: 
Rationalism Anarchy; Power; 
Bargaining; 
International 
sytem 
 
States the main 
actors; rationality; 
material incentives; 
Intergovernmental 
Conferences 
Alliance/Intergovernmental 
Institution 
Reflectivism Gender; 
Emancipation; 
Modernity 
Reconstruction of 
cognitive spaces; 
Inside-out 
explanations;  
Community; 
Communication; Cognitive 
system 
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Constructivism Ideas; norms; 
values; identities 
Eroding sovereignty; 
Complex and 
pluraristic systems; 
Socialization 
International/Supranational 
Organization; 
Transgovernmentalism; 
Transnationalism 
 
 
There are some questions that arise when we look back to the theoretical debate on the 
EU over the last 60 years. In the last decade the debate is moving away from focusing 
on dichotomist statements and a hermetic body of theories, thereby opening new 
venues of research. In this sense, when we observe the debate on integration we can 
highlight the following questions: How can the EU political integration be described and 
understood? How does integration develop? How does integration affect the identities 
and interest of social actors involved in the process?  
 
Firstly, the EU political integration was not only a response to the security dilemma 
posed by an order shaped by the Westphalian system of sovereign states. It was also 
pushed forward by the economic pressures and cross-border challenges of complex 
interdependence (Ginsberg, 1989; 1999). This new context where European states 
were able to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual 
relationships in a less threatening way could promote mutual oversight and resolve 
tensions and conflicts among member-states while also enhancing the predictability of 
behaviour and promoting mutual understanding (Smith, 2004; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008). This means that political integration was not aimed at balancing 
other powers or to influence other countries/regions. Political integration was developed 
first and foremost to manage internal EU relations, or in the words of Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan (2008:13), “to serve as an instrument of interrelational foreign policy”. 
Therefore, in order to better understand the EU political integration we must observe 
that most of the time, (especially in the formative years), it was not steered to influence 
the external environment but to manage mutual relations among member-states 
(interrelational); to strengthen or influence integration; and to affirm the common EU 
identity.  
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Secondly, political integration in Europe was developed on a trial-and-error basis. 
Learning from past mistakes with the failures of previous political integration projects 
(European Defence Cooperation – EDC; Pleuven Plans and Fouchet Plans), the 
Europeans developed a loose intergovernmental procedure in order to promote political 
coordination/cooperation, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (thus avoiding one 
of the major paradoxes in integration processes: supranationalism vs. 
intergovernmentalism) (see Furdson, 1980; Nuttall, 1992; Menon, Forster and Wallace, 
1992; Allen, Rummel and Wessels, 1982). The development of political integration in 
Europe was also the recognition that at least some level of political coordination and 
cooperation was utterly relevant in order to avoid harming economic relations (Smith, 
2004). As a result the concept of “supranational intergovernmentalism” coined by Jolyon 
Howorth (2000: 36-84; 2009; 2011) to explain the influence of state actors in moving 
forward the process of political integration in the EU aims to move the discussion over 
to the European political integration beyond the dialectical divide of supranationalism vs. 
intergovernmentalism. According to Howorth, in the case of the European political 
integration (2011: 6-7): “[…] there can be no doubt that the national representatives on 
intergovernmental agencies are proving as adept at persuading their own governments 
[…] as they are at persuading their fellow representatives of the virtue of national 
preferences”. In this sense it would be imperative to study the impact of these national 
representatives to European political integration.  
 
The loose intergovernmental structure and procedures which characterised the political 
cooperation in the EPC enabled the development of a complex transgovernmental 
network of national diplomats sharing ‘professional expertise and professional pride’ 
(which was already in motion in NATO and WEU, however those institutions were very 
formal - structural and procedural - and strictly under intergovernmental control, thus 
inhibiting further integration) (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 11; Øhrgaard, 2004: 30; Smith, 
1998: 308). According to Keohane and Nye (1974), transgovernmentalism is defined as 
the predisposition of government’s subunits to form international coalitions across 
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national boundaries and to operate on the basis of shared interests that might challenge 
the idea of exogenously defined national-interests.  
 
In the absence of formal structures and a codification of practices this 
transgovernmental network was left with the task of developing the “rules of the game” 
for daily EPC issues and creating information-sharing mechanisms, and while 
maintaining their national loyalties they were gradually oriented towards the 
development of common European positions for their national problems, thus creating a 
sense of ‘ownership’ of the process (von der Gablentz, 1979: 694; Wessels, 1982: 15; 
Nuttall, 1992: 16; Glarbo, 1999, Smith, 2003). The participation on the EPC/CFSP led to 
the development of a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding among national 
representatives. This esprit de corps represents at least “a basic commitment and belief 
in joint decision-making” (Tonra, 2001: 261), or in the words of a national 
representative: “People just know each other privately; invite each other to the 
meetings, and also on private grounds discuss various issues and some kind of 
community emerges … lets call it a community of thinking or a community of common 
views…” or “There is a kind of family atmosphere in the group. I probably spend more 
time with my group colleagues than with the other representatives from my country.” 
(Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 6 and 16). The informal practises developed by the 
transgovernmental network of diplomats (or DIPLOCOM) were captured with the 
Copenhagen and London Reports and the Stuttgart Declaration, but they were only 
codified in the Single European Act (SEA- 1986) and further institutionalized in the 
Maastricht Treaty with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). (Smith, 2003) A complete description of this process of institutionalization can 
be seen in chapter 3.  
 
In this sense, as the EPC/CFSP developed the diplomats became more “Europeanised” 
(Pjipers et al., 1988: 36). However, it is important not to overstate the influence of 
“Europeanization” and socialization on EU foreign policy (Øhrgaard, 2004). Other issues 
such as the influence of the EC in many issues of foreign policy and path-dependencies 
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generated by previous entanglements are also a part of the processes self-dynamic. 
Nevertheless, the role played by the presidency (during the EPC) and the presidency 
and the High-Representative (CFSP/ESDP) is important in facilitating consensus-
building. The presidency/HR is expected to “raise the horizon beyond the pursuit of 
immediate national interests” (Wallace, 1983a: 5). The rotating council presidency also 
enables everyone, especially the small member-states, to attain “enhanced visibility and 
presence in the international scene”, (Lorenz, 1996: 236) although a successful council 
presidency obviously depends on the ability to gather support from other member-states 
and move on the agenda, thereby avoiding paralysis (de Schoutheete, 1988: 79; 
Øhrgaard, 2004: 32). By and large it is important to highlight the fact that the CFSP has 
become one key (for some member-states the key) instrument to achieve some 
member-states’ national foreign policy interests. In this sense the maintenance and 
development of the EU foreign policy system is seen as a pre-requisite for the 
successful national foreign policy of some member states. Therefore, while creating 
binding positions in some issues and reducing national autonomy, the EU foreign policy 
also reinforces some national positions, thereby making it possible for some member-
states to “punch above their weight”. (Wallace, 1983b: 14; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 33; Øhrgaard, 2004; Pijpers, 1996: 265). 
        
Drawing from the theoretical developments and convergence in the fields of European 
Studies and International Relations, and especially from the models of European foreign 
policy analysis developed by R. H. Ginsberg (1999: 434), K. Glarbo (1999: 637) and M. 
E. Smith (1998; 2003; 2004), we suggest an analytical model to explain the self-
dynamic of political integration. Even though the study cases will be presented in the 
next two chapters of this dissertation, we will now briefly present the relevant 
explanatory concepts to our suggested theoretical model. According to figure 1 below 
we can observe the main features of the European political integration. We divided the 
features according to inputs, outputs and self-dynamic.  
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Many authors have already observed that despite the different historical, political and 
economic contexts in which they developed the integration processes in Europe and 
South America share much in common (Mattli, 1999; Vera-Fluixa, 2000; Hurrel, 1998; 
Mukhametdinov, 2007; Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, 2003; Guedes de Oliveira, 2005; 
2006). Nevertheless, those studies have mostly focused on either the economic, legal 
or historical issues of the integration process in South America. By adding to the 
previous studies this dissertation aims to contrasts the political integration in the EU, 
with other integration processes in South America. This comparison should point us in 
certain directions in order to develop general explanations about political integration in 
different integration processes around the world. Following the European model as 
presented in Figure 1 we turn to the main features of the incipient South American 
political integration process in Figure 2. Those two processes will be contrasted in order 
to find possible common explanations. Those figures also help us to visualize the 
features in both integration processes.  
 
In Figure 1 we depict a schematic figure of the European political integration system. 
This system can, however, be divided into two subsystems according to the debate 
between EU Studies and International Relations. Therefore the upper right part of the 
system which is consisting of feedbacks characterized by actorness, presence, and 
coherence is normally understood as being inside the International Relations field, while 
the system on the left with feedbacks of cooperation and institutionalization is seen as 
being a part of specific European Studies. The difficulty of putting together the external 
impacts in the integration process (IR) with the internal dynamics of the integration (EU 
Studies) was avoided for decades, thus limiting further theorizing on political integration. 
In this sense it is important to highlight the neoliberal-constructivist debate in IR theory 
and the developments in new institutionalism in the EU Studies to the theoretical 
convergence of both fields. An extensive description and analysis of the system will be 
carried out in the next steps of this research where we will present an explanation of 
how this system works in Europe and in South America in detail. 
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We divide the political integration model into four analytical units: inputs, self-dynamic, 
outputs, and feedbacks. Each of them has a distinctive impact in the integration 
process. Inputs are related to the impacts of the external environment in the integration. 
Those external impacts in the integration process are characterised by the influence 
exerted by the international system (for instance polarity, wars, relations with other 
powers and their interests, etc.). The self-dynamic is composed by the internal 
characteristics to the integration process. Those internal characteristics are not only 
defined by the institutional design21 (membership, scope, formal rules, norms, and 
mandate), but also by its multilevel governance22 (socialization, transgovernmentalism, 
and delegation, etc.). We define this process as self-dynamic because it replicates itself 
by reproducing/reinforcing its own mechanics. Outputs are characterised by the 
concrete policy-making results of the integration process. Those outputs are concrete 
policies resulting from the integration process. The outputs also influence the feedback 
loops. The feedback loops are the result of the impacts of the integration outcomes in 
two levels: internal to the integration and external in the international system. Internally 
speaking the policy results of integration can either harm or enhance the cooperation 
and institutionalization For instance, the successful ESDP mission in Congo propelled 
the development of more ESDP missions and more cooperation in this field (f.i. the 
creation of battle-groups). However, it is not only successful policies which lead to more 
integration. For instance, the failed Berlin-Plus agreements stimulated the development 
of European capabilities and the institutionalization of the European Defence Agency 
(EDA). The external influences of the integration refer to the impact that the regional 
policies have in the international system. This can be seen in how other States adapt to 
the regional policies (for instance: accession strategies, sanctions or common 
positions), and the effect that joint voting behaviour has in an international organization 
                                                          
21
 For a complete description of what is understood by institutional design see (2007) Acharya, A, and Johnson A.I. 
“Comparing regional institutions: an introduction” in Acharya, A, and Johnson A.I. (eds.): Crafting Cooperation: 
Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press.  
22
 For a comprehensive discussion of multilevel governance and integration see: (2007) Foradori. P.; Rosa, P., and 
Scartezzini, R.; Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: the EU in International Affairs, Lexington Books. 
93 
 
like the UN. Below we observe two figures that show the political integration model in 
Europe and in South America and the four analytical units. Following the figures we give 
an explanation of the analytical units in Europe and in South America.                
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Figure 1: An Analytical Model of European Political Integration 
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  Figure 2: An Analytical Model of South American Political Integration 
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2.3.1 European Model of Political Integration 
 
Inputs 
 
The European political integration is influenced by international, national and regional 
actors/issues. In this sense we observe that the EU is influenced by the changing 
currents of international politics and outside pressures for the EU to act internationally, 
regardless of whether it is ready or able to. Therefore systemic changes and challenges 
such as crises and wars, etc, have a measurable impact on the EU Foreign Policy 
dynamic. Also, other international actors such as powerful countries like the United 
States, Russia, China, and international organizations, such as NATO, UN and OSCE, 
have a direct impact on the European political integration, thereby putting pressures in 
place for responses/actions from the European part. As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 
(2008: 10) argue: “until the end of the Cold War foreign policy actions were largely to 
remain within the constraints of a world structured around the dividing lines of this 
contest.” 
 
The changes in the international system with the development of complex 
interdependences (Keohane and Nye, 1984) presented challenges and opportunities for 
the EU which are not accounted for by power politics. In this sense it is important to 
highlight the debate of Europe as a “civilian or normative power”. The concept 
developed by Duchêne (1972, 1973) was initially based on three assumptions: 1. 
European interstate relations were moved away from self-help towards politics based on 
cooperation and peace; 2. It would be possible for an actor to be a “power” whilst not 
possessing military instruments; and 3. A civilian power could play an important role in 
shaping the international milieu without resorting to force. 
 
The European context also plays an important role in defining the dynamic of the 
integration process. In this sense the basic premises of peace and reconciliation are still 
the guiding principles that inform relationships among EU member-states. (Feldman, 
97 
 
1998) As a result we can see that European values, norms and identity have a major 
impact on the dynamic of the European political integration (Jørgensen, 2004). One of 
the first common declarations in the EPC was named the “Declaration on European 
Identity” in 1973. As much as the European political integration was developed less in 
terms of influencing the external environment and more on mutual understanding, it was 
also aimed at establishing the basis of this mutual understanding on the pursuit of a 
common identity. The importance of values, norms and identities is even more evident 
when we observe that among the CFSP objectives as listed in Article 11(1) of the TEU 
are: “…to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union…” and “…to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Also, the so-called 
Copenhagen Criteria which were developed as preconditions to the accession of new 
members to the EU are strictly based on the forging of an EU identity: 1. Stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
the protection of minorities; 2. The existence of a functioning market economy…; 3. The 
ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of a 
political, economic and monetary union; and 4. Adjustment of administrative and 
institutional structures to guarantee effective implementation of the acquis. As our 
model argues, the constant participation in the EU political system fosters a sense of 
shared identity. As C. Hill (1996: 9) states: “[participation on the] … EPC stimulates a 
consciousness of and a debate about what Europe ought to be doing in the world … 
Where the EPC is weak in leverage it is strong on values … and European diplomacy 
has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles.” 
Therefore we can conclude that while some argue that those principles function as 
“consensus-generating,” serving “both to mask disagreements between member states 
on their actual operationalization and to underscore the EU’s self-conformity and 
superior moral identity” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 153), the European 
principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, soft-edged capitalism, zone of peace 
among members, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts represent the normative 
backbone in which the dynamic of the political integration process develops.  
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Based on decisions/actions taken in the past, the foreign policy system of the EU is also 
strongly shaped by the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique. The former 
refers to the legal obligation of member-states to accept EU relationships/agreements 
with third party countries and international organizations. The latter refers to the 
cumulated amount of previous political instances and actions implemented in the 
context of the EPC/CFSP/ESDP which is primarily set out in joint declarations, common 
positions and common actions. This accumulated set of “soft-laws” represents the fact 
that past decisions have a real impact on the actual system, thus constraining and 
influencing future outcomes. (Glarbo, 1999; Ginsberg, 1999)  
 
Besides the international and European contexts, the interplay between national foreign 
policies and collective diplomacy is also observed. This subject was well analysed by C. 
Hill et al. (1996) and also by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008). They argue that 
relationships between national and European interests and actors have a major 
influence on the advancement of outcomes in the European foreign policy system. In 
this sense, even governments of the most powerful member states benefit with the EU 
legitimisation and growing influence in world politics in order to pursue explicitly national 
interests (Pijpers, 1988). This situation is even more evident on the smaller member 
states, as argued by Pjipers (1996) in the case of the Netherlands. 
 
  Self-Dynamic of the European Foreign Policy System 
 
The Maastricht Treaty established an EU with a three-pillar system: the first pillar with 
the supranational EC and its provisions on an internal market, common agricultural 
policy, and trade and development policies, the second pillar with the institutionalization 
of the intergovernmental EPC into the CFSP, and the third pillar which was designed to 
deal with cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, thus making the second 
(CFSP) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars strictly and formally 
intergovernmental, and the first pillar supranational. This means that member states 
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retain complete control over those pillars while the majority of decisions are taken by 
consensus. This “pillarization” of the EU structure had serious consequences on the 
coherence and effectiveness of the outcomes, especially for the second pillar. It is 
argued that despite the clear limitations to cross pillar cooperation presented by the 
Maastricht Treaty with a formal division between the EC and the CFSP, in practical 
terms the EU political integration follows a logic where all pillars play a role. This lack of 
coherence and cohesion in the “pillarization” of EU politics was addressed by the Lisbon 
Treaty. Also, within the pillars there are disparities in the competence and policy making 
methods. This is intended to show that it is not possible to make such a clear cut 
distinction between EC vs. CFSP or Community method vs. Intergovernmentalism. It is 
more correct to characterize the EU political integration as a continuum with different 
degrees of supranational competences and intergovernmental cooperation and with any 
one pillar overlapping the others. In this sense, Stetter (2004) observes that the 
functional indivisibility of foreign policy led to a gradual and partial erosion of the pillar 
structure and the rise of “cross-pillarization” which enhances the operational capability 
depending on the issue being discussed. This problem of interpillar cohesion was partly 
solved by the Lisbon Treaty merging the positions of the High Representative for the 
CFSP (HR/CFSP) with the Commissioner for External Relations. Although this enables 
the use of Commission tools in foreign policy making, the decisions regarding the 
CFSP/ESDP remain intergovernmental (Ginsberg, 1999: 439; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 31; Stetter, 2004: 720).       
 
As observed above, one of the main features of the CFSP is its intergovernmental, 
consensus-oriented decision-making. This means that member states retain complete 
control over outcomes, however this intergovernmental nature masks one of the other 
main features of the system: a transgovernmental network is able to influence outcomes 
and learn from past mistakes (social learning), thus enhancing common interests, 
reaching common positions and moving the system forward (Smith, 2004). In this sense 
it is correct to argue that while the system moves on the diplomats become more 
“Europeanized”. As argued above, this transgovernmental network was set in motion 
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since the beginning of the EPC with the freedom for the diplomats to establish the 
procedural and substantive norms on which the European political cooperation was 
based. The development of those informal practises had a major influence on the 
institutional setting and the outcomes of the system, and most importantly it was 
recognized as an inherent part of the political cooperation in Europe by the Copenhagen 
and London Reports and the Stuttgart Declaration, codified by the Single European Act 
and formally institutionalized with the CFSP. (Tonra, 2001; Glarbo, 1999, Smith, 2003) 
 
Another important feature of the system and something that is also associated with the 
transgovernmental network presented above is the increasing interaction of foreign 
policy processes on the national level with those on the European level. This process is 
called “Europeanization” and is comprised of four characteristics: 1. National adaptation 
occurs when states adapt their policy-making instruments, policies, values and identity 
to fit with those of the EU; 2. National projection happens when states forward their 
national policies to the EU level, thus debating and flexibilizing their positions in regard 
to the others; 3. States not only forward their national positions to the EU level, but they 
also pursue their national foreign policy through the EU; 4. Refers to the effort to embed 
third party countries/regions within its structures and values. The effects of 
Europeanization on the outcomes of the system are various, including the reduction of 
foreign policy differences among the participants of the CFSP. According to Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan (2008: 143): “Europeanization implies gradual changes in a national 
actor’s world view, values and norms, role conception and identity”. Some also 
understand Europeanization as a forced modernization of the foreign policy of member 
states. This represents the idea that because the EU has global interests some of the 
member-states without a previous specific foreign policy towards a country/issue are 
forced to develop new positions for these new countries/issues. If the EU members do 
not develop or update their foreign policy to cover more distant geographical areas or 
other issues where they had no previous foreign policy position, they are just carried 
along by the more powerful member states with foreign policies with a global reach. In 
this sense all member-states have to upgrade their foreign policy position once they 
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participate in the CFSP/ESDP.  (Tonra, 1997: 190; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 
144). Europeanization of national foreign policies also offers an interesting locus to 
analyse the impact of the EU in member-states national bureaucracy. According to 
Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini (2007: xiv): “Europeanization has brought about a series 
of changes in the workings and organization of national bureaucracies. In some cases, 
new offices have had to be created or old ones reorganized in order to manage the 
ever-growing flow of exchanges with other European partners.”  
 
Political integration is also defined by the fact that decisions taken previously constrain 
and shape future outcomes. In this sense, the concept of path dependence used by 
historical institutionalists might be useful. According to William Sewell (1996: 262-263, 
see Paul Pierson, 2000: 252), path dependence refers to the fact “that what happened 
at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a later point in time”, and Margaret Levi (1997: 28 see Pierson 2000: 252) 
also suggests that: “Path dependence has to mean … that once a country or region has 
started down a track the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice 
points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy 
reversal of the initial choice.” According to Pierson (2000: 252), this means that once 
decisions are made (and especially when they are legally binding, such as the acquis 
communautaire/politique and most CFSP decisions), the costs of exiting increase, thus 
stimulating further steps in the same direction.       
 
The last feature of the European foreign policy system presented here is the importance 
of the delegation of leadership to the EC (communitarization) in the form of the High 
Representative (commonization) to one or a coalition of large member states (directoire) 
or/and to core groups (segmentation). As Scharpf (1988) observed, in systems like the 
CFSP with complex decision-making procedures which are ruled by unanimity in most 
of the cases and filled with participants and with too many policy issues to be discussed 
(with different order of priorities to different member states), outcomes and changes of 
course might be harmed due to what he calls “joint decision-traps”. In this sense, 
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member states may delegate authority to other actors that act on behalf of a policy 
outcome. As a result we can initially observe the Commission playing an important role 
on foreign policy issues, especially due to its wide (and good) relations with third party 
countries/regions, budgetary instruments and legal capacity to implement foreign policy 
initiatives (such as conflict prevention and institution-building and initiatives in the area 
of human rights and the promotion of democracy). The Council Secretariat (High 
Representative, Special Representatives, Policy Unit, DG E, PSC, etc) also provides 
political steering and operational action for the EU foreign policy. But in most issues 
political steering and operational action are delegated to “an informal and self-selected 
group of member states that take the lead in EU policy-making towards specific issues 
in which they have a particular interest and/or value added.” (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 113). This is not to be confused with the directoire-styled groups, 
where action is delegated to one or a coalition of large member states such as the EU3 
negotiations with Iran (Germany, United Kingdom and France together with the High 
Representative) or the Contact Group for the Balkans (the “big three” plus Italy, the US 
and Russia). Core groups instead involve the participation of smaller member states 
together with representatives of the EU institutions (for instance the informal Contact 
Groups on Afghanistan and on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the EU Core 
Group on Somalia). These groups can operate either temporarily or permanently and 
work either completely within the EU framework or only loosely related to it, and they 
can also operate informally and have a low profile or be very structured and highly 
visible. It is argued that this segmentation of EU foreign policy-making towards a set of 
specialized policy networks dealing with specific issues leads to a specialization and 
division of labour among member states that can strengthen the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the EU foreign policy system (Keukeleire, 2006).    
 
Altogether, those features compose the EU political integration system and provide a 
benchmark to analyse how far (or at least how similar to the EU) other political 
integration processes are developing around the world. One distinctive factor that will be 
analysed below is the self-dynamic of the system, meaning how the outcomes produced 
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by it have important impacts on the development of the whole system to the point that it 
will be able to influence the external environment and enhance further 
institutionalization. These feedback loops generated by the outcomes of the system 
represent the major stimulus for its functioning, and as a result we can characterize the 
EU political integration as a self-dynamic process with its outcomes shaping not only the 
institutional design (and the integration process) but also impacting the behaviour of 
third party countries and other international institutions around the world with its actions. 
After we observe the outcomes of the EU foreign policy system we will return to this 
discussion. 
 
Outcomes 
 
The outcomes of the EU foreign policy system are of various natures. They can be 
divided into four major groups, namely trade, bureaucratic, diplomatic, and military. The 
result of each of those outcomes will generate feedbacks impacting on both the external 
world and the internal EU system. An extensive analysis of those outcomes in Europe 
and in South America will be dealt in the next chapters of this dissertation. 
 
The first range of foreign policy outcomes does not stem from the second but from the 
first pillar. The Commission instruments of the EU foreign policy system are seen by 
many as being those who have the greater impact on the external world. They include 
trade, accession strategies, association and cooperation agreements, development and 
humanitarian, crisis management and conflict prevention, and the promotion of human 
rights and democracy. 
 
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one of the main expressions of EU presence 
and the most visible form of EU actorness. (Redmond, 1992; Sjostedt, 1977; Allen and 
Smith, 1990; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). It is observed that the decision to conclude 
a trade agreement with a third party country/region and the depth and scope of this 
agreement is to a large extent foreign policy. The EU also tries to use its trade policy in 
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order to pursue specific foreign policy objectives such as environmental and labour 
clauses. In this sense, trade policy has been one of the major outcomes of the EU as an 
international actor which is able to shape the external environment, and consequently it 
has been influential in shaping the EU foreign policy system.  
 
Association and cooperation agreements are located under the EC competencies, 
despite their increasingly political use. There are three types of agreements: 1. Pure 
trade agreements; 2. Trade and economic cooperation agreements; and 3. Association 
agreements. Here the use of political conditionality plays an important role in shaping 
third party countries political systems, human right records, etc. (Sole, 2004)  
 
Development and humanitarian policies are also very important outcomes of the EU 
foreign policy system. If we include the EC and the member states donations for 
humanitarian aid and Overseas Development Aid (ODA), the EU is the largest donor 
worldwide. The EC alone is the third largest. As observed in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy (ESS), “trade and development policies can be powerful tools for 
promoting reform. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be a 
more secure world for the European Union and its citizens”. Also, the EU has tried to 
insert the promotion of specific norms and values in its development activities such as 
human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. The European 
Instrument/Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) pushed forward by the 
European Parliament has its own budget line and aims to use EC external assistance 
and cooperation instruments to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008).  
 
Perhaps the most well-known outcome of the European political cooperation is the 
coordination-reflex among members of the system (de Schoutheete, 1988; Nutall, 1992; 
Wessels, 1997; Glarbo, 1999). This bureaucratic outcome of political integration refers 
to the previous consultation among member states of their foreign policy objectives in 
order to adjust it to the other member states. This reduces tensions and misperceptions 
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among the players while enhancing predictability, confidence and willingness to 
(co)operate inside the system. This outcome could only be achieved with the 
development of the transgovernmental networks of diplomats, which according to a first-
hand description of an EU policy-maker (Nuttall, 1992: 312) means: “the automatic 
reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contacts … has become an 
effective substitute for the traditional bilateral diplomacy … the experience of working 
together is durable, and as time goes by there will be an increasing number of diplomats 
who have attended the meetings … and thus feel bound to each other by family ties.” In 
this sense, as Nuttall describes above we consider the coordination reflex as one of the 
most important outcomes of the transgovernmental network of diplomats. Nevertheless, 
we can also see that the coordination reflex has turned into a characteristic of the EU 
political system in which national foreign policy actors consult with each other before 
arriving at defined national positions (Tonra, 2003).    
 
According to Article 12 of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU shall pursue the CFSP’s 
objectives by: 1. Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP; 2. 
Deciding on common strategies; 3. Adopting joint actions; 4. Adopting common 
positions; and 5. Strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in the 
conduct of policy. It is important to note that with the CFSP common strategies, joint 
actions and common positions are legally binding on the member states. In practice 
however those instruments have not been used so often while diplomats are developing 
other instruments that work alongside this legal categorization. This Treaty definition is 
useful for understanding how CFSP tools are organized and formulated in the EU 
system, however on a daily basis CFSP uses its standard diplomatic instruments to 
carry out its foreign policy, where declarations, demarches, high-level visits and 
meetings, international conferences, informal talks and telephone calls, mediation, and 
observers, etc. are the instruments used to consult, confirm, support, show solidarity, 
suggest solutions or options; demand, protest, disapprove, accuse, reject, deter, or 
sanction, etc (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 154).   
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Common strategies are instruments devised by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 in order 
to provide an appropriate framework to develop broad strategic policies towards a 
specific region, country or issue.  Once a common strategy is adopted (by unanimity) it 
can be implemented through joint actions and common positions, etc and require a 
qualified majority vote (QMV). This would allow a high-level of strategic guidance, 
coherence of policies and smooth implementation through the QMV. This would also 
allow the EU to use instruments from all three pillars and from member states towards a 
specific foreign policy objective. In practice, this instrument was dropped by the Union 
after the Javier Solana’ 2000 Common Strategies Report. According to the Report, the 
instrument was tested on three occasions (Russia, 1999; Ukraine, 1999; and 
Mediterranean, 2000), and failed to offer any added value to the first pillar instruments 
and was simply not strong enough. However, Joint Actions and Common Positions play 
an important role as policy outcomes of the EU foreign policy. Joint actions are directed 
to “address specific situations where operational actions by the Union are deemed to be 
required” (TUE; Art. 14 – 1 and 3). Joint actions are also binding of the member-states: 
“joint actions shall commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the 
conduct of their activity” (TUE; Art. 14 – 1 and 3). Common positions are in practice 
used to adopt sanctions and restrictive measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, 
and the freezing of funds and economic resources, etc. against third party countries. To 
come into effect, however, those actions need to be implemented by the first pillar and 
third pillar, thus showing the importance of cross pillar coherence. Common positions 
are also an instrument which can be used to define the Unions’ approach to an issue, 
for instance the Common Positions on the International Criminal Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 2005 Review of the Non Proliferation Treaty, the support to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and to affirm the EU’s position in regard to conflicts 
in Africa.       
 
Although security and defence issues have been a taboo in European integration for a 
long time, starting with the “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defence” in the Treaty of Maastricht (Art. J.4(1)) and 
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culminating in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki that established military 
and non-military aspects of crisis management of the Union, the development of the 
ESDP was a major breakthrough for the European integration process. Despite its 
weaknesses and flaws (which will be discussed in the next chapter), the ESDP 
instruments provided the CFSP with military and civilian means for crisis management 
operations which have already been used more than 20 times (see Annex II for a list of 
operations).   
 
Feedbacks 
 
The main characteristic of the system is its self-dynamicism. This self-dynamic system 
would not occur without the feedback loops observed in this section. Those feedback 
loops are represented by the impact of political outcomes on two different levels: 
internationally and internally. The international level refers to the impacts that the EU 
has on the international system, while the internal level represents the impact the policy 
outcomes of the EU have on its own integration process (f.i. outcomes impact on the 
institutional design).  Both feedback loops influence the European political integration in 
different ways, one indirectly through the impact of the outcomes in the external 
environment (international/European/national levels) and the other directly by impacting 
on the level of cooperation/institutionalization of the integration process (enhancing or 
constraining). This represents the fact that political outcomes have an impact on the 
internal shape of the integration process (for instance: the assessment of an ESDP 
mission can reveal that a new Joint Command is necessary, thus increasing the 
institutionalization). In this last section we will present what constitutes those feedbacks 
and how they affect European political integration.  
 
External feedback 
 
We can see that two concepts help us to understand the impact of European foreign 
policy system outcomes on the outside world, namely actorness, which was developed 
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by Sjoestedt (1977) and deepened by Bretherthon and Vogler (2006), and presence, 
which was developed by Allen and Smith (1996). Those concepts observe the notion of 
the EU as an international actor and the qualities and pre-requisites for international 
actorness and presence. 
 
Therefore, while the former concept refers to the EU as an international actor and thus 
having the capacity to act and to influence the others, the latter concept is related to the 
visibility in regional and global fora (f.i.: joint voting behaviour in the UN) (Ginsberg, 
1999: 432). According to Jupille and Caporaso (1998), the EU’s capacity to impact on 
the international environment should be measured in regards to four criteria: 1. 
Outsiders’ acceptance of its competence (recognition); 2. Legal competence to act 
(authority); 3. Distinctiveness and independence from other actors (autonomy); and 4. 
To what extent it acts unitarily in the external world (cohesion). Therefore we can argue 
that ideal-type actorness would involve all four of those elements, while the EU can be 
considered to be a quasi-perfect actor due to difficulties to act with cohesion and 
authority, etc. According to Hill (1996), the actorness is determined by not only common 
values, norms, identity and decision-making systems, but it also depends on concrete 
capabilities to produce effective outcomes. 
 
To avoid the difficulty of defining the international activity of an actor that is not a state, 
Allen and Smith (1990) developed the concept of presence to explain the increasing 
influence and legitimacy of the EU in the international environment. Presence refers to 
the step prior to actorness. This distinction explains why some actors have the 
possibility to engage in one issue (presence) but not the capacity (or will) to do so 
(actorness). Therefore presence is related to the legitimacy to act while actorness 
relates to the “ability to have a notable effect on the outcomes for third-parties” (Hill, 
2007: 15). Allen and Smith (1990), observe that although the EU does not always act as 
a unified actor, it has considerable structure, importance and legitimacy in processes of 
international politics. They go further and ask how the EU makes its presence felt 
internationally, and to what extent can it move from presence to purpose? In this sense 
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we have already observed (and a deeper analysis will be presented in the next step of 
this research) that the EU foreign policy system has the means to make its presence felt 
internationally in the economic, diplomatic and military spheres. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that EU actions have significant effects on both the perceptions and operational 
environments of third parties (Hill, 1993), however this presence impacts differently 
according to the use of the wide range of outcomes at the EU’s disposition, and most 
scholars observe that while this presence is real it is still incoherent. As a result, the 
coherence and effectiveness in not only implementing but also in generating political 
outcomes can determine not only the EU’s international presence but most importantly 
its international actorness (Ginsberg, 1999).     
     
Internal feedback 
 
This second category of feedback represents how outcomes of the European foreign 
policy system impact directly on the system itself, thus enhancing or constraining 
political cooperation/institutionalization.  
 
Students of International Relations have long argued that institutions enhance the 
prospects of cooperation among states. (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000) 
Moreover, many students of European political integration have observed that foreign 
policy outcomes have a distinctive impact on the institutionalization of the EU (Smith, 
2003). This does not mean that all outcomes have to be successful to have an impact 
on the systems self-dynamic. As seen above, the EU foreign policy system was 
constituted of trial-and-errors, and it is still like that, however it is clearly observable that 
not only the institutional nature but foremost the quality of the political cooperation in 
Europe has increased dramatically in the last 60 years. Therefore, according to Tonra 
and Christansen (2004: 6):  
 
“The trajectory of such development has been – and continues to be – towards greater 
institutionalization and greater coordination. The development of a complex 
political/military committee structure, the establishment and growth of the political 
secretariat, the increasing coordination between Community instruments and broader 
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foreign policy goals, and the introduction of a policy planning cell and the office of the 
High Representative for CFSP are all testaments to this increased institutionalization.”  
 
In this sense, we can observe that this feedback has major and more identifiable 
impacts on the self-dynamic of the system, however without understanding to what 
extent the external feedback influences the system no general theory of political 
integration can be achieved.   
 
In this section we observed the framework in which we will analyse and compare the 
integration processes in Europe and in South America. We briefly presented the 
characteristics of the European system and how we think the theoretical debate in EU 
Studies and IR can be synthesized. A full fledge study-case on the EU will be discussed 
in chapter 3. In the next section we will briefly analyse how the integration dynamic 
works in South America. The South American study-case can be seen in chapter 4.  
 
2.3.2 South American Model of Political Integration 
 
Inputs 
 
The South American system is influenced by international, national and regional 
actors/issues. In South America, the first failed attemps of integration in the 1960s and 
1970s concurred with the background of the Cold War and the spread of communist 
ideology in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, and guerrila activity in many countries 
in the region combined with strong nationalistic ideologies and the presence of military 
regimes and the role of the United States.  
 
The establishment of the actual regional integration initiatives had less to do with extra-
regional powers and more to do with the regional/national issues and more global 
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trends. Especially in the Southern Cone23, it is difficult to understand the establishment 
of the Mercosul if we don’t observe the global trends of economic prosperity in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, globalization, regionalization and the movements to build 
economic blocs.  
 
Internally speaking it is fundamental to observe the transition from the military regimes 
to redemocratization and the need to change the economic paradigm in order to adapt 
to the global market. Regionally speaking it is essential to understand the overcoming of 
disputes that fueled the nationalistic rethoric of the military regimes, and especially the 
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. 
 
In this sense we divide the integration inputs into three parts: international, regional and 
internal. 
 
In the hemispheric level no one can ignore the influence of the United States in the 
region, and consequently in the regional integration projects. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the will of the United States has always been pushed by either the 
instrumentalization of hemispheric institutions (such as the OAS) or bilaterally. The 
growing divergence of interests and expectations between Latin American countries and 
the United States exacerbated this behavior, which culminated in the US support of the 
military coups in the region. This led to a paradoxical relationship with the US: the 
perception in the region that the US cannot be trusted, while at the same time countries 
in the region compete for US favoritism in order to receive special treatment. 
Additionally, the elites in the region view the approachment of any country in the region 
with the US with suspicion.  
                                                          
23
 The Southern Cone is a geographical area that covers the southernmost part of South America under the Tropic 
of Capricorn. It includes: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and the southern part of Brazil.  
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More recently, the United States tried to push forward the creation of a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), a free trade zone which is mirrored in the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA). In the first phase, the US tried to negotiate multilaterally with all of 
the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This negotiation put big pressure in 
Mercosul countries to negotiate together and block the US proposal. With the failed 
multilateral negotiations the US is trying to develop free trade agreements with every 
Latin American country bilaterally, however despite US attempts to disrupt bloc 
negotiations Mercosul countries still hold the same joint position on the issue. The 
Andean Community also tried to coordinate its position on the issue, but the divergent 
positions inside the group shunned a common stand (especially between Colombia and 
Peru on one side and Ecuador and Venezuela on the other). Venezuela even pushed 
for the creation of an anti-FTAA group named the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA24) which aims to integrate infrastructure and energy but which also has 
more ambitious objectives such as economic, political and even military integration. 
 
Regionally, there has been a historic feeling of mistrust among the countries in the 
region. In the dawn of the independence movements in the 19th Century the countries 
were more worried about developing their own institutional capacities than with 
demarcating the borders located in remote areas of jungle, desert or High Mountains. 
However, by the end of the Century border disagreements started to arise, and some of 
them remain an issue to the day. Those disputes and conflicts were mostly settled in the 
Southern Cone in the 1970s – 1980s, thus creating the environment for the subregional 
integration. The fact that Mercosul survived even when the interdependence was very 
low and during deep economic crises is also partly explained by strong political will, the 
resolution of major disputes, and the development of confidence and mutual trust 
                                                          
24
 Composed of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
and Venezuela. 
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among the countries in the subregion. In the Northern part of South America most of 
those disputes and conflicts remain active, thus harming the development of trust 
among the countries. Even though there has always been a discourse of Latin American 
brotherhood and cooperation, in reality the lack of trust due to unresolved disputes does 
not provide the common ground needed for deeper cooperation in this part of the 
region. The best examples of failed integration attempts are the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). 
The former was created in 1960, and it was inspired by the EEC and had the objective 
of creating a free trade zone and eliminating trade restrictions within 12 years. However, 
the project collapsed even before it started due to the fact that the countries were 
experiencing the beginning of the industrialization process, and there were therefore 
very different levels of development allied with the diversity of interests. In order to save 
the heritage of the LAFTA the countries negotiated a new institution: the ALADI. ALADI 
came to replace the LAFTA with less ambitious goals. ALADI also had the final 
objective of constituting a common market, but instead of starting with a free trade zone 
it formed a preferential trade area, thus giving more flexibility for the members to 
negotiate bilateral agreements. However, the 1982 debt crisis and the consequent Latin 
America’s “lost decade” pushed for protectionist measures and left the ALADI as 
nothing more than a symbolic arrangement working as a framework for bilateral 
agreements. Those failed attempts show a typical pattern in Latin America of creating 
artificial institutions without the real basis for its existence (Oelsener, 2005). 
 
Internally, the military has always played an important role in South American politics 
since the independence movements in the 19th Century. In Brazil, the military is 
especially identified with the republican movement which overthrew the monarchy. As 
Mullins put it (2006: 41): “Across Latin America there is a strong connection between 
nationhood and the armed forces. According to the military folklore, the armed forces 
are not just part of the nation, they created it.” Therefore it is no surprise that the 
continent has been hampered by military interventions on politics throughout its history. 
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In this sense the politics in the region have been characterized by a competition 
between democratic and autocratic forces25. In particular, the simultaneous military 
dictatorships that spread throughtout the region during the 1960s created a shared 
trauma and a sense that the countries alone could not carry a stable democratic 
transition. The internal logic behind those military coups in the 60s was to counter the 
spread of communism. In all cases both the defence and the foreign policies were 
grounded on inter-regional rivalries. Those policies were based on the National Security 
Doctrines (NSD)26. The NSD is a set of ideas and principles on how to achieve national 
security. Ideologically bred in German, French, US and Latin Ameican literature, it was 
theoretically advanced in the School of the Americas27, a US training centre for Latin 
American officers that was specialized in anti-communist counterinsurgency during the 
1960’s. The primary focus of the NSD was to eliminate leftist opposition by all means, 
including political repression, use of force and economic development. In the NSD 
ideology the component of development played a fundamental role in figthing against 
leftist movements. The NSD also emphasised the role of the military in defending 
national borders and territorial integrity, thus overdimensioning regional rivalries and 
regional threats (Arcenaux, 2001; Pion-Berlin, 1989).  
 
Against the background of a historical military participation in politics which makes it 
impossible to completely exclude the military from politics completely and after a shared 
period under strong military rule, South American countries started the transition to 
democracy in the 1980s. The stability of the new democracies depended on two 
mutually reinforcing factors. Firstly, the internal configuration of power within the civilian 
regimes was determined by the way in which the transition to democracy was carried 
                                                          
25
 This competition does not mean that direct military rule has been the normal state of affairs, but that the 
military has always been present and ready to intervene in daily politics.  
26
 For a deeper discussion of the NSD see Arraigada, 1981; Pion-Berlin, 1989; and Arcenaux, 2001. 
27
 Since 2000 renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and relocated to Fort Benning, 
Georgia.  
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out28. Secondly, this configuration influenced the process of foreign and defence 
decision-making policies. This represents the extent to which the militaries were able to 
control the transition and keep political power in the new democracies. As Mullins 
(2006:8) argues: “The more influence components of the old regime had over the 
civilian authorities the more continuity there was in policy terms”.29  The fact that those 
countries were experiencing similar difficulties in reestablishing democracy allied with 
the dire economic problems in the 1980s lessened the particularist predispositions and 
propped up deeper integrationist movements. As a result, at that time foreign and 
defence policies were seen as a tool to foster transition from the military dictatiorships to 
democratic governments by reducing the tensions between the countries, enhancing 
civilian control over the military apparatus, and promoting economic development 
(Mullins, 2006; Oelsener, 2001; Kacowicz, 2005).              
 
The relationships between South American countries were marked by rivalry and 
mistrust; however the difficulties that those countries faced in the transition period from 
dictatorship to democracy represent a major breakthrough in order to review the norms 
guiding those relationships. According to Kacowicz, (2005), there is set of norms shared 
by the whole region which guide the relationships among the countries. Those norms 
include: uti possidetis (the recognitions of former colonial borders), peaceful settlement 
of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-
intervention, self-determination, convivencia (peaceful coexistence), concertacion 
(consensus seeking), arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation, and CBMs 
(confidence building measures). Besides this, since the 1980s we can identify political 
democracy and human rights as being well recognized norms (Mullins, 2006). Holsti 
                                                          
28
 Here we follow the classic distinction between transition models proposed by Guillermo O’Donnell. He 
differentiates the transition patterns between controlled transition (when the military were able to highly 
influence the transition to democracy), balanced transition (low military influence) or collapse (no influence at all).  
29
 The Argentinian case occupies one end of the spectrum of civilian control over the military, while Peru is 
positioned on the opposite side of the spectrum.   
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(1993), argues that due to a long historical and learning process Latin American 
countries have managed to develop a unique normative system of “diplomatic culture” 
that has helped their governments to resolve many of their international conflicts without 
resorting to war. In this sense, Kacowicz (2005) observes that some places, especially 
in South America (and in the Southern Cone), people have succeeded in developing 
this Latin American exceptionalism regarding their recourse to a peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. These common norms have had a clear influence on the 
international relationships of the region in three cases according to Kacowicz (2005: 
11): (1) They have contributed to the maintenance of the “long peace” in South America 
since 1883; (2) They have reshaped the definition of state interests in terms of their 
foreign relations, and (3) After the redemocratization process, they have moved and 
upgraded the already existing relationships among countries in the direction of a 
pluralistic security community. Those norms form the background in which the 
integration process evolves.  
 
Self-Dynamic of the South American Political Integration 
 
No integration movement in South America can be thought of in terms of 
supranationalism. The strong normative of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states plays a fundamental role in 
understanding integration in the region. In fact, all integration initiatives in the region, 
from LAFTA-ALADI to UNASUL, were characterized by a strong commitment to 
intergovernmental politics and a solemn exclusion of supranationalism. According to the 
Brazilian President during a meeting of the UNASUL: “I am deeply convinced that it is 
the time to deepen our South American identity (…) based on common values and 
principles such as the respect for sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity and 
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non-intervention in domestic affairs.”30 However, as we aim to show in this study, the 
question about political integration must be located beyond the dialectical divide of 
intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism. In this sense we look at how a region 
marked by the strong sovereignty normative can allow a regional integration process to 
flourish and succeed. The success of regional integration in South America points to the 
fact that the development of supranational institutions is not a pre-condition to 
integration processes. Strict intergovernmental relations are also not able to account for 
the integration in areas beyond commercial/economic policies, especially in a region 
with a strong sovereignty normative. Therefore the discussion over the success of 
integration processes beyond traditional trade and economic regimes must surpass the 
supranational-intergovernmental divide and focus on the systems of governance 
beneath the Intergovernmental Conferences and formal meetings. 
 
Comparing this with the European case also reveals an important hidden factor in the 
South American political integration dynamic: transgovernmental networks. Those 
networks are especially strong in the Southern Cone and were re-directed and 
enhanced in the aftermath of the military dictatorships, first and foremost to foster the 
civilian control over the military during the transition period. On the other hand, in the 
Andean region the institutional weakeness harms the civilian hegemony and the 
unresolved international disputes disrupt the development of networks. The extent of 
the influence of this network in their governments has to do with how the transition to 
democracy was internally negotiated31. The establishment of Mercosul, for instance, 
was pushed by an ad hoc transgovernmental network created with the 1986 Program of 
                                                          
30
 Translated from ”Lula sugere reuniao exclusiva para tratar do Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa“, Folha Online, 
23/05/2008. 
31
 Ranging from total collapse in Argentina to controlled transition in Brazil, and more extreme military autonomy 
in Peru (see Pion-Berlin, 2001 and Arceneaux, 2001). The South American case suggests an inversion of the 
huntingtonian model of military professionalism in the sense that more professionalism leads to more military 
autonomy. According to Diamint (2001: 122), “The more organized and efficient the institutions and the armed 
forces are, the more influence they have over other government agencies” (free translation from Spanish).     
118 
 
Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) signed by the Argentinian and Brazilian 
Presidents. This network was initially composed of technicians from the Foreign and 
Development Ministries and was loosely bound and created top-to-bottom with strong 
presidential backing. This in turn led to the creation of an institution, namely Mercosul, 
which started very successfully in the economic/commercial area, however the 
economic crisis that affected the region in the 2000s halted the integrationist pace. 
Despite the initial economic/commercial successes, the biggest advances in the 
integration hide in the politico-military cooperation. The increase of confidence among 
the countries and the perspective of common interests enhanced the prospects of 
institutionalization where the strategic partnerships were framed. One of the 
fundamental aspects for the institutionalization according to Andrew Hurrel (1998: 246), 
was the “[…] steady creation of interest-groups and networks within the state favouring 
integration. The network of bi-national working groups established under the 1986 
agreements, and also the intergovernmental structures of Mercosur acquired a degree 
of bureaucratic autonomy … Not only was the habit of consultation growing but a small 
group of officials was increasingly able to push the integration agenda forward and to 
work together to try and find solutions to problems. Moreover, the institutionalization of 
visits and exchanges by presidents and officials was leading to a broader ‘habit of 
communication’ of the kind that has been so important within Europe.” What is most 
interesting for the political cooperation is that the military in the region (and especially in 
Brazil and Argentina) developed closer political ties after the redemocratization 
process,32 and those were re-directed from the traditional rivalry logic to extensive 
cooperation (Mullins, 2006; Goncalvez and Pena, 2005; Mathias, Guzzi and Giannini; 
2008). 
 
                                                          
32
 In fact, the raprochement between the military had already started in the last phase of the military dictatorships 
with the Tripatite Agreement signed between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in 1979. This Agreement put an end 
to the conflict over the management of water ressources and construction of the Itaipu Dam, solving one of the 
most serious disputes between Argentina and Brazil. However, the most significant steps toward the de-escalation 
of the rivalry were taken in the first years of the democratic governments with the solution for the nuclear issue 
and economic integration.   
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In this sense, while in Mercosul the economic and commercial issues constituted a set 
of contentious questions in the agenda of integration, the issues of security and defence 
advanced at a much faster pace. A special preoccupation with the consolidation and 
expansion of democratic regimes in the region was exemplified with the adoption of the 
Democratic Clause of the Mercosul. The rapid development of relationships in the field 
of security and defence was a consequence of the existence of consolidated networks 
of relationships among the military in the region. Those relationships were re-directed in 
the democratic transition. The most important mechanism for the creation and streering 
of this network is the School for High Command and General Staff of the Brazilian Army 
(Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exercito - ECEME). Passing in one of the 
graduation courses in the ECEME is a pre-requisite for promotion to the post of General 
in the Brazilian army and an important factor in the promotion of army officers in South 
America. Students in the ECEME are normally majors or lieutenants and are usually 
already married with children. Most officers do not bring their families for the usual 2 
years-course in Rio de Janeiro, and therefore they live together in a shared appartment 
next to the School. This enables an intensive personal exchange between the students, 
thereby creating tight relationships that involve their whole families which eventually 
come for visits. In this network relationship takes precedence, because only graduates 
from the School move upward. Those bonds are maintained informally with email 
conversations and phone calls, mostly containing small talk, however it is no surprise 
that high level officers also talk about politics. As the officers move upwards in their 
careers they expand the group’s contacts. Normally students in the same schoolyear 
attach themselves to a higher level officer, usually one of the Professors or one superior 
officer. These students then become what form the superior’s “trusted men”. Those 
relationships are remembered when one of the officers has openings in his command33. 
Since the beginning of the redemocratization process and through the 1980s and 1990s 
the structure of the courses has been changing to not only include disciplines of 
                                                          
33
 Such networks of relationships can also be seen in the armed forces of other countries/regions. See for instance 
a similar case in the United States Army: Broadwell P. and Loeb, V. (2012) “All in: the education of General David 
Petreaus”, Penguin Press, Washington.   
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democracy and human rights, but also of regionalism and peacekeeping operations. 
Even though the armed forces have autonomy in educational matters, the courses of 
the ECEME have been sanctioned by the Education Ministry. (Medeiros, 2010; ECEME, 
2013)  
 
The most important issue for this dissertation is the impact of those networks on the 
regional political integration. In terms of security and defence issues, despite the 
development of civilian Defence Ministeries in the 1990s and further efforts to enhance 
civilian control over the military, the politics of security and defence in the region are still 
dominated by the military. Therefore the importance to observe how these networks of 
South American military impact on the policy-making and political integration processes 
cannot be overstated. Moreover, it is important to understand the transformation of 
these networks to conform to the norms set by the democratic governments. As 
mentioned above, the networks that have been built in the ECEME play a fundamental 
role in streghtening the relationships of friendship and cooperation between countries in 
the region. Until 2009 the School had graduated 618 officers from Latin American 
countries, including 28 Argentinians, 37 Bolivians, 21 Chileans, 28 Colombians, 21 
Equatorians, 57 Paraguayans, 31 Peruvians, 23 Uruguayans, 103 Venezuelans, and 
many others from Central America34. Those foreign students do the same courses as 
the Brazilians and live together with the Brazilians in the same building. Besides the 
graduation of foreign students, the ECEME has instructors35 from Argentina, Chile, 
Equador, Paraguay, the United States and Spain. According to Gen. Campos, 
commander of the School: “In this aspect [the presence of foreign students], there is not 
only an exchange of knowledge, but also an affirmation of relationship […] It is 
fundamental that foreign students come to us because they learn, teach and – most 
importantly – develop relationships.” Moreover, Gen. Campos states that: “If I had to 
                                                          
34
 Numbers of Dialogo Review, 07/2010: http://www.dialogo-
americas.com/pt/articles/rmisa/features/knowledge_is_power/2010/07/01/feature-01 
35
 The instructors in the ECEME are high level members of the armed forces. 
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choose one factor that differentiates the ECEME from the other similar Schools in Brazil 
and in the World, I would say that it is the will of the officers to come and study here”. 
 
The influence of each of those officers in their respective countries’ foreign and defence 
policies vary according to the pattern of transition each country experienced. For 
instance, while in Brazil the officers still have a position to influence the formulation of 
polices, in Argentina this influence is very small (Goncalvez and Pena, 2005; Mathias, 
Guzzi and Giannini; 2008). Nevertheless, the lack of civilian knowledge or will to deal 
with issues of security and defence leaves the military in the region as the dominant 
players in the field. As a result, when it comes to the regional institutionalization of 
practices already adopted by the military or new policy prescriptions in the area they 
activate the previous transgovernmental contacts in order to coordinate positions and 
arguments to push for a common governmental response by either bypassing or 
supporting their government’s policies, but definitely by influencing their governmental 
positions. The biggest achievement of this network was the creation of the South 
American Defence Council (CDS), which was established under the aegis of the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUL).    
 
The transformation of the military mindset in the aftermath of the redemocratization 
processes in South America was influenced by how the transition from the military 
dictatorships to democratically elected governments was negotiated. In this sense the 
development of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and regional organizations 
were an important step to enhancing civilian control over the military and re-steering the 
military network towards normative conformity. According to Pion-Berlin (2001:24), “[…] 
institutions – be they trade, border or security agreements – can also have an impact on 
domestic civil-military affairs. They do so by shifting the military incentives towards or 
away from support of civilian-led foreign policy initiatives, while altering incentives of 
societal actors either to conspire with the military or to join to constrain its reach.” As a 
122 
 
result institutions can socialize the military to incorporate the normative discourse 
prompted by the new democracies. This logic surrounded the Argentinian-Brazilian 
relationship in the immediate period after the redemocratization, according to the words 
of the former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Lafer (1992 and 2001-2002): “If the 
coincidence of authoritarian regimes favored a somewhat similar perception of the 
international order and the internal order, it also bred a mutual perception of mistrust in 
the bilateral and sub-regional level. Now the simultaneity of the democratic regimes 
breaks the tension and agregates an element of partnership and necessity of both 
governments [Brazilian and Argentinian] to affirm and consolidate the democratic 
civilian control over the military” (1997: 254).                                       
  
The question that remains open is how those military involved in the dictatorships were 
re-directed to comply with democratic norms. This question is especially relevant in 
countries where the military mantained political influence. One important issue that 
should not be overlooked is the reconfiguration of the Brazilian military education which 
took place in the 1990s. This factor is important because most of the transnational 
contacts and the development of networks occurs in the Brazilian military schools. The 
inclusion of disciplines that teach human rights, democracy and new roles for the 
military such as peacekeeping play a role in resocializing the military mindset to comply 
with the democratic standards. As observed in a quantitative study by Medeiros 
(2010:191-196), the younger officers that are more exposed to the new courses are 
more prone to accept civilian control and to take the democratic norms for granted. This 
explanation might work well for the next generation of senior officers, but it has a lesser 
impact on the generation that participated in the dictatorships. This generation was 
socialized in a period that the literature calls “populism” (1946 – 1964), which was 
marked by a mindset composed by views of elitism, moralism, difuse religiosity (in a 
secular state), historic positivism (the military as savior and promoter of the republic), 
and pro-US beahviour. In order to foster compliance of these senior officials socialized 
in the populist era, democratic governments use the attractive device of fulfilling the 
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military corporate wants to reward cooperative behaviour or cut benefits to punish non-
compliant behaviour. This is done by sharing the costs regionally, such as regional 
programs for officers’ exchange, joint exercises, joint arms projects, and the creation of 
regional schools to train the military for UN Peacekeeping Operations36. This mix of 
educational and material rewards enhances regional peace and helps to socialize the 
military into the democratic norms (Hurrel, 1998; Pion-Berlin et all, 2001; Taddei, 2007; 
Mederios, 2010).              
 
Furthermore the concept of path dependence used by historical institutionalists is useful 
and can help us to understand the evolution of political integration in South America. 
Although in South America a lower commitment to institutions is observed than we see 
in Europe, the destiny of the democracies in the region seems to be tied to the 
development of regional institutions that decrease external rivalries and enhance the 
solution of common economic and political problems. Therefore the decisions taken in 
institutionalizing cooperation and moving it forward constrain future decisions, thereby 
increasing the costs of exiting and promoting more integration.         
 
Altogether, those features compose the self-dynamic of the political integration in South 
America and provide the aspects to compare political integration in South America to 
other political integration processes that are developing around the world. One 
distinctive factor that will be analysed below is the self-dynamic of the system, meaning 
how the outcomes produced by it have important impacts on the development of the 
whole system to the point that it will be able to influence the external environment and 
foster further institutionalization. These feedback loops generated by the outcomes of 
the integration represent the major stimulus for its functioning.  
 
                                                          
36
 Argentina and Chile even created a binational military contingent patterned after the French-German battalion 
EuroCorps.  
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Outcomes 
 
The first and foremost attraction for joining the existing institutions in South America is 
the increase of trade and economic well-being. In this sense we see a splendid 
evolution in the past 20 years of integration in Mercosul. As seen in the table below, the 
trade flow in the internal market grew 10 times since the creation of Mercosul in 1991, 
from 2 billion dollars in 1991 to 22 billion dollars in 2010. In the Andean Community the 
trade flow was more modest but was still significant, increasing from 1 billion dollars in 
1999 to 7 billion dollars in 2008. Both institutions are planning to merge and create one 
single internal market by 2014 under the aegis of the UNASUL. The attraction of 
increasing development and economic well-being are translated into association and 
cooperation agreements with other countries/regions and accession strategies designed 
to enlarge membership. Those tools are especially interesting because they are also 
based on political conditionality. Only democratic countries are eligible to join and 
remain in the South American institutions.      
 
Graph 1 – Trade flow in Mercosul 1989 - 2010 
 
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Development 
Graph 2 – Trade flow in the Andean Community 1999 - 2008 
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Source: Andean Community 
 
The second set of outputs, which is defined as bureaucratic, can be understood in the 
development of a South American bureaucracy, with officials from different countries 
thinking on how to move the integration forward. This is especially seen in Mercosulwith 
the creation of the Forum for Consultation and Political Cooperation (FCCP). This 
organism aims to consolidate and expand the political dimension of Mercosul by 
deepening the relations among the member-states and between the member-states and 
third party countries/regions in terms of foreign policy and a common political agenda 
(Decision MERCOSUR/CMC/No 18/98). In this sense we can observe the FCCP 
working as an institution where member states consult and coordinate common political 
positions, both in regard to the internal and external issues related to the bloc. Apart 
from the negotiations of the Mercosul-EU Bi-regional agreements, the associate 
countries37 also participate in the FCCP. The external representation is carried out by 
the High Representative. The FCCP has already produced interesting common policies 
such as the joint positions in the regional (Rio Group, Latin America – European Union 
                                                          
37
 Mercosul member-states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Associate members: Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Non-members with special status: Surinam and Guiana. Observers: Mexico and 
New Zealand.  
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Summit) and international (Iraq War) agenda. The FCCP also plays an important role 
internally, as shown in its resolutions regarding the Paraguayan and Ecuadorian Coups, 
the Bolivian separatism and the state of democracy in the region (Ushuaia Protocol) 
(Ueltschi, 2011). We also observe the development of an incipient South American 
bureaucracy in the South American Defence Council (CDS) of the UNASUL. The South 
American Defence Council (CDS) is an institutional space which was developed in the 
framework of the UNASUL in order to foster regional cooperation and political 
coordination in the field of security and defence. The CDS is not a collective security 
mechanism (like NATO), but it is first of all designed to be a consultative forum where 
governments inform their partners on their positions on issues of security and defence. 
As a result it can be defined as a mechanism of confidence building among the 
countries in the region in order to enhance mutual trust, decrease levels of tension and 
promote at least some political coordination to avoid damaging the economic interests. 
In this sense the CDS can be seen as a forum that can be used by the member States 
to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual relationships in a less 
threatening way, thereby promoting mutual oversight and resolving tensions and 
conflicts among member-states while enhancing the predictability of behaviour and 
promoting mutual understanding (Vaz and Jácome, 2009). 
 
At the diplomatic level we see an increase in the coordination of foreign policies of 
South American countries when those countries are involved in international 
negotiations. The most important outcome at this level is the realization of summits 
between South America and other countries/regions. At the Mercosul level we see the 
high importance of the bi-regional negotiations with the European Union. In those 
negotiations the Mercosul member-states harmonize their interests in advance and 
negotiate as a bloc with the Europeans. At the UNASUL level we note the increase of 
exchanges with African countries in the creation of the UNASUL-Africa Summit. We 
also see the increasing interest of the Arab countries to increase exchanges with South 
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America in the institutionalization of the UNASUL-League of Arab States Summit since 
2005.       
 
On the military level the outcomes vary greatly for a region that was hampered by 
strong rivalries and mistrust not long ago. Since redemocratization we can see an 
increase of joint-military exercises among South American countries. The graph below 
depicts the number of joint military exercises of Argentina in the period between 1993 
and 2004. We can see that in this period Argentina carried out joint exercises with 
almost all of the other South American countries. Brazil, the former rival, supplanted the 
United States as the closest military partner of Argentina during this period. Those joint-
exercises were further institutionalized into formation courses for officers (such as 
Operation Fraterno between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) (Hurrel, 1998: 235; 
Silveira, 2002; Saint-Pierre and Winand, 2005).  
 
Graph 3 – Argentinian joint military exercises with foreign nations 1993-2004   
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Since redemocratization we can also see a proliferation of Peacekeeping Training 
Centers in South American countries. Those PKO Training Centers incorporate officers 
from other countries in the region as both students and as instructors.38 The increasing 
participation of South American countries in Peacekeeping Operations points to the 
necessity to satisfy the military corporate wants of better professionalism in an era of 
budgetary constraints, while at the same time the participation in UN PKO induces the 
military to work with diversity, thereby creating a democratizing effect because it brings 
the principle of tolerance to the soldiers (Diamint, 2001). Beyond increasing the ties of 
friendship and camaraderie already present among the armed forces in the region, the 
participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations prompts the military to incorporate 
subjects such as Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and International 
Relations, etc. in their academy’s curricula (Medeiros, 2010). The culmination of the 
intensive exchange among the UNPKO Training Centres in the region prompted the 
creation of the Association of Latin American and Caribbean Peace Keeping Training 
Centres (ALCOPAZ). This regional joint-training Centre offers courses and organizes 
the cooperation between the diverse national Peacekeeping Centres.        
 
Even though there is a longer tradition of South American countries participating 
individually in Peacekeeping Operations39, the most interesting military outcome of the 
recent political integration in South America is the regional participation in the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Created in 2004 under the 
diplomatic leadership of Chile and the military leadership of Brazil, the MINUSTAH is 
composed of soldiers from all of the South American countries. According to the 
Argentinian General Julio Hand, the participation of South American countries in the 
                                                          
38
 For instance, the Argentinian CAECOPAZ has permanent instructors from Brazil and Chile and has invited 
instructors from other South American countries.  
39
 For instance, Brazil has already participated in 33 PKO with over 27,000 troops (source: Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: http://www.un.int/brazil/book/conselhoSecuranca_index.html) and Uruguay is one of the top ten 
worldwide contribuitors to UNPKO (source: MIT Center for International Studies: 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/fpi_peacekeeping.html).  
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MINUSTAH: “… represents the first project of joint sub-regional participation in a 
Peacekeeping Operation (…) We cannot say that there is an integrated force, but there 
are not only strong ties and interconnections in the General-Staff level, but also in the 
battle-groups level operating in the Mission” (see Mathias, Guzzi and Giannini; 2008: 
77). The importance of transgovernmental networks to the success of the Mission was 
also highlighted by one Brazilian Army General who stated that his personal 
connections with members of the armed forces involved in the Mission (and especially 
those Armed Forces integrated in the Brazilian Battalion such as those from Bolivia, 
Paraguai and Peru) were very important to accomplish certain tactical and operational 
goals. The Minustah represents a breakthrough in terms of military and defence 
cooperation for countries that not long ago were on the brink of a nuclear arms race. 
The UN Mission consists of troops from eight South American countries (including all 
Southern Cone countries) under the military aegis of Brazil (Costa Vaz and Jacome, 
2009).  
 
Graph 5 – Participation of South American Troops in PKO during the month of 
July/2008 
 
Source: DPKO: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml 
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Graph 6 – Brazilian participation in UNPKO (1989-2006) 
          Mission  Location              Military     Police  Civilians            Period 
 
Source: www.seitenfus.com.br 
Graph 6 – Mercosul share of contributions to Peacekeeping Operations 
 
Source: United Nations, 2005. http://www.un.org/spanish/peace 
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Feedbacks 
 
The main characteristic of the system is its self-dynamicism. This self-dynamic system 
would not occur without the feedback loops observed in this section. Those feedback 
loops are represented by the impact of the political outcomes of the system on two 
different levels, namely those that are international and internal to the integration. Both 
processes influence the political integration in different ways, one indirectly through the 
impact of the outcomes on the external environment (international/South 
American/national levels) and the other by directly impacting on the level of 
cooperation/institutionalization in the region (enhancing or constraining). In this last 
section we will present the things which constitute those feedbacks and how they affect 
the South American political integration.  
 
External feedback 
 
As observed above in the previous section about the EU, the concepts of actorness 
(Sjoestedt, 1977; Bretherthon and Vogler, 2006; Hill, 2007) and presence (Allen and 
Smith, 1996; Ginsberg, 1999) help us to understand the impact of political integration 
outcomes on the outside world. Those concepts were created in order to observe the 
notion of the EU as an international actor and its qualities and pre-requisites for 
international actorness and presence, but they are also general enough to help us 
understand the impacts of South American political integration in the international 
environment. 
 
While the EU can be considered a quasi-perfect actor, South America cannot be 
classified as an international actor due to difficulties of acting with cohesion and 
authority, etc. Some South American institutions such as Mercosul have a limited 
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concrete impact on the external world and can be analysed in terms of actorness 
though.  According to Hill (2007: 4), a regional organization can be defined as an actor 
when it “... has the capacity to act and to influence others without necessarily requiring 
the attributes of statehood…” 
 
In terms of presence, the South American integration processes lack the further 
structures and legitimacy which they need to be felt throughout the world, but somehow 
their influence is being felt regionally due to coordinated economic, diplomatic and 
military actions. Nevertheless, it is argued that South American actions have significant 
effects both internally in the member-states (such as with the ease of tensions, 
consolidation of democracy and civilian control over the military), and externally on the 
perceptions and operational environments of third parties (such as the Peacekeeping 
Mission in Haiti and the common positions in international organizations). However, this 
presence impacts differently according to the use of the outcomes at their disposition, 
and therefore we can see that the South American presence is incipient and mainly felt 
internally in the region.     
 
Internal feedback 
 
This second category of feedback represents how outcomes of the South American 
political integration impact directly on the integration process itself, thereby enhancing 
political cooperation and institutionalization.  
 
As seen above, we argue that institutions enhance the prospects of cooperation among 
states (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000). The distinctive impact of policy 
outcomes in the institutionalization process has also been extensively studied (Smith, 
2003). South American political integration is constituted of trial-and-errors, as the 
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former institutionalization attempts have shown, however the dramatic increase in not 
only the institutional nature but also the quality of the political cooperation in South 
America since the redemocratization in the 1980s is clear to see. Therefore, according 
Andrew Hurrel (1998: 252): 
 
“… regionalism has become important to security and political stability, not 
because the costs of fighting became too high according to some abstract 
measure, but instead because it has helped to stabilize the redefinitions of 
interest that occurred in the 1980s and because it promotes an ongoing process 
of socialization and enmeshment. It has done this through a double process of 
internalization, the first element of which involves material changes in the way in 
which politically salient individuals think and act.”  
 
As a result we can see that this feedback loop has a major and more identifiable impact 
in the prospects of political integration in South America. In the absence of a more pro-
active role in international politics the impacts of the South American political integration 
are more visible regionally with the institutionalization of cooperative measures. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
Transgovernmental networks and socialization in European Union Political 
Integration 
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Since the seminal works of Ernst Haas (1958) and Karl Deutsch (1961) there is little 
doubt among students of European integration that international institutions can develop 
senses of community and belonging beyond the nation-state under certain conditions 
(Checkel, 2007; Beyers, 2007). This interaction between European integration and 
changes among domestic actors/institutions is also a subject of the contemporary 
Europeanization studies. In this chapter we analyse how far socialization processes and 
the development of transgovernmental networks have influenced the European political 
integration, especially in the field of security and defence, and whether they were a 
precondition for the institutionalization of cooperation or vice-versa. In this sense we 
observe the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, states and 
state agents internalize group community norms and how transgovernmental networks 
based on those shared understandings give feedback on the process of integration in 
Europe. 
 
In the first part of this chapter the definitions and types of transgovernmental networks 
based on shared principles of trust and consensus-building and which influence the 
integration process in Europe will be examined and presented. We will then continue by 
looking at the conditions under which the European Political Cooperation (EPC) enabled 
the starting point for the consolidation of a transgovernmental network devoted to 
European political integration. It will be shown that the further the political cooperation in 
Europe advanced in its institutionalization then the more dense and broad this 
transgovernmental network became.  
 
In the second part of this chapter we will observe the definitions, strategies and 
mechanisms through which the institutions socialize state agents, thus leading them to 
internalize new roles or group-community norms. After this first glance at the 
socialization and development of the transgovernmental network in the EU the chapter 
will focus on the socialization processes in the contemporary CFSP Council Working 
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Groups, Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER). Those three bodies are the most important in daily EU 
Foreign Policy formulation and decision-making while allowing the measurement of the 
internalization of socialized norms due to its high variance on the socialization 
indicators. In this sense, those three bodies are the main organizations to be tested in 
the task of measuring the influence of socialization processes and transgovernmental 
networks in the European political integration. 
 
3.1 - Transgovernmental networks: definitions, strategies and outcomes 
 
According to Wessels (1997), Slaughter (2004), and Thurner and Binder (2008), 
transgovernmental interactions represent the most important factor in integration 
processes. Sometimes referred to as supranational intergovernmentalism, multilevel 
governance, administrative fusion, Europeanization or Brusselization, 
transgovernmentalism argues that the relationships between national government 
officials at every level of the decision making process shape the European integration. 
In this section we will observe the definitions of and look at why and how 
transgovernmental networks emerge (Howorth, 2000; 2001; Wallace and Wallace, 
2000; Webber et al. 2004; Regelsberger and Wessels, 2005; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 
2006; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle, 2010).   
 
However, in order to understand the development and role of transgovernmental 
networks in International Relations we must first go one step backwards and look at the 
main concepts in “social network analysis” theories. By social network we are not 
referring to the common contemporary use of internet-based tools like Facebook and 
others, but instead social network theory focuses on the idea that personal influence 
plays an important role in decision-making processes. Social network methodology 
helps us to detect and describe formal and informal relations in a policy field. As a result 
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this section is divided into two parts. The first part is an introduction to social network 
theorizing, and the second part explains how IR works out this concept. 
 
 Social Networks 
 
Nowadays when we speak of networks we immediately have in mind the World Wide 
Web, however the basic definition of network is “a set of relationships between objects 
which could be people, organizations, nations, items found in a Google search, brain 
cells, or electrical transformers” (Kadushin, 2012: 3). In this research we are interested 
in transgovernmental networks, which is one kind of social network. In social networks, 
instead of electricity or data the flows among the nodes of the network are constituted of 
friendship, love, money, power, ideas, values, norms, and even diseases. As a result 
social networks are networks involving people and the flows that pass from one to 
another. Those human networks are created by individuals and organizations and 
develop from interaction between its participants, but they also produce extended 
structures that the participants had not imagined and in fact cannot see. The individual 
interaction in the network occurs in a context of social statuses, positions, and social 
institutions, and therefore the social networks are also constrained by these factors. 
These networks are in constant movement and developing or decreasing, but in any 
case they are affecting and changing the very institutions and organizations from which 
they emerged (Kadushin, 2012).   
 
As we mentioned in the definition above, a network is composed first of all of a set of 
relationships. More precisely, a network comprises a set of objects named “nodes”. 
Between the nodes there are flows of relationships. The figures below40 are graphic 
descriptions of simple networks. Figure 3.1 is the simplest value-free form of a network. 
                                                          
40
 All figures are based on Kadushin, 2012: 14-16. 
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Those nodes might be people in the same room for instance. Figure 3.2 is a directional 
relationship. For instance 1 loves 2 but 2 doesn’t love 1. Figure 3.3 represents a 
symmetrical relationship and presents us with one very rare characteristic in networks: 
mutuality. A predominant type of network is anti-symmetric, which means that there is 
no mutuality. Examples vary, such as boss – employee or professor – student, etc.  
 
In most cases however there are n relationships between the nodes, and those are 
called multiplex relationships. Figure 3.4 shows a relationship through an intermediary. 
Those relationships can be transitive, which means that if 1 likes 2, then 2 also likes 3. 
This example also represents a typical hierarchical relationship: 1 gives an order to 2 
that passes it forward to 3. Figure 3.5 is the so-called sociogram and is the basis for 
mathematical analyses and graph methodology (Moreno, 1953). Another possibility is to 
work algebraically with networks depicted as matrixes (table 3.1 is an algebraical 
representation of the sociogram 3.5). The network presented in figure 3.5 has three 
nodes and is called a triad, and this is the building block of more complex networks.        
 
Figure 3.1 – Simple relationship 
 
1                                              2 
       
Figure 3.2 – Directed relationship 
 
1                                             2 
 
 
141 
 
Figure 3.3 – Symmetric relationship 
 
1                                            2 
 
Figure 3.4 – Relationship through intermediary 
 
1                     2                   3 
 
Figure 3.5 – Mutually related three nodes 
 
                         1 
 
 
  2                                          3      
 
Table 3.1 – Adjacency Matrix 
 1 2 3 
1 - 1 1 
2 1 - 1 
3 1 1 - 
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Although most studies with networks are carried out in natural sciences, there are three 
types of networks which are researched by social scientists: ego-centric, socio-centric, 
and open-system networks. Ego-centric networks are those that are centred in just one 
node. Socio-centric networks are those characterised by very controlled closed 
systems, for instance the relationships of children in a classroom. Open-system 
networks are those which are not enclosed and have boundaries which are difficult to 
measure, for instance the connections between elites or corporations41. (Kadushin, 
2012)  
 
In all those types of networks there are some social situations that favours the 
connections between the nodes. Those are mainly caused by propinquity and diverse 
types of homophily. Propinquity refers to the likeliness of nodes being connected to one 
another if they are spatially near. Therefore it is much more probable that individuals will 
make friends to those who are geographically close (Feld and Carter, 1998). There is an 
important distinction between co-location and co-presence though. While the first refers 
to people being in the same geographical range of one another, the latter implies a 
social relationship that happens within a social institution or structure (Zhao and Elesh, 
2008). Common interests and common places for meeting also foster the development 
of relationships (Feld and Carter, 1998). According to Domhoff (1967) in his study of 
elites, people that went to the same prep school at the same time are more likely to 
have a connection and therefore propinquity can be related to the Brusselization of 
political integration in Europe, as we will see later in this chapter. On the other hand, 
homophily refers to the people that share characteristics in a proportion greater than the 
average part of the population, and they are more likely to be connected (Lazarfeld and 
Merton, 1978). However, Kadushin (2012:19) reminds us that the opposite is also true: 
                                                          
41
 Open-system networks are the most studied type of network. The “small world” and diffusion models are drawn 
from this type of network. 
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“if two people are connected then they are more likely to have common characteristics 
or attributes. There is also an implied feedback: over time relationships tend to sort 
themselves out so that they become more homophilous.” Furthermore, Lazerfeld and 
Merton (1978) divide between status-homophily (determined by things beyond control 
such as race, sex, etc., or acquired things such as education, occupation, and marital 
status, etc.) and value-homophily42 (such as common attitudes, stereotypes, etc.). 
According to Burt (1982) there are two causes of homophily: firstly, common norms or 
values may connect people with common attributes (the opposite also holds true), and 
secondly is the structural location of the nodes – meaning that two nodes may have the 
same attributes because they share the same space (and vice-versa). Homophily is a 
fundamental trait of transgovernmental networks and involves seeing the counterpart as 
a peer. 
 
One of the most important ways to describe the aspects of a network is to observe the 
distributions of network properties. This includes an observation of the number of 
connections (dyads, triads), density, structural holes, strength of weak ties, popularity or 
centrality, and distance between the nodes.  
 
Density of a network refers to the number of direct connections divided by the number 
of possible direct connections. According to Kadushin (2012:29): “Density is at the heart 
of community, social support, and high visibility (when people in a network can see what 
others are doing and monitor and sanction their behaviour). Density facilitates the 
transmission of ideas, rumours, and diseases. Other things being equal, the greater the 
density is the more a network is likely to be considered a cohesive community, a source 
of social support, and an effective transmitter.” While density focuses on the amount of 
connections, structural holes focus on the lack of connections. Structural holes are 
mostly used in ego-centric networks when members of a network are connected only 
                                                          
42
 Also called homogeneity (Hall and Wellman, 1985) 
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through one member (ego), and therefore without the presence of this ego the network 
wouldn’t exist. (Burt, 1992) Like structural holes, weak ties also focus on a lack of 
connections in a network. According to Granovetter, 1982:105-106, (see Kadushin, 
2012:30): “Our acquaintances (“weak ties”) are less likely to be socially involved with 
one another than our close friends are (“strong ties”). Therefore the set of people made 
up of any individual and his or her acquaintances will constitute a low-density network 
(one in which many of the possible ties are absent), whereas the set consisting of the 
same individual and his or her close friends will be densely knit (many of the possible 
lines present).” In this sense, weak ties help to facilitate communication from peripheral 
parts of the network and facilitate the integration of social systems. The concept of 
popularity or centrality refers to the node(s) with a high degree of connections. This 
concept could also be called “leadership”, “brokerage43” or “gatekeeping44” because 
those nodes with more connections are responsible for enacting the connections and 
circulating the information among members of the network. This also relates to the 
concept of “betweenness” which refers to the nodes that are “in the middle of things” 
and serve as a switching point between nodes of a network. Ego-centric networks and 
structural holes have a high level of betweenness. (Freeman, 1979)  
 
Another important characteristic of a network is distance. According to the definition, the 
distance between two nodes is measured by the length of the shortest route via the 
edges or binary connections between nodes45 (Kadushin, 2012). However, in networks 
for the diffusion of ideas, values, and norms, redundancy (the fact that one has to hear 
the same thing from different sources to get it rooted) plays a major role. As a result the 
set of nodes directly connected to each other are known as the first-order zone or 
                                                          
43
 See Scott, 2000. 
44
 See de Nooy et al., 2005.  
45
 Also called geodesic distance. 
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“interpersonal environment” (the shortest distance between the nodes) (Barnes, 1972; 
Mitchell, 1969). 
 
When studying social networks it is important to observe their “multiplexity”. This 
concept refers to the fact that sometimes the nodes have more than one single 
relationship with each other. Multiplexity is commonly used in two fashions: firstly as 
role multiplexity which means that two nodes can occupy more than one position that 
ties them together (for instance, the nodes relate as diplomats and friends), and 
secondly as content multiplexity, which refers to when two nodes have one role but the 
flows are multiple (for instance, they are diplomats that negotiate agriculture, security 
and environment). Multiplexity plays a major role in defining the network, and according 
to a very substantial part of the literature the relationship between formal positions held 
in organizations and informal relationships between the nodes has a fundamental 
impact on the organizational outcomes (Homans, 1950; Lazega and Pattison, 1999; 
Podolny and Baron, 1997). As a result there are two different consequences of 
multiplexity: firstly it can enhance a relationship and build trust, or secondly it can create 
conflict and enhance the possibility of fraud (Kadushin, 2012).             
 
The last step of this brief introduction to the concepts of social network theory refers to 
network partitioning (or segmentation). The most important concepts in network 
segmentation are: primary groups, cliques, clusters, cohesiveness, structural 
similarity/equivalence, and core/periphery structures.  
 
Primary groups are those networks where members identify strongly with each other. 
According to the definition of Charles Cooley (1909:23, see Kadushin, 2012:46): “By 
primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and 
cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are 
fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals
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intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common 
whole so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and 
purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by 
saying that it is a “we”; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for 
which “we” is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the 
chief aims of his will in that feeling.” This definition fits well for what the EU scholars 
refer to the development of we-feelings among diplomats involved in the EPC.  
 
Cliques are defined by cohesiveness. In the mathematical definition it is “a maximal 
complete subgraph of three or more nodes” (Luce and Perry, 1949), meaning that all 
nodes of the network are connected to each other (total direct connectivity). Clusters 
refer to a named group or organization (for instance members of the Council Working 
Group on Human Rights are a cluster). They may have a clear hierarchical organization 
or not. In most cases clusters do not overlap, which means that a node can only be part 
of one cluster at a time. Cohesiveness is defined according to Moddy and White, 
2003:106, as “A group is structurally cohesive to the extent that multiple independent 
relational paths among all pairs of members hold it together … The strongest cohesive 
groups are those in which every person is directly connected to every other person 
(cliques), though this level of cohesion is rarely observed except in small primary 
groups”.  The level of cohesiveness can be measured in two equivalent ways: firstly 
when the network is confronted with disruptive forces, and secondly when some nodes 
of the network are suppressed or substituted and/or the connections removed. Another 
example of partitioning networks is by examining those nodes with special or stronger 
relationships with each other (instead of looking for cohesion in terms of relationships 
between the nodes). This concept is called structural similarity46 (Burt, 1992; Borgatti 
and Everett, 1992). Finally, core/periphery structures are the most common method of 
                                                          
46
 This idea is based on an algebrical method called “blockmodeling” developed by White, Boorman, and Breiger 
(1976). According to the literature on blockmodeling, polarization in the network is fundamental to promote social 
change. According to Kadushin (2012:54) “[…] polarization of networks leads to social change in terms of norms, 
values, and other social structures.”    
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network segmentation. This concept sheds light on the relationship between cores of 
nodes that are responsible for dictating the relationship to the periphery. Normally those 
core nodes are the founders of the network and are more enmeshed and experienced 
with the flows. As a result they are the “guides” or norm-setting nodes responsible for 
communicating with the periphery of the network (Kadushin, 2012). 
  
Now that we have examined the basic social network concepts, we will present how the 
concept of transgovermental networks is analysed in the field of International Relations.  
   
 Transgovernmental Networks and IR 
 
The study of transgovernmental networks is interested in the observation of social 
structures involving the relationship between government’s subunits. In this sense it 
tries to detect informal social relationships in addition to the formal ones, thus “verifying 
the growth of a social layer beneath formal state interactions” (Merand, Hoffmann, and 
Irondelle, 2010:4). These networks of government subunits interrelate through 
transversal bureaucratic cooperation which is beyond the formal state hierarchy and 
along functional lines. Therefore we can differentiate between pure 
intergovernmentalism (figure 3.6), transnationalism (figure 3.7) and 
transgovernmentalism (figure 3.8)47. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 adapted from Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle, 2010: 6-7.  
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Figure 3.6 – Intergovernmentalism 
Defence Ministry A                                Foreign Ministry A 
 
 
                                                  Presidency A 
 
 
 
                                                Presidency B     
 
 
 
Defence Ministry B                             Foreign Ministry B  
 
Figure 3.7 – Transnationalism 
  
NGO                                           Foreign Ministry A                              Think Tank       
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                           Defence Ministry B         
                                                                                                                    
      Defence Ministry A 
                                                                                                                                           
Presidency A                                              Presidency B              Foreign Ministry B 
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   Figure 3.8 – Transgovernmentalism 
 
Defence Ministry A                                Foreign Ministry A 
 
 
                                      Presidency A 
 
 
 
                                      Presidency B     
 
 
 
Defence Ministry B                             Foreign Ministry B  
 
 
In International Relations literature the classic definition of transgovernmental relations 
is provided by Keohane and Nye (1974: 43): 
 
“We define transgovernmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-
units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the 
policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take 
the policies of top leaders as our benchmarks of official government policy.” 
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In their definition, Keohane and Nye observe the power of transgovernmental networks 
to go further than the highest governmental authority’s interests. They differentiate two 
types of transgovernmental relations: “transgovernmental coordination” and 
“transgovernmental coalitions”. While the first refers to relationships of government 
officials that are fully consistent with the targets and intentions of top leaders, the latter 
refers to when State interests are diffuse or when the State control of officials is weak 
and officials “perceive a great common interest with another government or sub-units of 
another government” (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 43; Thurner and Binder, 2008: 3). 
 
A more comprehensive definition of transgovernmental networks is offered by Slaughter 
(2004: 7): 
 
“National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed in networks of 
personal and institutional relationships. They would each be operating both in 
domestic and the international arenas, exercising their national authority to 
implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing 
the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational 
counterparts to disseminate and distil information, cooperate in enforcing national 
and international laws, harmonizing national laws and regulations, and addressing 
common problems.” 
 
The definition of Slaughter grasps how the state officials embedded in those 
transgovernmental networks act with a “double hat”, representing their State interests 
and sharing information, while arguing and persuading each other in order to build 
consensus while addressing common issues at the same time. She also highlights the 
distinction among different locations of transgovernmental networks. It is observed that 
they can be located within traditional international organizations and can be created 
both as a result of executive agreements or can be generated spontaneously through 
increasingly regular contacts between officials (Slaughter, 2004: 14). She also identifies 
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three different types of networks: information networks, enforcement networks, and 
harmonization networks.  
 
Information networks are not only exchange information hubs but they often collect and 
distil information about how members behave. The hallmark product of this distillation of 
information is a set of the best possible means for achieving a desired result to a 
common issue (Fulton and Sperling, 1996). Officials in an information network can also 
cooperate to uncover new information of value to all members. Equally important is the 
information that officials exchange about each other relating to competence, quality, 
integrity and professionalism. When a network is established it basically becomes an 
arena of information exchange about member’s reputations and peer pressure. 
According to Slaughter (2004: 54): “[…] Having and caring about a reputation among 
one’s peers is a very powerful tool of professional socialization to the extent that the 
bond between members of a network is that they face common challenges and 
responsibilities, and therefore they are likely to strengthen norms of professionalism.” 
Violations of those norms are likely to be transmitted and harm one’s reputation and 
credibility, thus raising the costs of violations. As we will see below, in the EPC/CFSP, 
these networks are referred to as “bearers of reputation,” thus facilitating the creation of 
behavioural standards and working practices that develop common expectations and 
improve the effectiveness of the social tools of reputational enforcement. In this sense, 
reputation plays a central role in this network of regulation by information, where power 
stems not from coercive threats but from the ability to influence decisions through 
knowledge and persuasion (Majone, 1997; Slaughter, 2004; Smith, 2004). 
 
Enforcement networks are mainly developed in order to enhance cooperation among 
national regulators to enforce existing laws and rules. In this sense, enforcement 
cooperation refers to the sharing of information and the concerted development of 
enforcement strategies to deal with common problems. One of the main features of 
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enforcement networks is its capacity-building through technical assistance and training. 
This kind of network is typically populated by police officers, customs officials, drug 
agents, and prosecutors. The best European example of an enforcement network is the 
EU criminal enforcement network known as the TREVI48 Group. This group was created 
in 1976 and is constituted of national officials from Ministries of Justice and Interior 
responsible for anti-terrorism, international organized crime, and public order. In 1993 
this network was codified in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar (Slaughter, 2004). 
 
Harmonization networks are a product of harmonization agreements between States. 
These agreements aim at the harmonization of regulatory standards with the objective 
of achieving efficiency. These networks clearly represent the complex interrelationship 
between formal international agreements, transgovernmental relations, and domestic 
regulation (Slaughter, 2004). In this sense, harmonization represents “the adoption of 
an international standard that adjusts the regulatory standards or procedures of two or 
more countries until they are the same” (Mattli and Slaughter, 1995: 183). One example 
of a harmonization network is the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) in which 
networks of officials are created in order to standardize their respective national 
requirements on a specific issue (food security, Visa waiver, etc.) 
 
Another possibility to help typify transgovernmental networks is to differentiate between 
horizontal and vertical transgovernmental networks. Horizontal networks refers to the 
relationships of representatives of the States that interact, share information, socialize, 
discuss, and persuade each other in order to achieve a consensus or a common ground 
for cooperation. According to Slaughter (2004: 19): “These [horizontal] networks operate 
both between high-level officials directly responsive to the national political process – 
the ministerial level – as well as between lower level national regulators. They may be 
surprisingly spontaneous – informal, flexible, and of varying membership – or 
                                                          
48
 The acronym TREVI stands for: Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, et Violance Internationale. 
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institutionalized within official international organizations.” On the other hand, vertical 
transgovernmental networks refer to the ties between supranational officials and their 
domestic government counterparts. Supranational organizations are more effective in 
their tasks if they can link up directly with national government institutions. Being 
capable of cooperating with its national counterparts means supranational officials are 
able to exert a more legitimate authority by “borrowing” the coercive power of domestic 
government officials in order to implement supranational rules and decisions (Slaughter, 
2004).    
 
A transgovernmental network can become so sufficiently institutionalized that it can 
transform itself in an international organization or regime. The formalization of 
transgovernmental networks normally follows the path of their own institutionalization, 
meaning that they are not a direct result of international negotiations but instead derive 
simply from regular meetings so that the participating officials decide to constitute 
themselves into an organization, thus influencing the decision of States to 
institutionalize what was previously already agreed between members of the network. In 
other cases the transgovernmental network can just choose to stay looser, consisting of 
webs of agreements, norms and rules that define its behaviour. Transgovernmental 
networks can also be institutionalized by States that aim to exert greater control over 
the networks (Slaughter, 2004; Smith, 2004). 
 
An important piece of the puzzle is to observe how far those transgovernmental 
networks impact on addressing the common problems and how efficiently they do that. 
According to Slaughter (2004: 24), transgovernmental networks contribute in three 
ways: 1. By creating convergence and informed divergence; 2. By improving 
compliance with international (organizational) rules; and 3. By increasing the scope, 
nature, and quality of international cooperation. In this way networks lead to the 
development of standard rules and practises which are common to the countries that 
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participate in them. This can lead to a sufficient policy convergence which enables the 
development of a more formal international organization or regime over the longer term. 
As a result, soft law codes of conduct which are created by transgovernmental networks 
together with the simple diffusion of credible and authoritative information also promotes 
political convergence. Nevertheless, the attempt to promote convergence can also lead 
to informed divergence, when governments acknowledge a prevailing standard and 
intentionally choose to diverge from it for reasons of national history, culture, or politics. 
Transgovernmental networks also enhance existing cooperation by providing individuals 
with the information, norms, rules and principles they need to figure out how to improve 
their performance against benchmarked standards by moving away from the traditional 
command-and-control methods to a more “regulation by information” approach. Finally, 
transgovernmental networks can socialize their members in ways that create a 
perceived cost in deviating from the standards. In this sense, socialization can operate 
within transgovernmental networks in different ways, most importantly by inducing 
compliance with collectively generated rules through peer pressure. In his seminal work, 
Mancur Olson (1965) showed that small groups are especially well suited to overcoming 
the problems of collective action because of their ability to put social pressures and 
reward with social incentives to induce compliance. Those incentives are most powerful 
when they are selective, meaning when “the recalcitrant individual can be ostracized 
and the cooperative individual can be invited into the center of the charmed circle” 
(Olson, 1965: 61). These kinds of incentives work primarily in groups that are small 
enough that members can know each other personally, and they are even stronger in 
groups that are relatively homogenous in terms of norms and values. 
 
In the next section we will observe the development of transgovernmental networks in 
Europe, including how they were created and developed and how they influence the 
path towards political integration in Europe. 
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3.1.1 - Common foreign policy on the making: transgovernmental networks 
and the EPC/CFSP 
  
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union represents a milestone for the foreign 
and security integration in the EU with the formal institutionalization of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of a three-pillar Union. 
However, this outcome represents the two decades of silent evolution of a more 
informal mechanism, the European Political Cooperation (EPC). In this section we will 
observe the antecedents of the EPC and look at how and why it developed as a 
transgovernmental network and its influence on the formal institutionalization of the 
CFSP/ESDP.  
 
It is not very surprising that strongly interdependent States involved in an economic 
integration project would establish at least modest political institutional support in order 
to avoid a situation where different political views which are too different could harm 
economic integration. In this sense there is little doubt that the first drive for the creation 
of the EPC could be described in part as a consequence of functional or sectoral 
spillover (Smith, 1998; Mattli, 1999). What is extraordinary about the EPC is that 
member governments felt increasingly impelled to develop and adhere to common 
norms, even though the EPC had a very weak and almost inexistent organizational 
structure with an inexpressive participation of supranational actors. However, some 
questions need to be addressed to see how the transgovernmental network created for 
- and mainly within - the EPC influenced the institutionalization of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the European Union. How could an allegedly weak agreement 
such as the EPC have such deep impacts on its member governments, especially in 
such a sensitive issue-area such as foreign policy cooperation? How could this happen 
with no involvement of supranational actors such as the EC? In this section we will 
challenge the notion that strict State interests dominate the EPC/CFSP decision-making 
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process, notwithstanding the fact that the EPC originated as an intergovernmental talk-
shop. Secondly, it will be shown that the EPC changed from a strict intergovernmental 
system due to the development and enhancement of a transgovernmental network 
which linked and harmonized foreign policy-making in the member-states. 
 
According to first-hand policy-makers accounts such as De Schoutheete (1996) and 
academic research such as Nuttall (1992), the EPC developed as an unusual European 
institution, a community of national diplomats (Diplocom). It reinforced informal rules of 
behaviour established through trial and error. Those informal EPC rules changed it from 
being simply a forum for sharing information among governments, as it was designed, 
to a more institutionalized, collective, legally-binding system, even though some 
governments tried to resist the process. In addition, state preferences were often 
formed endogenously within the EPC’s transgovernmental network. The member 
governments did not monopolize the EPC system. Its administrative infrastructure, 
based on a highly complex transgovernmental information network, was developed in 
such a way that it limited the ability of senior-level officials of member states who were 
not involved in daily EPC issues to dominate the entire policy process. In this sense the 
EPC’s outcomes were less based on ad hoc political discussions than on the 
socialization of lower-level officials in national capitals. According to Smith (1998: 309): 
“Shared ideas and understandings were pursued in this [transgovernmental] network, 
and this sensitivity to European issues among lower-level policy-makers filtered up to 
governments in terms of the issues and options that were considered. With EPC’s low-
key network of transgovernmental consultation, state preferences were changed in 
some cases and practically created out of thin air in others”. Secondly, the 
transgovernmental network in the EPC developed its customs into rules that did not 
stress bargaining. The EPC was not used as a forum for making side-payments, 
threatening sanctions against each other, or linking issues into broad package deals in 
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order to solve incomplete contracting problems49. That kind of behaviour was 
considered inappropriate by officials who preferred to avoid power politics and 
confrontations during their discussions. Instead, officials emphasize the exchange of 
views and persuasion, and if states discovered a common interest during discussions 
they could act in common if they wanted to. In this sense the EPC was seen as a 
problem-solving forum instead of a bargaining style of decision-making. This happened 
thanks to the links of trust built up in the transgovernmental network. Officials stress the 
EPC’s social dimensions and the importance of persuasion and peer pressure. Once 
these informal rules provide themselves to be useful they were preserved in a coherent 
body of policies and procedures that later conditioned the EPC outcomes (Glarbo, 1999; 
Hill, 1993; Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 1998; 2004). 
 
The substantial effects of this behaviour on the outcomes of the European cooperation 
in foreign policy were exponential. The first direct tools of the EPC were declarations, 
démarches, and common positions to international organizations and conferences50. 
The direct impact of this political coordination can be attested to with the rapid increase 
of voting unanimity among EPC states at the UN General Assembly, which jumped from 
30-40% in the 1970’s up to 80% at some point in the 1980’s. The performance in the 
CSCE was even better. The EPC tools expanded to include codes of conduct, written 
conventions, economic aid and sanctions, peace and democratization plans, and fact-
finding missions, etc (Smith, 1998: 311). Moreover, the EPC changed the ways member 
states determined and pursued their interests. In this sense, countries with no previous 
interest in specific problems took EPC positions or even strongly supported EPC’s 
positions (such as Irelands participation during the Portuguese crisis in 1975 and the 
first years of the Euro-Arab dialogue). Member’s foreign policies became more 
                                                          
49
 According to Johnston (2001: 488-491), the involvement in international institutions can lead to changes in state 
behavior once those conditions mentioned are absent. In this case, those changes can be atributed to socialization 
effects.   
50
 See annex I for a complete list of EPC/CFSP/ESDP tools. 
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transparent and predictable and compliance with common positions became stronger, 
even in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms. 
 
The development of the Diplocom was in fact the key feature of the EPC from the 
beginning. Due to the fact that rules and sanctions were not well developed in the EPC 
and because decisions were not legally binding on the member states, officials 
experienced more freedom of movement. Also, the fact that governments allowed 
coordination to occur below the highest levels to harmonize their views in order to 
produce common positions enabled the emergence of a tighter coupled 
transgovernmental network. For States, the development of this transgovernmental 
network was acceptable and a low cost alternative to devoting resources to a 
permanent staff and secretariat to manage the EPC. However, that was the first step 
towards the institutionalization of political cooperation. Despite the fact that the rules of 
the EPC were sometimes developed in a process of trial and error, States did not object 
to the increasing links between professional bureaucrats and diplomats. For instance, 
coordination below the level of foreign ministers was reached through regular contacts 
between the Foreign Offices. Those contacts occurred primarily in the Political 
Committee (PoCo) which was composed of Political Directors of the member state’s 
Foreign Offices. PoCo started with at least four meetings a year and eventually met 
once a month. With its unusual casual group atmosphere, the PoCo reached many 
agreements, most of which had to be defended later to individual national governments. 
The PoCo was also allowed to set up working groups composed of experts from foreign 
or other appropriate ministries. Below the PoCo, a European Correspondents body was 
created to manage the EPC on a daily basis because the EPC had no secretariat. The 
main task of the European Correspondents was to serve as liaison between member 
states capitals (Hill, 1993; Nuttall, 1992; Glarbo, 1999; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). 
According to Smith (1998: 314): “Cohesion within this group [European Correspondents] 
became especially close over the years, and it fostered many personal friendships. With 
their common bureaucratic roles, esprit de corps, and devotion to a new policy system 
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that privileged their input, European Correspondents and EPC working groups made 
common analyses of problems rather than bargaining on behalf of their governments.” 
 
This horizontal, information-sharing, transgovernmental network was further deepened 
with the development of the Correspondence Europeène (COREU). COREU was a 
telex network created in 1973 to enhance the communication among officials dealing 
with the EPC. In Table 1 we can observe the exponential growth in the number of 
COREU telexes on the EPC from 1974 to 1994.  This system enabled officials to share 
their points of view with all other participants in a matter of few hours. Besides this 
quantitative change, the qualitative change can also be seen with more security and 
defence issues being discussed via COREU.  
Table 1: Growth in the number of COREU telexes on EPC, 1974-9451 
Year Number  
1974-82 4.800 (avg.) 
1985 5.400 
1986 9.800 
1990 7.548 
1991 10.184 
1992 11.394 
1993 11.714 
                                                          
51
 Recent data on COREU are difficult to evaluate due to the use of emails supplementing the telex system in the 
EU and the 1995 enlargement. The objective with this table is to show the fundamental importance of 
institutionalized communications during the formative years of the EPC, and the COREU data reflect this finding. 
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1994 12.699 
Source: (2004), Smith, Michael E., Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – the institutionalization of Cooperation, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 101.                
The day-to-day contacts of this transgovernmental network helped to limit the strict 
intergovernmental monopoly of the EPC process52 and the working groups created in 
the PoCo also played a greater role, as was anticipated by member states, by 
frequently suggesting collectively derived options to higher officials (Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007). Most scholars of the European political integration observe the 
emergence of a “mobilization effect” or “coordination reflex” among Foreign Offices and 
member states missions in international organizations (also described in the 
Copenhagen Report, 1973). This refers to the automatic consultation through the 
COREU communications system in order to exchange information, consider options and 
build consensus, even before individual national positions over a foreign policy issue 
were adopted (De Schoutheete, 1980; Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981; Hurd, 1981; Nuttall, 
1992; Smith, 1998; 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, etc). As a result, 
officials from member states dealing with the EPC gradually oriented themselves toward 
“Europe” when considering foreign policy issues. According to Wessels (1982) and De 
Schoutheete (1980), by empowering and involving domestic bureaucrats with the task 
of developing political cooperation in Europe the EPC developed some sense of 
organizational loyalty among foreign policymakers by moving their positions towards a 
middle ground instead of defending strict national considerations. 
 
Finally, the development of the EPC stimulated the idea of joint gains and common 
perceptions based on an especially designed communauté de vue. The 
transgovernmental network built inside the EPC allowed relations to be structured 
towards achieving a European consensus on foreign policy issues. This is not to 
                                                          
52
 Jolyon Howorth (2000 and 2011) suggests that political integration in Europe must be understood beyond the 
the supranational vs. intergovernmental divide. As a result he coined the term “supranational 
intergovernmentalism” to describe the influence of the community of diplomats (Diplocom) in the European 
political integration.   
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overstretch the explanatory power of individual personalities, career options and 
loyalties, but the information-sharing and consultation mechanisms developed by the 
Diplocom in the EPC permitted the idea that most officials felt committed to the 
communauté de vue (Glarbo, 1999; Smith, 1998). In the following sections we will see 
the conditions under which this transgovernmental network was created and how it 
influenced the evolution of a loose discussion forum (EPC) to the institutionalization of 
the cooperation into the CFSP/ESDP.  
 
The years before: from EDC to Elysée 
  
The 1954 failed French plans to develop a European Defence Community (EDC) with 
the “Pleven Plan” which would work in the framework of a European Political 
Community following the lines of the European Community (EC)53 left two immediate 
legacies: firstly, the German and Italian rearmament was left as an issue for the 
Western European Union (WEU) which had most of its security and defence functions 
transferred to NATO. Secondly, it was common sense that a political union in Western 
Europe should start in an informal or indirect way (Furdson, 1980; Menon, Forster and 
Wallace, 1992).  
 
On his comeback to the French presidency, Charles de Gaulle proposed a three-power 
directorate which would serve as a political cooperation framework54 for the Americans, 
                                                          
53
 As the description requires, when I refer to the European Community (EC) it is understood to be following the 
common usage to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Community and the European 
Economic Community linked together with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The term is referred to in the literature as 
“European Communities”. The EC was absorbed by the EU with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU – 
Maastricht Treaty). Here the terms are used interchangeably.   
54
 As stated in Grosser, Alfred, (1980) The Western Alliance, London: MacMillan,, page 304: “[this directorate 
would have]… made joint-decisions in all political questions affecting global security … and would also draw up 
and, if necessary, implement strategic action plans, especially with regards to the use of nuclear weapons”. 
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British and French. This idea was immediately rejected by the Americans and British, 
thereby turning the attention of the French towards continental Europe (West Germany, 
Italy and the BENELUX States). The French government suggested they should hold 
informal talks between the foreign ministers in order to discuss foreign policy issues. An 
agreement was reached in November 1959, but defence matters were excluded from 
the meetings and they would mainly focus on European instead of Atlantic issues 
(Grosser, 1980; Furdson, 1980). 
 
Despite its limitations and its problematic relationship with the United States, this 
intergovernmental agreement provided the basis for the Luxemburg Report ten years 
later. It was the first recognition that the efforts for economic integration would have 
impacts on political relationships too. Due to its ineffectiveness in producing coordinated 
actions the French, with the support of the Germans, proposed a political union based 
on intergovernmental meetings and a secretariat in Paris, but the EC small States, led 
by the Dutch, promptly rejected the French proposition fearing that some kind of 
Political Committee dominated by the French or the Germans could undermine the EC, 
which at the time was still fragile (Smith, 2004; Nuttall, 1992). 
 
Replying to the Dutch concerns, some ideas to develop a loose intergorvernmental 
procedure to promote political integration were suggested. For this purpose, a study 
commission led by the French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet, was set up. 
The main idea of the “Fouchet Plans” was to create a new council of heads of State or 
government with powers to “harmonize, coordinate, and unite the foreign, economic, 
cultural, and defence policies of the Six”. The proposal failed again due to the 
resistance of small EC States, now led by Belgium. Even though the Fouchet Plans 
were revised to try to reconcile the intergovernmental and supranational visions of 
political cooperation that divided the Europeans, it failed to bridge the divide (Allen and 
Wallace, 1982; Nuttall, 1992).  
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Meanwhile, through the close relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom the Atlantic Alliance was managing all defence and security issues at the 
European level, what made the French president Charles de Gaulle veto the UK 
application to join the EC and resume the efforts to find a “European way” to political 
integration based on the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation (called the Elysée 
Treaty). This Treaty, signed in January 1963, established close cooperation between 
France and Germany on issues of foreign policy, defence and culture, but the Germans 
wanted it to refer explicitly to the cooperation in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, 
thus blocking an independent European defence policy. In this sense, as the French 
could not find resonance for its proposal of creating a defence policy more independent 
from the Atlantic Alliance and they were not willing to accept any kind of foreign policy 
cooperation which would not include the defence component, the political cooperation at 
the European level stalled for the rest of the decade (Smith, 2004; Menon, Forster and 
Wallace, 1992). 
 
The Luxemburg Report and the EPC 
 
A couple of years later the idea of greater political integration at the European level 
regained power due to the enlargement perspectives of the EC, the final stage of the 
Common Market, the inability even to discuss the Six-Day War, and Charles de Gaulle 
stepping down as French president. In this context, the debate about an institutionalized 
political integration restarted with the Hague Summit in December 1969 in which the 
foreign ministers of the Six were instructed to study the best way to achieve political 
unification,55 thus “paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its 
responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate 
                                                          
55
As explicitly cited, the foreign ministers were not supposed to develop institutions for foreign policy cooperation 
but to study the possibilities of political unification which were not defined in the instructions. (Smith, 2004: 69)  
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with its traditions and its mission” (Regelsberger, 1997: 6). The foreign ministers of the 
Six passed the instruction to the Political Directors which were responsible for drafting 
the Luxemburg Report (also called the Davignon Report). This report created the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Smith, 2004).  
 
The ghost of the failed EDC and Fouchet Plans haunted the negotiators during the 
deliberations, meaning that the participants of the negotiation did not want to open the 
Pandora’s Box of discussing the views of intergovernmental or supranational political 
unification which led to the collapse of previous attempts. This norm of not discussing 
issues that led to the failure of previous attempts of integration (mainly the subject of 
supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism) and focusing on consensus building was 
one of the first features on the development of the transgovernmental network 
composed by the Political Directors in charge of the Luxemburg Report’ negotiations. 
They were also aware that the perspectives of enlargement and especially the inclusion 
of a major power like the UK could undermine the efforts already made to coordinate 
the policies of the Six. Moreover, France and Germany were unable to assume a bigger 
part of the leadership and the US was still standing against the idea of a more politically 
independent Europe (Smith, 2004; Nutall, 1992).  
 
Unlike its predecessors (the EDC and the Fouchet Plans) the EPC was successful 
because it gave away the main problem of its predecessors as it was neither 
supranational or federal like the EDC nor completely intergovernmental and separate 
from the EC like the Fouchet Plans (Nuttall, 1992: 30). However, the most important 
features during the creation of the EPC were the development of an information-sharing 
transgovernmental network directed at consensus building and the recognition of 
member states’ that at least some political coordination and cooperation were important 
in order  to avoid harming the EC, its policies, and the relationships between 
themselves and between the EC and the external world. Therefore we can argue that 
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one of the most important achievements of the political cooperation in Europe was not 
the establishment of capacities to act on the world stage but the ability to avoid internal 
disruption due to extremely different political views. Furthermore, it gave a voice to 
member-states in the international arena, and by the 1980´s this was a tool of 
preventive diplomacy in the East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern Europe 
(Hill, 1993; Stewart, 2006). 
 
According to the framework proposed by the Luxemburg Report the idea of a common 
foreign policy was discarded, or at least omitted from the framework. The defence 
issues were not to be discussed in the EPC but in NATO following the concerns from 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK of interfering with NATO politics. The 
institutional framework of the EPC was also very loose. The foreign ministers should 
meet at least twice a year to discuss international problems, however there were no 
specific decision-making mechanisms for producing coordinated foreign policy positions 
and taking common actions. Coordination was to be delivered by the regular Political 
Committee (PoCo) meetings which were composed of national Political Directors. Some 
countries had to create the position of Political Director in their Foreign Ministries due to 
the EPC (e.g. UK). This small evidence shows how the EPC somehow impacted on the 
domestic political systems of the member-states. The Luxemburg Report also required 
that each member-state should designate a liaison official to hold responsibility for the 
EPC on a daily basis in the absence of a secretariat. Those officials were later known 
as “European Correspondents”. As a result we can conclude that according to the 
Luxemburg report the EPC had a scarce institutional sphere, was dependent on the 
national foreign ministries and limited the participation of the EC procedures and 
organizations, even though it recognized the legitimacy of the EC, and it also 
established an informal biannual colloquy between foreign ministers and members of 
the EP (Smith, 2004). 
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The EPC was the perfect system for states who preferred to cooperated informally: it 
had no permanent budget, finances and staff for many years, no fixed meeting place, no 
secretariat, no specific subject to start the discussions, no compliance standards, no 
record-keeping system, and no legal obligations or enforcement mechanisms. Its 
administrative infrastructure was carried out exclusively by the foreign ministries of the 
member-states and the three most important documents until 1981: the Luxemburg 
Report, Copenhagen Report and London Report, had no treaty status and therefore 
didn’t need parliamentary ratification. This was a perfect system for States that wanted 
to avoid explicit, formal and visible pledges so that they could easily renegotiate their 
commitments and develop or abolish the system at the pace they desired. In short, in 
the beginning the EPC was little more than an exclusive “gentlemen’s club”, run by 
diplomats for diplomats (Lipson, 1991; Smith, 1998; 2004). Nonetheless, the lessons of 
the failed attempts at political cooperation showed the negotiators involved in the 
creation of the EPC that a more formal, legally binding agreement would be impossible 
at that time.  
 
Informal networks of political cooperation: Copenhagen and London Reports 
 
With the Copenhagen Report of 1973 and the London Report of 1981, the EPC gained 
weight and showed the importance of informal cooperation to European political 
integration. The Copenhagen Report established a transgovernmental infrastructure 
which gave rise to a broad information-sharing structure (combination of actors 
involved, types of information and channels of communication) that helped to prevent 
clashes on foreign policy interests among member-states and even stimulated the 
coordination and cooperation of policy views with the goal of solving common 
problems56. According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 92 – 93), “many of these … 
                                                          
56
Among these transgovernmental infrastructure created with the Copenhagen Report we can cite: the 
cooperation between embassies of member-states in third-countries and in international organizations and 
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[information-sharing] … mechanisms and processes were not ordained by EU 
governments; they were based on the habits and customs of EPC diplomats 
themselves.” With the Copenhagen Report, the Political Committee (PoCo) was allowed 
to meet as much as the amount of work required and established the role of the 
Working Groups in the elaboration of the EPC (Nuttall, 1992; 2000). This enabled the 
foreign ministries to refer to the “reflex of coordination” which means that they had been 
accustomed to automatic consult with their colleagues on important foreign policy 
matters.  
 
This information-sharing structure left by the Copenhagen Report can be translated as 
five major institutional developments to European political integration process. First it 
was a confidence-building measure in the sense it reduced the possibilities that the 
member-states would be surprised with others positions on foreign policy, thus reducing 
the possibility of conflict inside the community. Second, it helped to define to which 
problems the EPC were to address. Third, it helped to produce common points of view 
and analyses. Fourth, it had an evaluative aspect, that means there were discussed not 
only the EPC performance regarding a specific policy but also the overall development 
and effectiveness of it as an institution. Fifth it helped to enhance the demands for more 
norms and rules of behaviour to address common problems and the daily management 
of the EPC. Therefore the main policy outcomes of the EPC under Copenhagen Report 
were: 1. creation of institutionalized regional political dialogues, as seen in the Euro-
Arab Dialogue, and 2. the first experiments with conflict prevention and civilian crisis 
management outside the community, with the European responses to the Arab-Israeli 
War of October 1973, the Portuguese Revolution of April 1974, the Cyprus Coup of July 
1974, and the execution of Basque terrorists in Spain in 1975 (Regelsberger, 1988; 
Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
especially the development of the COREU (encrypted telex network to share information on issues of foreign policy 
among member-states).   
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After the consistent establishment of the transgovernmental network at the time of the 
Copenhagen Report and further disappointments with the response of the EPC to the 
crises in Iran and Afghanistan the member-states agreed to improve the EPC, although 
with caution and efforts made not to make it more supranational. As a result the London 
Report was negotiated under the British presidency. The new Report focused on three 
areas of improvement within the EPC in particular: a better consultation mechanism in 
case of crises, the establishment of an administrative secretariat to the EPC, and the 
necessity for stronger political commitment of the member-states to the EPC (Nuttall, 
1992). Therefore the London Report aimed to produce a major change in the EPC in 
order to transform it from a coordination mechanism to a tool for supporting the 
European interests in its international relationships (Smith, 2004). Here we can see the 
policy-makers recognizing that the EPC worked well enough as a preventive diplomacy 
mechanism (especially in the cases of East-West relations and Middle East and 
Southern Europe as mentioned above), and now they realized they needed to deepen 
the conflict prevention tools. As a result, with the London Report the member-states 
indicated their will to start building the basis for an external crisis management 
approach57, thereby demonstrating the potential for projecting stability beyond its 
borders (Stewart, 2006).  
 
It is important to highlight the evolution of procedural and substantive norms and rules 
inside the transgovernmental network after the Copenhagen Report. Those norms and 
rules enhanced the cohesion of the network, and although not institutionalized in a 
treaty they presented the driving force towards the forging of consensus and further 
development of the EPC as the main European political tool. These norms developed 
                                                          
57
According to the London Report, Part I: „ … possible to discuss in political cooperation certain important foreign 
policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security.”  
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through constant debate, interaction among the negotiators and trial-and-error learning, 
as reflected in the Luxemburg, Copenhagen and London Reports.  
 
The Single European Act: institutionalized cooperation 
 
The provisions of the London Report were further discussed in the 1983 Stuttgart 
Declaration which highlighted the importance of greater coherence and close 
coordination between the EPC and EC structures (Nuttall, 1992), but the EPC was only 
codified in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. However, it was still treated as a 
separate entity to the EC, thus reflecting the concerns of the member-states with its de 
jure intergovernmental character (Stewart, 2006). The SEA recognized that while the 
EC was based on its own treaties the EPC was based on “…reports of Luxembourg 
(1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), the Solemn Declaration on European 
Union (1983) … [Stuttgart Declaration] … and the practices gradually established 
among the member states [called the coutumier]58”. The SEA also highlighted that:  “… 
[member-States] are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political 
and economical aspects of security…”59. 
 
The SEA included the most complex provisions since the EPC was created, mainly 
involving three aspects of the system: intergovernmental, transgovernmental and rule-
governed. Firstly it slightly enhanced the intergovernmental character of the EPC by 
basically establishing the role of the European Council (Bonvicini, 1988) on one hand 
but allowing the EPC meetings to be held together with the General Affairs Council of 
the EC on the other, thereby challenging the procedural distinction between the EPC 
and EC affairs. The transgovernmental aspect of the EPC was also slightly improved in 
                                                          
58
 Single European Act, Title I, Article 1 (emphasis added).  
59
Single European Act, Title III, Article 30 6(a) (emphasis added).  
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the SEA due to the move of the Political Committee to Brussels and the increase in the 
frequency of the EPC working groups meetings in Brussels (a process called 
“Brusselization” by many EU scholars) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). Those 
actions enhanced the consultation and brought the EPC closer to the EC. Thirdly, the 
SEA formally codified many EPC informal norms, rules and customs as “general 
obligations” or legal rules and demanded that the EC and EPC external policies should 
be consistent, thus highlighting the importance and influence of the norms developed by 
the transgovernmental network into the integration process. In conclusion, the SEA did 
not make the EPC either more “supranational” or less “intergovernmental,” but its main 
achievement was to codify existing practices and to formally start to bridge the gap 
between the community and the EPC (Smith, 2004). 
 
Treaty of Maastricht: CFSP   
 
The fact that the international system was rapidly changing at the end of the 1980´s 
prompted major challenges and reforms to many institutions, including NATO, WEU, 
CSCE and the EU. However, it was not only due to external pressures that the 
institutional reform of the European political integration occurred, and instead those 
changes reflected endogenous, path-dependent processes. More precisely, those 
changes reflected the further codification of previously established norms and principles 
which were already in motion at the EPC. The institutionalization of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on 
European Union – TEU) represented a natural, logical progression by codifying what 
was already achieved with the EPC and establishing new goals and procedures into the 
system (Smith, 2004: 107). 
 
Nevertheless, we can define four major areas of improvement of the European political 
integration as established by the Treaty on the European Union. Firstly it demanded a 
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higher level of coherence and rationalization of the policy-making process. Secondly, it 
established the CFSP as legally binding on EU member-states. Thirdly, it established 
many areas in which decision-making would take the form of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) instead of unanimity, and finally, it provided the EC organizational actors with a 
broader degree of autonomy to act in European foreign policy. 
 
The TEU clearly signalled the vision (mainly stated by France and Germany) that the 
EPC needed to be transformed from a reactive to a proactive cooperative mechanism. It 
was the recognition that the EPC was unable to deal with the crises that affected 
Europe, and this deficiency was felt mainly during the outbreak of the Gulf War and the 
civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore issues of security and defence were 
brought to the negotiation table for the new Treaty while concerns over the possibility of 
serious security and defence problems in the post-Cold War era could undermine the 
ability of the Europeans to even prevent conflict inside Europe. Moreover, Europeans 
recognized that they would have more foreign interests with the development of the 
Single European Market and the possibility of a European Monetary Union, but they 
lacked institutional resources to politically protect those interests. Also, the demand to 
aid the Central and Eastern European Countries to support democracy and 
development posed a challenge to the European political structures.  
 
Under the TEU the CFSP represented a mix of intergovernmental and supranational 
elements, with enhancements and extensions of institutional mechanisms. The major 
elements of change can be identified as the rationalization of the policy process, the 
establishment of binding legal obligations, changes in decision-making rules, and the 
greater autonomy of EC organizations.  
 
In the TEU the Europeans agreed to include the need for more cooperation in defence 
matters in the provisions of the CFSP, even though they did not agree to merge the 
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Western European Union (WEU) with the EU60. This clarified the decision-making 
process for the use of common positions and joint actions alongside the normal EPC 
consultations, declarations, and demarches, and this is a change from a consultative 
approach of the EPC to a mechanism designed to produce regular foreign policy 
outputs (see the actual CFSP instruments on the Annex I). The EU presidency 
represented the Union under the CFSP (as one of the two intergovernmental pillars of 
the Union – CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs), implemented its policies and was 
responsible for expressing the EU positions in international organizations and 
conferences. The EU presidency could be assisted by the Troika (former, current and 
following EU presidencies), the Commission and the WEU (in any decisions and actions 
of the Union with defence implications).  
 
In the second element we can observe that for the first time the European political 
cooperation was institutionalized in terms of a Treaty, and the CFSP common positions 
had the form of a formal legal act of the Council of Ministers and therefore they were 
legally binding on EU states (they are published in the Official Journal of EC 
Legislation). Moreover, the term Common Foreign and Security Policy denoted the EU`s 
will to transform itself into a global actor and reflected an obligation towards joint policy 
making rather than the coordination of individual national foreign policy goals during the 
EPC. 
 
In the third element we can see that a major advance regarding decision-making rules 
was that the TEU established that any initial decision concerning actions under the 
CFSP must be unanimous, but once passed the actions could be subject to QMV (such 
as means, duration, financing, etc.). Together with the inclusion of defence issues, the 
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 However there was a WEU declaration attached to the TEU in which the WEU would commit to strengthen itself 
as the defence arm of the EU and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.  
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QMV was a major advance of the CFSP compared with the EPC, even though there are 
many rules and restrictions to the use of QMV.  
 
Finally, in the fourth element the TEU saw the increase of autonomy on the part of EC 
organizations. This was both due to Treaty provisions and to complex linkages of EC 
actors and CFSP policy process. The creation of a “Unified External Services” and the 
new DG-IA (Directorate General – External Political Relations) represented those 
linkages between the EC and CFSP. With the creation of these organs we can see that 
the economic and political functions of external relationships were inseparably linked for 
the Commission. 
 
Even though the taboo over defence issues was brought down under Maastricht, 
different visions on what would be an independent European defence structure, the 
future of NATO and the WEU and the relationship between the EU, WEU and NATO 
undermined the efforts of a common European defence (van Ecklen, 1998). Therefore 
under Maastricht the CFSP, like its predecessor the EPC, was basically devoted to 
long-term conflict resolution with diplomatic and economic tools and not a quick crisis 
management mechanism using military means, as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in 
1991 and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia showed (Stewart, 2006). The 
institutionalization of the transgovernmental network of officials dealing exclusively with 
military issues was pushed forward only after the Yugoslavian Crisis. This explains the 
inability to reach a European consensus to military action during this crisis. Due to the 
strong resistance in the military staff of some countries of the EU (such as England, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, etc.), those issues were left to NATO. The development 
of an institutional setting to deal with military issues was only possible after the Saint 
Malo agreement and the development of capacities to launch joint operations. For this 
reason it is important to distinguish between the “coordination reflex” and socialization 
effects in the foreign ministries and the transgovernmental network among military staff 
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in the EU that is still on the making  (what Christoph Meyer calls “development of a 
European strategic culture”, 2007). Those crises influenced the reform of the CFSP 
under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which emphasised the operational capacities, 
coherent foreign policy representation and competences on planning and analysis. 
 
Considering the fact that during the EPC years security and defence issues were a 
taboo, we can see that during the European Councils in 1992 (Lisbon and Edinburgh) 
and 1993 (Brussels) the EU defined specific issues in the security area that could be 
subject to joint actions (those included non-proliferation, territorial and political integrity 
of the EU, stability of neighbouring nations, etc.). Nevertheless, until the beginning of 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 few minor security-related issues were 
addressed by the CFSP through joint-actions. Even during the early 1996 crisis 
between Greece and Turkey over the island of Imia/Karadak, the CFSP was unable to 
avoid conflict escalation and depended on the United States to take action. This 
problem was in part due to the major role played by the EU presidency over the CFSP 
agenda. The Italian presidency did not call for a more assertive approach of the EU, and 
the leadership vacuum was not filled by anyone (Smith, 2004). These problems of crisis 
management were expected to be addressed during the next IGC in Amsterdam. 
 
To this point we can remark that substantive coherence was enhanced in the CFSP 
compared to the EPC, meaning the use of different EU external policy mechanisms or 
competencies (such as development aid, political dialogue, market accession, etc.) 
toward a common external goal. Meanwhile, procedural coherence was still a problem 
because it involved the rationalization of institutional tools for achieving those goals 
(decision-making, policy implementation, representation, etc.). We also see the 
discussion over the development of an institutional setting to deal with military issues as 
an effect of the Yugoslavian crisis. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice tried to address 
these institutional flaws of the EU external policy. 
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3.1.2 - Transgovernmental networks and the ESDP61 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam: High-Representative for the CFSP 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty put forward general provisions concerning coherence and 
common interests by expanding the definition of fundamental objectives of the CFSP 
and providing common strategies that enabled the mobilization of resources under the 
three-pillars (EC, CFSP and JHA) towards a single foreign policy goal. It also addressed 
three other concerns of EU foreign policy, namely decision-making, implementation and 
financing.  
 
The most important change to be noticed was the creation of the function of High-
Representative for the CFSP (which would also be the Secretary-General of the 
Council) and is designed to assist the EU presidency and head the “CFSP Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit” in the Council Secretariat. This Unit is responsible for 
monitoring and providing assessments, early warning and policy options for the Council, 
and it was expected that it would provide a link for greater cooperation among the 
Commission and the EU member-states. However, the Higher-Representative for the 
CFSP (HR/CFSP) is not able to initiate policies, and until the Lisbon Treaty they had 
fewer resources as the Commission (Smith, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). 
Despite its high prominence in the CFSP/ESDP structure, the High Representative and 
his staff occupies, together with political leaders, the most remote positions in the 
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 The acronym ESDP was substituted by CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) by the Lisbon Treaty. We will 
use the ESDP acronym in this work because it is how the Defence policy of the European Union is still best known. 
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network62 (Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle, 2010:10). According to Duke and 
Vonhoonacker (2006), this is caused because those administrative actors are more 
heavily involved in day-to-day policy making, and therefore they become remote from 
the information that has already passed and was digested through other more central 
nodes in the network.       
 
The Amsterdam Treaty also established a legal basis to provide military capability to the 
CFSP, incorporating the WEU “Petersberg Tasks” which included “humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace making”63. The discussion over the merging of the WEU into the EU 
divided the member-states, and this was only concluded in 1998 when the UK agreed to 
pursue crisis management tasks under the EU at the St. Malo Declaration (Boyer, 
2004). Still, in Amsterdam it was affirmed that NATO was the essential forum for 
European defence. 
 
Building up the capabilities: Cologne, Helsinki and Nice 
 
The discussions to develop institutional settings to deal with military aspects of security 
gained weight after the agreement at St. Malo and the European failure to formulate a 
coherent response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The agreement to develop an 
autonomous military capacity of the EU was established on the condition that it would 
not duplicate or challenge the role of NATO as Europes main defence organization. 
                                                          
62
 The HR/CFSP has many connections in the network, but it does not occupy a central position and could be 
defined as a weak-tie in social network theory. Nonetheless, the lack of centrality is compensated by the number 
of connections and the status sponsored by the HR/CFSP. In this sense the HR/CFSP helps to facilitate the exchange 
of information from different parts of the network (easing the integration of the social system) and between the 
network and other actors. 
63
 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, Article J. 7 (2). 
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Nevertheless, the argument that an independent European collective defence was to be 
developed was false because the main focus of the Europeans was on external crisis 
response such as that delineated in the Petersberg Tasks and not defence in its 
traditional sense (Stewart, 2006).      
 
The most important steps toward the development of European crisis management 
capabilities were taken in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki in 1999. In 
the European Council of Cologne it was agreed that the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) would need enough military capabilities and decision-making 
structures to work properly. As previously agreed at St. Malo, it was accepted that the 
WEU crisis management functions would merge with the EU (Hochleitner, 2001), and 
the WEU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies were also incorporated 
into the institutional framework of the CFSP. The talks with NATO to establish protocols 
for the use of its assets to accomplish the ambitious “Petersberg Tasks” started in 1999 
and were agreed in 2002 at the Copenhagen European Council with the so-called 
Berlin-Plus arrangements (Howorth, 2007).  
 
The Finnish presidency moved forward the agenda regarding the military and non-
military aspects of crisis management established in Cologne. During the Helsinki 
European Council the European Headline Goals were established, and these prompted 
the Member-states to enhance their military capabilities and interoperability. It proposed 
the creation of an EU crisis management force, known as the European Rapid Reaction 
Force (ERRF), which would undertake the Petersberg Tasks. This force was to be 
composed of 60.000 troops which would be ready to be deployed within 60 days for a 
minimum period of one year. With the advancements achieved in Cologne and Helsinki, 
the ESDP was finally declared operational at the Laeken Summit in 2001 (Weisserth, 
2003).      
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Even though it was not on the discussion agenda for the 2000 Nice Treaty, additional 
reforms of the CFSP were finalized at this Treaty. After the 1998 St. Malo Declaration it 
was possible to merge the WEU within the EU. The Nice Treaty also added three new 
institutional organs to deal with the issues related to the ESDP: the Political and 
Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, and the European Union 
Military Staff. Among those new organs, the most important is the Political and Security 
Committee – PSC (also known as the French acronym, COPS). The PSC is composed 
of permanent representatives of the member-States with ambassador ranks that meet 
two or three times a week in Brussels to discuss the formulation of policies, draft 
opinions for the Council and oversee the implementation of agreed policies (Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007; Howorth, 2007). According to recent research, the PSC is a 
fundamental gathering of a transgovernmental network dealing with defence issues and 
the development of a “European strategic culture” (Howorth, 2011; Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007; Meyer, 2007). According to Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle (2010), 
the PSC ambassadors occupy a strategic position in the network as the main 
gatekeepers64 for their domestic governments65. The European Union Military 
Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the member-
states and is responsible for making military recommendations to the PSC. The EUMC 
is the highest EU military body, and its chairman participates in the PSC, Council and 
NATO Military Committee meetings. It is the designated “forum for consultation and 
cooperation between member-states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis 
management” (Howorth, 2007). The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed 
of 150 senior officers from the member-states and is responsible for providing expertise 
through situation assessment, early warning and strategic planning.  
 
                                                          
64
 For a statistical analysis of the Gatekeeping Scores in the ESDP Transgovernmental Network see Merand, 
Hoffmann, and Irondelle, 2010. 
65
 However, it is important to highlight that the accesses to national subnetworks are also controlled by other 
governmental actors with more internal connections (such as national officials in defence and foreign ministeries). 
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The Treaty of Nice also endorsed the development of the civilian crisis management 
mechanisms with the creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM). The CIVCOM was established to report the COREPER and 
assist with the PSC. It should produce expertise on civilian crisis management 
operations and enhance the inter-pillar coherence of the EU capabilities on civilian crisis 
management. Those progressed in four areas, namely police, rule of law, civilian 
administration and civilian protection operations (Stewart, 2006). 
  
The European Security Strategy (ESS): developing a strategic culture 
 
The first concrete result towards the development of a European strategic culture can 
be observed in the European Security Strategy (ESS). This document was presented by 
the High Representative for CFSP at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 
(Stewart, 2006). The ESS established the normative strategic thinking behind the 
ESDP. The document had in mind an idea to forge a “European strategic culture” in the 
event of disputes among EU member-states over the Iraq War (Howorth, 2007). The 
ESS would not have been possible without the initiative of the transgovernmental 
network of ambassadors at the PSC which decided to draft a common strategic 
document and managed to persuade their own governments of the importance to 
develop such a common EU strategy (Meyers, 2007). 
 
The document shows that the Europeans have drawn lessons from perceived failures in 
cooperation and policy-making. Moreover, some authors understood it as a response to 
the US American National Security Strategy (US NSS) of September 2002 
(Dannreuther and Peterson, 2006). This understanding that the ESS was a response to 
the 2002 US NSS derives from the fact that the firm commitment of the ESS to 
multilateral solutions to deal with threats contrasts with the unilateral inclination of the 
US American National Security Strategy.  
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The ESS identified the main threats to EU security and outlined responses to deal with 
those threats. The threats identified in the ESS are international terrorism, failed states, 
regional conflicts, organised crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). The document reinforced the EU commitment to multilateralism and the EU 
responsibility to build security in its neighbourhood and work with partners in order to 
tackle those threats. Moreover, the ESS recognizes that the EU has to be more active, 
capable and coherent. There is also a very strong mention of preventive engagement of 
the EU as opposed to the pre-emptive logic of its US American counterpart. In the first 
draft it was suggested that the ESS should mention pre-emptive engagement instead of 
emphasising preventive engagement, which would please the American partners, but 
there was strong objection to using this nomenclature (Stewart, 2006).  
 
The ESS also reflects the many concepts which inform the normative approach of the 
ESDP (Howorth, 2007). The most relevant among those concepts are comprehensive 
security, global public good and human security. The first key concept relates the ESDP 
to a positive dimension of security, which means that the concept of security (one’s 
security depends on the security of the others) is directly opposed to the concept of 
defence (one’s security depends on the weakness or insecurity of the other). First 
drafted at the Helsinki Final Act, the EU concept of security addresses basic human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental cooperation, peace and 
stability. The second key concept of global public good reflects concerns with stability, 
physical security, rule of law, economic development, general well-being, health, 
education and environmentalism. Those issues are understood as being interdependent 
and they cannot be addressed separately. The third concept of human security, 
according to the Human Security Report, is defined as “freedom for individuals from 
basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations”. 
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The ESS also recognizes that the first line of defence of the EU is usually abroad, and 
therefore it stresses the role of conflict prevention and crisis management of the Union. 
As a result it calls for a closer relationship between the conflict prevention capabilities of 
the EU and the crisis management tools of the CFSP/ESDP.  
 
For most of its critics however there are many flaws in the ESS, mainly with the lack of 
indication of the ESDP’s geographical scope and disputes on the appropriate use of 
force. Moreover, there is still the uneasy partnership with NATO and the fact that to date 
the ESDP missions66 have been relatively small, and there are still doubts on the will of 
member-states to act in case of crisis response (Stewart, 2006). However, the ESS 
represents the increasing influence of the transgovernmental network in the EU and 
contributes to the emergence of an EU strategic culture which is socializing the military 
and civilians responsible for defence and military issues into shared norms, rules and 
codes of conduct.         
 
Transgovernmentalism and the ESDP 
 
Based on our research and the statistical analysis presented by Merand, Hoffmann and 
Irondelle (2010) we can see that the PSC ambassadors are the main leaders in the 
ESDP transgovernmental network. Those actors are responsible for expressing the 
opinions of their governments, but they are also influential on how those opinions can 
be steered back in their capitals in order to reach a common agreement. As a result 
they occupy the position of main gatekeepers in the EU-National Capital relationship. 
Other political-military bodies also occupy a relative central position in the network such 
as the EUMC and the EUMS, but these act more as coordinators than facilitators. Other 
bureaucratic actors of different countries also provide access to sections of the network, 
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 The list of ongoing and completed Missions is available in Annex II.   
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but their relationship and interaction is exclusively formal and bureaucratic. Other actors 
such as think tanks, NGO’s, lobbies and political leaders are deemed as not being 
relevant to daily cooperation practices. 
 
We observed a high degree of cooperative interaction among governmental units that 
occupy structurally similar positions in the ESDP issues. In our interview with the 
German PSC representative he argued that,: “The interactions with my colleagues not 
only in the work-time but also in the private sphere enhance the prospects of trust and 
confidence that a common position can be reached.” As a result, based on the results of 
our interviews we agree with the statistical findings of Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle 
(2010) which shows two main transgovernmental groups in the ESDP: first a core policy 
group which is responsible for crisis management and capability development and is 
composed of officials in the Council’s Secretariat, permanent representations, and 
national-based security officials (with a more functional than political role), and secondly 
a more politically robust Franco-German group that can be related to almost 60 years of 
close cooperation. Therefore, in the words of Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle 
(2010:15): “… there are clear elements of transgovernmentalism in the ESDP domain, 
but the phenomenon seems limited to a narrow group of officials.” We will see how the 
transgovernmental networks are socialized in the PSC, CWG, and COREPER below.          
 
3.2 - International socialization: definitions, strategies and outcomes 
 
Our second hypothesis to be addressed in this chapter is whether European institutions 
are able to socialize agents. Institutions are understood as organizations established by 
state’s agreements such as the EPC, the CWGs and the COREPER. While some 
scholars focus on the broad socialization effects of institutions on States 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2006), in this chapter we study the influence of 
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institutions on individuals (national representatives) as socializable agents67. Those 
socialized agents might internalize or instrumentalize norms, values and principles 
developed in transgovernmental networks, but they sensitively influence the path of 
integration in Europe. 
 
Socialization is a central concept for constructivists. According to Onuf (1998:59) “social 
relations make or construct people – ourselves – into the kinds of beings we are”. As a 
result, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) suggest that we should treat institutions as social 
institutions where “actor expectations converge”. Johnston (2001) argues that there are 
two microprocesses of socialization: persuasion and social influence. While the first 
refers to “changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in 
the absence of overtly material or mental coercion” (2001:496), the latter denotes the 
distribution of social rewards and punishments that enhance pro-norm behaviour such 
as “rewards that might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, 
and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations. Punishments 
might include shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning, or dissonance derived 
from actions which are inconsistent with role and identity” (2001: 499). Socialization is 
especially used for observing how newcomers and novices change their ways to comply 
with the norms of a group. According to Stryker and Statham (1985: 325 see Johnston, 
2001: 494), “Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which 
the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee for example – becomes incorporated into 
organized patterns of interaction”; or as Berger and Luckmann (1966:130, see ibid) 
define it, “the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective 
world of a society or sector of it”.       
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 According to most of the socialization literature in social psychology, sociology, communications theory, and 
political socialization theory, the unit of analisys is the individual or small group, and not the unitary state (See 
Johnston, 2001: 506-507).  
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We use the ideotypical definition of socialization, according to Checkel (2007; 5-6): 
 
 “[…] a process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given 
community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of 
these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an 
agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent 
from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.” 
 
 
Therefore, in Checkel we observe the close relationship between the concepts of 
socialization and internalization. Although the concept has been used by many to cover 
all forms of rule adoption by States and governments (Schimmelfennig; 1994; 2000; 
Alderson, 2001; Checkel; 2005), we understand internalization in its narrow sense as it 
was presented by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. In this sense internalization refers to 
the reflective and individual adoption of rules, and therefore individuals internalize rules 
and follow them because they accept them as legitimate or appropriate. However, even 
though we consider the idea that socialization might lead to internalization, we also 
consider that actors may also only adopt the group’s practices strategically and without 
internalizing such norms or practices. Checkel (2007: 6) observes two different types of 
internalization of socialized norms. The so-called “type I” internalization refers to the fact 
that agents may learn a role and therefore behave appropriately, independent of 
whether they like or agree with the role. The important feature in this “type I” 
socialization is that agents learn to consciously know what is socially accepted in a 
given setting or community. Contrary to this, “Type II” socialization goes beyond role 
playing and implies that individuals adopt the interests or even the identity of the 
community to which they belong.  
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The second question refers to how and when the socialization process of norms occurs. 
The socialization strategies addressed in this chapter are68 strategic calculation, role 
playing, and normative persuasion. We will examine each of these strategies below.  
 
Strategic calculation recognizes that incentives and rewards for socialization can take 
the form of social (status, shaming) as well as material roles. However, this mechanism 
– with deep roots in rationalist social theory and which implies that agents are 
instrumentally rational – only produces socialization effects when behaviour adaptation 
to the norms and rules of a given community which are first carried by calculations to 
maximize interests are later followed by sustained compliance caused by cognitive and 
institutional lock-in effects (Checkel, 2007). 
 
Role playing or role conception sees agents being bound by rationality, meaning that 
they are overwhelmed with information to process and are therefore not capable of 
calculating the costs and benefits of all of the alternative courses of action precisely. In 
this sense, organizational or group environments offer simplifying shortcuts which can 
lead to the development of specific role conceptions among individuals. This lack of 
calculative behavioural adaptation can be described as Type I internalization because 
agents assume determined roles due to the appropriateness of one particular setting 
and therefore are not involved with reflective internalization guided by communicative 
processes. In this sense, according to the mechanism of role playing individuals take on 
roles because it is easy socially and when it is impossible to measure the costs and 
benefits of all alternative courses of action. However, those roles can develop into 
taken-for-granted habits without any conscious act of persuasion (Checkel, 2007; 
Beyer, 2007; Aggestam, 2004; Smith, 2004). According to Checkel, the conditions for 
the internalization of role conceptions according to community norms can be defined as  
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 Based on Checkel, 2007. 
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1) The contact among agents is long and sustained and it has some significant duration; 
and 2) Agents are in settings where the contact is intense. 
 
Normative suasion argues that agents present arguments and try to persuade and 
convince each other, thus keeping their interests and preferences open for redefinition. 
In this sense, when normative suasion occurs agents actively and reflectively internalize 
new norms of behaviour. According to Hasenclever et al. (1997: 176-177), “the parties 
enter a discourse where they try first to bring about agreement concerning the relevant 
features of a social situation and then advance reasons why a certain behaviour has to 
be avoided. These reasons – as far as they are convincing – internally motivate the 
parties to behave in accordance with the previously elaborated interpretation and the 
justified expectations of others.” This is what Checkel labels Type II internalization. This 
idea that persuasion operates as a fundamental mechanism in 
internalization/socialization is also defended by practitioner-scholars such as Chayes 
and Chayes (1995), and De Schoutheete (1988). According to Chekcel (2007: 13), the 
scope of conditions under which a persuasion-socialization dynamic occurs can be 
defined as: 1) The agent is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively 
motivated to analyse new information; 2) The agent has few previous and deep-rooted 
beliefs that conflict with the socializing agency’s message; 3) The socializing 
agency/individual is an authoritative member of the in-group; 4) The socializing 
agency/individual acts out principles of serious deliberative argument; and 5) The 
meetings/interaction happen in less politicized and more closed-doors settings. 
 
In this sense, in our case-studies of the Council Working Groups (CWGs), Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), and the COREPER we will see which socialization 
strategies are used and the outcomes of this socialization process. Although these are 
highly institutionalized settings, they are also the locus of transgovernmental networks 
which were established well before its creation (especially the PSC), and therefore they 
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are legitimate settings to analyse if and how socialization operates inside 
transgovernmental networks. 
 
3.2.1 - When norms matter: socialization and the European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy 
 
Since Deutsch’s (1957) and Haas (1958) seminal studies, questions on European 
integration have been about issues such as to what extent, under which conditions, and 
through which processes political elites of member states shift their allegiance towards 
the EU. According to Beyers (2007: 99), socialization is conceived as: “[…] the 
organization of social interactions (meaning institutional conditions and informal/formal 
rules that structure social life) and/or the logic of these interactions (meaning 
instrumental bargaining, role playing, or suasion) affect which behavioural practices, 
norms about appropriateness, and preferences about outcomes are internalized by 
individual actors, but because they are shared by many they also characterize and 
shape the identity of larger social aggregates (meaning a bureaucratic agency, a 
political party, a country, and so on). Socialization therefore refers to both individuals 
(meaning when and how they socialize) and groups (meaning the social aggregate’s 
features and how interactions among individuals shape these aggregates).” Therefore 
we can see that socialization is a process of the internalization of the rules and norms of 
a group that can lead to a change from a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness.  
 
In this section we will look at the strategies (strategic action, role paying, or normative 
suasion) and outcomes of socialization in the three main bodies of the Council that deal 
with foreign policy and security issues (the CWGs, COREPER and PSC), ranging from 
ambassador level bureaucrats (such as in the COREPER and the PSC) to less 
experienced diplomats (CWGs), and also observing the variance in the level of rotation 
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(high in the CWGs and low in the COREPER and PSC). Besides the secondary 
literature used and the official documents, this section is also based on non-consecutive 
in-depth interviews carried out in Brussels and national capitals during the period of 
2007-2009 with officials of the three bodies. 
 
3.2.1.1 - Socialization in the Council Working Groups dealing with the CFSP     
 
The Treaty of Maastricht merged the former EPC Working Groups with the EC Working 
Parties in a single institutional framework known as CFSP Standing Working Parties69 
(CWGs henceforth). The function of the CWGs is to discuss and draft CFSP documents 
such as Join Actions, Council Conclusions, and Action Plans. National representatives 
of the permanent representations in Brussels compose the CWGs. There are 36 
permanent CFSP CWGs following either thematic or geographical lines; two dealing 
with EU crisis management (the EU Military WG and the CIVCOM), two responsible for 
preparing the agenda for the PSC and COREPER II meetings, and the RELEX 
Counsellors WG responsible for certifying horizontal coordination between CFSP and 
EC matters. Most of the CFSP CWGs meet once or twice a week, and they sometimes 
meet together with other CWGs on cross-cutting issues (see figure 2 for CWGs 
channels of socialization). CWGs can also meet in “capital formations” with expert 
officials from the Foreign Offices. The CWGs in “capital formations” meet twice every 
presidency on average (6 months), however depending on the theme of the Working 
Group and the current world political situation they can meet more often. According to 
officials, not all of the CWGs share the same position in the European foreign policy-
making process, and there is a feeling that CWGs that deal with sensitive issues have a 
lesser say while the CWGs that deal with the ESDP issues are composed of more 
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 For a detailed explanation about the merger and transformation of the former EPC and EC Working Groups into 
CFSP Working Groups see Nuttall, 2000: 249. 
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senior officials (EUMC is composed of senior officials from the Ministries of Defence), 
and they occupy an intermediate position between bodies at higher levels (PSC and 
COREPER II). Also, contrary to the COREPER and PSC meetings CFSP CGWs 
meetings are not insulated70. However, issues agreed at the CWGs meetings represent 
around 70 per cent of the items “ready for approval” in the GAERC agenda and 15-20 
per cent in COREPER`s agenda. This is a very high percentage because sensitive or 
contentious issues such as granting candidate status or appointing the EU Special 
Representatives have to be directly forwarded to higher levels (Duke and 
Vanhoonacker, 2006: 169; Nuttall; 2000; Juncos and Pomorska; 2006; Beyers, 2007). 
 
The code of conduct in the CWGs is composed of three principles, namely coordination 
reflex consensus building practice, and domaines réservés. 
 
Coordination reflex represents the willingness of officials to communicate and exchange 
information with each other (even if actors take into account who they share the 
information with and for which purposes – i.e. actors as self-reflective). In this sense, 
the group exerts peer pressure on those who do not share information. Even though the 
COREU system has lost much of its importance for informal communications in the 
CWGs, the communication among officials has increased exponentially and nowadays 
happens mainly through emails, mobile phones, and frequent corridor or lunch 
meetings. These consultations can take place in small groups (core groups), bilaterally, 
or in broader groups, etc. In those informal negotiations the officials exchange 
information about their positions or other types of information that facilitate the decision-
making process. 
                                                          
70
 According to Lewis (2007: 146), insulation refers to the fact that the participants of the group are not influenced 
by “normal currents of domestic constituent pressures”. As a result insulated meetings are confidential and closed 
to participation and attendance of non-members of the group. In the case of the COREPER meetings, besides 
discussing sensitive positions officials debate the best strategy to sell the package back in their home capitals.    
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Figure 2 – Channels of Socialization 
 
- Regular Working Groups meetings in the Council once or twice a week. 
- Extraordinary meetings of the Working Groups and additional formal social 
events. 
- Informal meetings, with the Presidency, bilateral meetings or in a group (so 
called ‘like-minded groups’) 
- Meetings on private occasions. The atmosphere in the group is often very 
‘friendly’: group photos are taken at the end of presidencies, former group 
members stay in touch, visit each other, and inform each other about 
personal issues, even on the special group-mailing lists. 
- Networks of formal and informal communication; these vary from COREU 
messages, frequent contacts via phone to mailing lists. 
Source: Juncos, Ana E., and Karolina Pomorska, (2006): Playing the Brussels game, in European Integration Online 
Papers. p. 7. 
 
Informal negotiations to achieve a compromise before the meeting is also a normal 
practice among the CWGs officials. In the like-minded groups (core groups), informal 
consultation meetings serve the purpose of preparing a common line of action and 
arranging the strategy for the next formal CWG meeting in detail. Therefore the formal 
meeting becomes a simple representation of “roles” previously agreed. Those groups 
often operate on a very informal basis and participants credit each other with trust. 
Coordination reflex therefore also implies a tendency to take other’s views into account 
when formulating national positions (instructions) and avoiding conflict with others 
positions. However, coordination reflex is mostly seen by diplomats as a path to 
increase their chances in the negotiations and avoid isolation in the CWGs. In this 
sense we can conclude that it’s a strategic calculation of socialized actors. Some 
officials even admit that they share selective sensitive information (like national 
instructions, security assessments, etc.) with their colleagues if it is necessary to reach 
an agreement (Tonra, 2001; Aggestam, 2004; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Beyers, 
2005). 
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The second guiding principle of the CWGs is the consensus building practice. This 
refers to the fact that member states hardly ever use their veto power during 
negotiations. The logic is the opposite, as there is a general practice to keep everyone 
in the discussion and try to achieve consensus. In this sense, the main driving force 
behind day-to-day CWG is the search for an agreement within the group. The group, 
their superiors in the PSC and COREPER II, and the presidency pressure for 
effectiveness by pushing the officials to reach an agreement at the end of the day and 
not leaving any unresolved problem to be passed on to a higher political level. In these 
terms of agreed issues of the agenda, efficiency in the CWGs reaches 90-95% (Juncos 
and Pomorska, 2006: 8). 
 
The third guiding principle identified is the role played by the domaines réservés to the 
convergence of positions in the CWGs. Domaines réservés are very sensitive issues to 
specific member states that cannot be submitted to discussion and interference of other 
member states. Those domaines réservés are normally security/defence issues 
(national defence, borders, nuclear status, neutrality, etc.) and special relationships. 
Those issues are purposely kept out of the CWGs agenda and go straight to a higher 
level.  
 
Besides this there are rules of behaviour which are considered appropriate by the 
group, and once breached these lead to a decrease of credibility and even the 
ostracism of an official in the group. These rules refer to the comportment to present the 
instructions, courtesy towards other group members, and language used. According to 
Juncos and Pomorska (2006: 9), other rules of behaviour in the CWGs include: 1) 
Vertical and horizontal consistency (meaning not contradicting the position taken at a 
higher level, not opening an already closed issue, and not contradicting the positions 
already taken in other forums); 2) When the instructions are considered difficult to justify 
in front of the group the official should give informal signs of that to other group 
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members with expressions such as “according to my instructions…” or “according to my 
capital…” instead of “we think…”; 3) Keep the group atmosphere positive by avoiding 
clashes with other members; 4) One cannot argue against the EU’s agreed policy which 
has been established before; 5) Consider the deals proposed by the Commission and 
the presidency; and 6) Do not express radical positions or “hide behind the back” of 
others. 
 
The rules of behaviour, or “ways of doing things” in the CWGs originate from the 
interaction with members of the same group and the norms and rules evolved from the 
transgovernmental network developed since the beginning of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). The socialization to those norms and rules do not mean the actors 
internalize the interests and identity of the organization. In this sense however some 
authors argue that socialization in the CWG follows a logic of role conception (see 
Beyer, 2007), but we argue that in the CWGs rationality plays a major role in 
determining an actor’s behaviour. Therefore the most important mechanism of 
socialization at work in the CWG is strategic calculation because it recognizes that 
incentives and rewards for socialization are, in this case, social (status, shaming), 
and/or material (career perspectives). This means that in the CWGs the behaviour 
adaptation to the norms and rules of the community is firstly carried by calculations to 
maximize interests (long term negotiations) and then later followed by sustained 
compliance caused by cognitive and institutional lock-in effects (reputation, credibility). 
Diplomats in the CWGs are self-reflective, and when asked about why they adopt these 
norms they respond in terms on national interest. According to Juncos and Pomorska 
(2006: 4): “The [CWGs] actors’ motivation to follow social pressures stems from the 
desire to maintain or improve their position within the group as part of their long-term 
interest calculation. Legitimacy and reputation, factors contributing to one actor’s status 
in a group become highly appreciated as they improve the chances of getting the 
national interest reflected in the policy outcome. Credibility is particularly important in 
the case of iterated negotiations such as those taking place at the EU…” 
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This is not to say that in the longer term, especially when actors stay in the same group 
for long time periods with regular contact with each other, that the behavioural norms 
and rules become “taken for granted” (habitualization or type II internalization according 
to Checkel). However, the empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis for the 
CWG officials. We observe that officials in the CWG might imitate the behaviour of their 
colleagues in the beginning when they don’t know how to act accordingly. This 
represents what Checkel (2007) calls type I internalization. Some socializations’ scope 
conditions identified by Lewis (2005: 945-947) such as insulation, the density of issues, 
and low level of rotation are not present in the CWG. In this sense, contrary to the PSC 
and COREPER meetings the CWG formal negotiations are not insulated, thereby 
allowing not only the participation of other diplomats and ambassadors of the 
COREPER and PSC but even the participation of actors which are external to the EU. 
This leads to a lack of “agent autonomy”, also identified by Johnston (2005) as another 
condition for internalization. Therefore national representatives in the CWGs experience 
relatively less margin of manoeuvre than their colleagues in the COREPER and the 
PSC. Furthermore, the level of rotation of the CWGs officials (average of 2-3 years) is 
higher than in other bodies such as the COREPER and the PSC. In this sense, if 
national representatives would stay longer in the CWGs they might have the time to 
develop internalization type II or habitualization with the CWGs norms and rules and 
thus begin taking them for granted (Checkel, 2007; Beyers, 2007; Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2006).   
 
Another important question to be addressed is how far socialization affects the national 
positions (instructions) received by the officials at the CWGs level. As seen above, 
credibility and reputation play a central role in daily negotiations in the CWGs. In the 
CWGs there are two types of credibility: the individual (perceived as the adherence of 
representatives to the group norms and rules) and the country. More than the State 
credibility, if the position of the diplomat within the group is strong he will have more 
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possibilities to negotiate and move forward his national instructions. However, the 
representatives can be entrapped in situations where the instructions are not in tune 
with the negotiating atmosphere in Brussels. According to CGW officials, when there is 
a difference in the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those formulating the 
instructions in the capital the official will try to discuss the instructions with his superior 
or try to convince the capital that the instructions should be changed for the sake of the 
state’s credibility in the group. The officials see themselves as “transmission belts” – 
they are able to use their expertise and institutional position to not only influence the 
European politics and decision making process but also their foreign ministries 
(Spencer, 2002: 33; Lewis, 2007). According to Beyers (2007), this happens because 
they are embedded in two social environments: domestic and European (what he calls 
“multiple embeddedness”), and in this way the code of conduct learnt upon their arrival 
in Brussels modifies their national code of conduct. As a result their participation in the 
process of the Europeanization of national foreign policies is twofold: adapt the national 
foreign policy to the European foreign policy and promote national foreign policy goals 
at the European level. Officials have different ways of influencing their instructions. In 
some cases diplomats are not given any precise instruction on how to deal with a 
specific issue on the agenda. In other cases, depending on the foreign office 
organizational structure and the power of the representatives’ position within it the 
official practically writes his own instructions. The worst situation for a national 
representative is when he receives instructions completely “out of the point” which are 
ignoring the negotiating atmosphere and the code of conduct in the CWGs (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, 2008; Smith, 1998; 2004; Glarbo, 1999; Juncos and Pomorska, 
2006; Beyers, 2007). 
 
Despite the mostly technical nature of the issues discussed in the CFSP CWGs, they 
still exert influence on the directions of the EU foreign policy. This influence is based on 
the norms, rules and principles that constitute the CWGs code of conduct. These rules 
are learnt as a result of the official’s participation and exposure in the CWGs (but also 
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quantity, quality and longevity of the interaction in the CWGs). As a result, non-
compliance with those rules harms the credibility and legitimacy of the diplomat and the 
state inside the group, therefore decreasing the chances of influencing the policy 
outcome according to the national instructions. Finally, the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the lack of insulation and agent autonomy allied to a high level of 
rotation inhibits the development of internalization type II among CWG officials. 
 
3.2.1.2 - Socialization in the Political and Security Committee 
 
The PSC (Political and Security Committee), also known by its French acronym COPS 
(Comité Politique et de Sécurité), was established in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice and 
replaced the EPC’s Political Committee (PoCo). Many studies from policy-makers71 and 
scholars72 show the importance of this specialised committee (PoCo) in the formulation 
of European foreign policy making. According to those accounts, “the notion that the 
Committee’s ‘ambiance d’intimité’, with its small number of regular participants, had led 
to the formation of both an ‘esprit de corps’ and a ‘consultation reflex73’” (Nuttall, 1992; 
2000; de Shouthetee, 1980). Those studies provided evidence for ‘cognitive’ 
approaches to the study of European foreign policy which showed that the events 
happening in the PoCo meetings had an impact on the European foreign policy making, 
and moreover “that national officials could, over time, come to develop new loyalties, 
                                                          
71
 See de Shouthetee, P., “La cooperation politique europeenne”, 1980; and Nutall, S., “European Political 
Cooperation”, 1992; and “European Foreign Policy”, 2000. 
72
See Jorgensen, K.E., “PoCo: the diplomatic republic of Europe,“ in K.E. Jorgensen (ed.), “Reflective Approaches to 
European Governance”, 1997. In the same volume: Tonra, B., “The Impact of Political Cooperation”.  See also 
Tonra, B., “Committee Governance in the European Union”, 2000.  
73
Nuttall refers to “consultation reflex“ as the “automatic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent 
personal contacts with opposite numbers from other Member-States” (1992:312) . Nuttall also observes the 
development of a “club spirit” allegedly caused by the frequent meetings, formaly in the PoCo formations and 
informally at lunches and dinners, and through sharing information and discussing their national foreign policy 
positions (1992:313). 
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thereby affecting their definition of interest” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 128). Ben 
Tonra suggests that the participants of the PoCo (2001:12) “see themselves not as 
emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters. They are, in effect, seeking to 
internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as to thereby see that their own 
positions are at least complimentary”. 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that the PoCo was established together with the EPC 
in 1970 by the Luxembourg Report, right after the failed attempts of the European 
Defence Community and the Fouchet Plans. In this sense, the discussion between 
supranationalists vs. intergovernmentalists was a major issue during the creation of 
PoCo, and therefore in order to avoid a spillover contamination of foreign policy issues 
by the European supranational structures the participation of the EC in the EPC was 
voluntarly restricted, thus excluding the EC’s participation in meetings in which issues of 
security and defence were being discussed. Moreover, the PoCo meetings were carried 
out in Member State capitals in order to “keep the new procedure untainted by the 
insidious atmosphere of Brussels” (Nuttall, 1992: 317).  
 
Despite the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 replacing the EPC, the PoCo remained in its original form. 
The PoCo also survived other changes in the EU’s institutional arrangements such as 
the establishment of the High Representative and the Policy-Unit. A reform of the PoCo 
only started to be formulated with the creation of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) at the European Council of Cologne in 1999. As a result the PSC, 
modelled after similar NATO structures such as the WEU Council and the NAC (North 
Atlantic Council)74, was designed in order to adjust two main flaws in the PoCo. The first 
issue addressed was the lack of continuity and permanency in the people involved in 
                                                          
74
 See Chaillot Paper no. 47, Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Paris, 2001. The idea of a committee similar 
to those of NATO was pushed by the UK and Germany. 
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the organization75. This was especially true in regards to the PoCo, which was 
composed of the Political Directors of member-states which used to meet just once a 
month with the objective to coordinate the broad issues of foreign and security policy at 
senior level. The second flaw addressed with the creation of the PSC was the constant 
moving of the meetings from one capital to the other according to the six-month 
presidency. With the inclusion of the ESDP issues the Political Director’s agenda was 
overwhelmed, and it was evident that the political coordination of the EU needed a 
permanent body composed of ambassadors with longer term of office (three to four 
years) and based in Brussels. Therefore with the creation of the Nice Treaty the PSC 
replaced the PoCo. 
 
 The PSC was established by the Nice Treaty under Article 25, which states that: 
 
“Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international 
situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and 
contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the 
request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the 
implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
Presidency and the Commission. Within the scope of this Title, this Committee 
shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and 
strategic direction of crisis management operations. The Council may authorize 
the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management 
operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions 
concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation…” 
 
In a letter to the Finnish Presidency in 1999 the French President, Jaques Chiraq, 
showed that he was particulary convinced that the establishment of the PSC would 
                                                          
75
High rotation in the ministerial and representative levels plus six-month presidency.  
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move forward “l’Europe de la defense”76. In this sense, as a Brussels-based committee 
designed to deal with substantive issues related to the CFSP/ESDP the PSC 
represented a significant development from the PoCo. However, the worries of some 
States about keeping this powerful Committee under strict control created a major 
debate during the Finnish Presidency. While some States favoured the idea that the 
representatives in the PSC would have a more senior level, other States, fearing that 
those senior ambassadors would escape their principals’ leash77, were favourable of 
more junior representatives78. Finally, at the Helsinki Council in December 1999 it was 
agreed that the representativies in the PSC should have “senior/ambassadorial” levels. 
However, the first generation of PSC officials (2000/2001-2003/2004) was very mixed in 
terms of seniority. After this agreement an interim PSC was created in March 2000 and 
this became permanent in January 2001. The PSC is therefore composed of permanent 
representatives with ambassadorial rank gathering two or three times a week in 
Brussels. As seen above, this group of diplomats was charged with tasks of monitoring 
the international situation and drafting opinions for the Council, thus contributing to the 
formulation of policies and supervising the implementation of the agreed policies. The 
former PoCo liason officers (Political Directors based in their national capitals) were 
then displaced as gatekeepers of the CFSP/ESDP decision-making process in their 
national capitals, thus also facilitating the communication between the PSC and 
member-states capitals. 
 
Another important issue raised by the creation of the PSC was the division of labour 
between the PSC and the COREPER. According to the provisions establishing the 
PSC, both the PSC and COREPER were legally responsible for preparing the Council’s 
                                                          
76
See Rutten, M. (2001) “From St. Malo to Nice. European Defence Core Documents”, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 
Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Paris.  
77
 Some member states were trying to avoid what Howorth calls “the lionisation of EU institutions“ (2010: 6).   
78
 The United Kingdom proposed “double-hatted” representatives in NATO and in the PSC. This suggestion was 
directly dismissed by Paris (op. cit.).  
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meetings79 (Duke, 2005). This legal issue was tackled at the 2002 Seville European 
Council with the differentiation between the GAERC (General Affairs and External 
Relations Committee) internal and external agendas80. While the “internal” meetings 
(GAC meeting under Lisbon) are prepared by the COREPER, the PSC prepares the 
“external” meetings (FAC meeting under Lisbon). Regarding the relationship between 
the PSC and COREPER, if the PSC ambassadors do not reach a consensus over a 
sensitive issue this issue goes “up” to the COREPER for resolution81. As a result the 
COREPER enjoys a formal hierarchical superiority to the PSC and all decisions in the 
PSC go to the GAERC via COREPER82. 
 
Although the PSC is responsible for all aspects of the CFSP/ESDP, it focuses its 
attention on what is seen as their “core business” by the Ambassadors, namely 
planning, preparation and oversight of both civilian and military operations. The 
meetings of the PSC are not completely insulated, and a representative of the 
Commission participates in order to guarantee cross-pillarization and four 
representatives of the Council Secretariat also attend the meetings. The Director-
General of the DG-E also attends the meetings frequently. Back in the national capitals, 
the PSC Ambassadors are assisted by “European Correspondents” who work as a 
liason between the PSC’s representatives and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs’s political 
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 For a list of the Committee‘s full responsibilities see Duke, S. (2005) “The Linchpin COPS”, 2005/W/05 EIPA 
Working Paper, Maastricht.    
80
 Before Sevilla it was known as GAC (General Affairs Committee). With the Lisbon Treaty the GAERC was further 
divided into two different Council formations: the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) chaired by the High Representative 
and the General Affairs Council (GAC) chaired by the rotating Council presidency. For an extensive explanation of 
the GAERC see Kaczynski P.M., and Byrne A., (2011), “The General Affairs Council”, CEPS Policy Brief, n. 246. 
81
 According to Howorth estimates, the issues that go up to the COREPER for decision are roughly once a month. 
(Howorth, 2010 : 6)  
82
 There are in fact two COREPER (I and II). While COREPER I consists of permanent representatives of member-
states (deputy heads) and deals with social and economic issues, COREPER II consists of heads of mission (Senior 
Ambassador/Plenipotentiary) and deals with political, financial and foreign policy issues.   
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directors. The agenda of the PSC is previously agreed between the Presidency and the 
Council Secretariat and prepared by the the so-called “Nicolaidis Group83” which helps 
to identify problem areas before they come to the Committee. The Nicolaidis Group is 
modelled after COREPER’s “Antici and Mertens Groups”. Initially the COREPER 
resisted the creation of the Nicolaidis Group, apparently because it felt threathened by 
the PSC copying its working methods and feared that it could lead to the PSC stealing 
some of COREPER’s responsibilities. Instead of waiting the approval of the COREPER, 
the PSC created the Nicolaidis Group informally. When the COREPER realized that it 
would be impossible to avoid the functioning of the Nicolaidis Group it released the 
Council document 8441/03, thus approving the creation of the Nicolaidis Group, but 
imposed the condition that all institutional changes in the PSC had to be previously 
accepted by the COREPER in accordance with Article 19 (3) of the Council Rules of 
Procedures (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, Howorth, 2010).    
 
The PSC members are also assisted by the Politico-Military Working Party,84 which is 
composed of officials from member-states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of 
Defence that meet around four times a week in Brussels. This working group deals with 
diplomatic aspects and technical details of planned operations and also the relationship 
with NATO. Other preparatory bodies are the EU Military Committee85 (EUMC) which is 
composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) of the member-states, but they are 
regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives (MilReps), and this 
group discusses the military aspects of ESDP operations86, and the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) which is responsible for accessing 
the results of civilian missions and planning new missions (Howorth, 2007; 2010). 
                                                          
83
 The Nicolaidis Group is a Council Working Group named after his first chair in 2003.  
84
 Termed “the working muscle of the PSC“ by one PSC Ambassador (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 138) . 
85
 The EUMC has its own Council Working Group: the Military Comittee Working Group (EUMCWG).  
86
 Including the use of NATO assets under the Berlin-Plus Agreement.  
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Unlike the PoCo meetings, the PSC meetings sometimes include 100 people. However, 
even if the PSC is not as “insulated” as the PoCo was, ambassadors in the meeting 
refer to each other using their first-names (and not the delegation’s name). 
Nonetheless, according to our interviews and the literature, ambassadors in the PSC 
had already had previous relationships with the each other due to their educational and 
career tracks87. The meetings have no translation available, and therefore all 
interventions are most commonly made in English, but also in French88. 
 
According to a in-depth study carried out by Joylon Howorth (2010 and 2011) about the 
socio-political profile and identity of the PSC members,89 the data indicated that there is 
a “strong sense among members of the PSC that they are deeply involved in taking the 
EU forward,” showing that they have a “high degree of belief in the intrinsic wisdom and 
virtue of the European integration project” (Howorth, 2010:8). Ambassadors also 
stressed the “club-like” atmosphere and revealed that “there is clearly a unanimous 
feeling in the minds of PSC members that national interests and European interests are 
entirerly compatible”. The room to maneouver that a particular ambassador enjoys 
depends on their seniority, the member-state they represent, and of course the issue 
being discussed. While some large member states have instructions which sometimes 
consist of 50 pages, the ambassador’s position is also dictated by what his government 
has already said publicly about the issue. On the other hand, an ambassador of a 
smaller or new member state often receives no instruction on a specific subject and has 
the liberty to formulate the national position in Brussels. 
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 For a similar perspective see: Meyer, 2006; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007 and Howorth, 2010; 2011.   
88
 According to (Meyer, 2006: 126) between 70% to 80% of the PSC’s business is carried out in English and 20% to 
30% in French.    
89
 Howorth interviewed mostly “third generation“ PSC members (2005/2006 – 2009/2010).  
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The effectiveness of the committee also depends on the working procedures, and we 
found a number of procedural rules that are not written down in official documents. 
Those informal rules of procedure are fundamental in ensuring the Committee’s 
objective of reaching agreements on issues before moving them up to the COREPER.  
The most interesting feature of the PSC is something which according to their members 
is a consensus-seeking committee90. Instead of purerly defending their national 
positions as their primary goal, the members of the PSC try to defend their national 
position while at the same time actively seeking consensus towards European positions. 
According to one ambassador “there is always a strong will to find a common line, 
whatever the instructions from our capitals91” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007:141). Even 
though in most cases the starting positions of the members are quite different, the 
process involved in decision-making usually ends up with a broad consensus or 
unanimity92. Ambassadors also stress that “a significant measure of socialisation 
ensures that the dominant mode of interaction is consensus-seeking rather than 
bargaining around fixed national positions”. (Howorth, 2010: 16)  Most ambassadors in 
the PSC agree that the strategy used in the meetings to gain support for their 
propositions is persuasion using the common EU norms and values to base their 
proposals and not package deals (hard bargaining). They also mention that the 
maintenance of legitimacy within the group plays a major role in their cooperative style 
of negotiation because they know that they will meet again to discuss other topics. 
Another important unwritten rule inherited from the PoCo and strenghtened in the PSC 
is the consultation-reflex. Due to the residence of all of the committee members in 
Brussels, informal meetings to consult with each other before the negotiations take 
place are a routine for the ambassadors. We can see the result of this constant 
                                                          
90
 In the Howorth study the prevalent attitude within the committee was defined as “cooperative and consensus-
seeking” by 63% of the ambassadors.  
91
 It is important not to overestate the PSC’s ability in forging consensus. Issue areas such as: US policy, Russian 
policy, and the Middle East are still difficult policy areas in which consensus is not easily achieved.  
92
 We can ask how broad and honest this consensus is, but the fact that in most cases a consensus emerged from 
different starting national positions shows that the quest for consensus is a basic norm in the PSC daily business.  
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interaction of PSC representatives either as trying to anticipate the outcome of the 
negotiation in order to improve their strategy vis-a-vis the others, or alternatively the 
representatives could be seen as trying to “actively seek to internalize93” each others 
views. According to Juncos and Reynolds (2007:142) “[…] this would not be seen as a 
calculated process to increase pay-offs but a ‘natural’ process necessary to define their 
own positions/interests.” This statement might prove itself to be truthful, especially in 
cases where ambassadors receive no specific instructions from their capitals on the 
subject being discussed, thus opening up space for them to develop their national 
position according to the interaction with other colleagues. 
 
For Howorth (2010; 2011), the major factor stimulating compromise is the degree of 
socialization happening in the committee. The members also know each other very well, 
so they learn how to “read” each others stances and how to react. Besides this, they 
also share a strong sense of mutual trust. According to one Ambassador: “I think we all 
have a trust in each other that whatever compromise is possible we will find it. […] It is 
really true that there is a trust among colleagues that they try to find wherever a 
common basis is possible. It would be a different thing altogether if you always met 26 
different colleagues. You simply would not have that crucial element of personal trust 
that everybody is doing their utmost, whatever is possible, to find the best compromise”. 
(Howorth, 2010: 16) This means that the substitution of one ambassador by his/her 
deputy is enough to break down the trust-based group dynamics because the trust is 
something personal and non-transferable. Another interesting dynamic in the PSC is 
that in cases where some members have no defined position on a subject they see it as 
their duty (and role) to help other members with divergent positions on the subject to 
reconcile their views. Here we can identify some evidence of the Type I socialization 
proposed by Checkel, which means that members change from strategic calculation to 
role playing. In the case of those members with strongly held national positions they try 
to persuade the others to change their positions with the force of argument. When the 
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 See Tonra, B. (2003: 740).  
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decision-making process reaches a stalemate due to strict instructions members are 
allowed to call their capitals, and that is usually sufficient to keep the discussion moving 
forward. The fact that ambassadors’ point to persuasion and the force of argument 
based on the common EU norms and values as the main features in convincing their 
colleagues to change position also shows that some kind of normative suasion is 
happening in the committee, which is the first sign of a movement towards Type II 
socialization. The scope and condition which allows for socialization in this committee is 
the member-states’ readiness to compromise in order to keep the CFSP/ESDP moving 
forwards. It is important to highlight the point that we do not deny that member states 
have full autonomy in national foreign-policy making. However, all participants in the 
CFSP/ESDP have the interest that the system moves forward. Particularly in this area 
the whole has been shown to be more important than the sum of the parts. Moreover, 
the member states also want the process to achieve results. In this sense, in order to 
avoid disturbance of the system we do not see proposals circulating in the PSC that 
explicitly run against the national interest of one member state. In this sense, the PSC is 
creating a new policy area (like the EPC before them). According to Howorth (2010:17):  
 
“Debates thus tend to turn around proposals that have a realistic chance of 
success. In this context, knowing intimately the sense of the prevalent collective 
mindset ambassadors will sometimes pitch their initial bargaining positions 
slightly closer to what they feel would be a consensual position than might have 
been the case in, say, the PoCo. Thereafter, as they feel their way through the 
ensuing discussion they quickly know what margin of maneouvre exists and are 
in a good position to contact the national capital with a suggestion as to how best 
progress business”             
 
In this sense, with constant formal and informal interactions ambassadors are 
embedded in a European learning process, and at the same time they give feedback to 
their capitals about the sense of European collective opinion in the PSC and suggest 
how national positions can be moulded to achieve the desired collective result. This 
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suasion, or didatic function represents the notion that although PSC representatives still 
remain under the hierarchical control of their capitals’ Ministries they are able to 
influence and sometimes dictate the national interest at home, while at the same time 
they influence others’ national interest in Brussels and write on the “blank sheet” of the 
CFSP/ESDP. 
   
The 2004 enlargment also apparently did not disturb the modus operandi in the 
committee. Even though new ambassadors often come with a specific idea of how the 
committee should work, they realize quickly that they must follow the written and 
unwritten procedural rules. Those rules are enforced by peer pressure, and therefore 
the existing members of the committee explicitly censure the newcomer if they 
disregard those rules94. This adjustment of the newcomers to the group dynamics 
clarifies the functioning of the committee after the enlargement. Besides, some 
accounts point to the better functioning of the committee after the enlagment due to the 
development of another informal rule about the importance of being concise in a more 
populated committee, so no delegate speaks for more than two minutes (Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007). 
 
Christoph Meyer (2006) also reaches the same conclusions in his analysis of the PSC, 
taking into account the group characteristics, discursive dynamics and persuasiveness: 
“… [the work of the PSC] has set in motion dynamics of social influence that can mould 
a group of national officials into a socially cohesive policy community with shared 
objectives and increasingly shared attitudes concerning the use of force” (2006: 112). 
He also observed two dynamics in the PSC: “compliance or normative pressures, which 
make group members conform in public to dominant attitudes or views, and personal 
                                                          
94
 In particular, the ambassadors with more seniority, lengevity in the committee, personal charm, in-depth 
knowledge, and relevance of their country to the issue being discussed, have a bigger chance to influence the 
group with their arguments, as long as they follow the accepted normative framework. 
206 
 
acceptance of these group norms through informational influence based on better 
arguments or superior expertise of in-group persuaders (2006: 117). As in the EPC, 
PSC ambassadors see themselves as pioneers of a very important policy area, and 
their necessity to reach consensus leaves their inclination to compete at bay. Again, 
Meyer sees the PSC as having inherited the characteristics of the PoCo as “an 
unusually cohesive committee with a club atmosphere, high levels of personal trust and 
a shared ‘esprit de corps’ driven by a common commitment to pioneer cooperation in a 
new-labour intensive and particularly sensitive policy-field” (2006: 124). Furthermore, he 
argues that the PSC “has developed into a multiplier of social influence, both through 
informational influence and peer pressure. It has managed to manufacture consent and 
broker compromises even in areas where national strategic norms would initially 
indicate incompatibility. [It] remains one of the most important ideational transmission 
belts of a gradual Europeanisation of national foreign, security and defence policies” 
(2006: 136-137). 
              
However, we should not overstate the internalization of rules and norms in the PSC. 
The fears expressed by Nuttall (2000: 246) that the codification and bureaucratization of 
the CFSP/ESDP would undermine the possibilities for socialization, which was the key 
factor for moving the EPC/PoCo forward, are consolidated in the PSC. As a result, one 
can state that the socialization in the PSC occurs more due to the number of contacts 
between the representatives based in Brussels rather than the quality of those contacts. 
The workload of the committee reduces the possibilities for socializing among the 
members. With the tight agenda and increased number of participants, ambassadors 
have few opportunities for personal informal meetings and socializing with all of their 
colleagues. This has an impact on how well they can develop personal relationships 
with the other representatives and discuss the issues informally. This factor 
differentiates the PSC from its counterpart, the COREPER II, and limits the 
opportunities for the internalization of rules and norms (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007).      
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3.2.1.3 - Socialization in the COREPER 
 
The COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) was created in 195895 
within the context of the Council’s rules of procedure and inspired by the Coordination 
Committee (COCOR) of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. In 
1967 both bodies were merged in accordance to Article 4 of the Merger Treaty96, and 
this was the first time that the COREPER was cited in a Treaty. There, the general 
responsibilities of the COEREPER were defined as: “A committee consisting of the 
Permanent Representatives of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the 
work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council” (Art. 4, 
Merger Treaty, 1967). With the 1973 enlargment (Denmark, Ireland and United 
Kingdom) and the increasing workload of the Council, the 1974 Paris Summit and then 
the 1980 European Council redefined COREPER’s responsibilities to increase its 
participation in the decision-making process, thereby leaving the Council with only the 
major political issues. Those new roles of the COREPER were codified in Article 207 of 
the EC Treaty (TEC) which states that it is responsible for preparing the Council 
meetings both in formal terms and content. This is a major breakthrough, because until 
then the COREPER could not participate officialy in the decision-making process. The 
TEC also established that “… The Committee may adopt procedural decisions in cases 
provided for in the Council's Rules of Procedure …” (Art. 207, TEC). This task allowed 
for further discussion when the PSC decided on the creation of its own preparatory 
committee (Nicolaidis Group) without the previous approval of the COREPER. 
 
Since 1962, the Committee meets in two functionally independent settings97. COREPER 
I is composed of deputy members of the national representations and gathers weekly to 
                                                          
95
 However the Committee was already informally operating since 1953 (see Nugent, 2006: 199). 
96
 Also known as the Brussels Treaty, it merged the executive bodies of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC. 
97
 See Rules of Procedure Art. 19, paragraph 2. 
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prepare the “technical” Councils (employment, environment, social policy, etc.). 
COREPER II is composed of senior-level ambassadors of the permanent national 
representations to the EU and also meets weekly to discuss “politically sensitive areas” 
and prepare the monthly GAERC meeting. As a result the committees main tasks are 
coordinating the work of the Council, giving detailed evaluations of the dossiers, and 
suggesting options. In this sense, all items in the Council’s meeting agenda are 
examined by the COREPER98. Generally speaking, when an agreement is reached in 
the Committee, the Council simply confirms it. 
 
The agenda of the Committee is divided into issues that have been agreed at the CWGs 
and PSC and are ready for approval (so-called Part I)99, and issues that have been 
“moved up” to be examined by the COREPER (Part II)100. When an issue is agreed in 
the COREPER it moves to the Council’s Part A agenda101. The Mertens (COREPER) 
and Antici (COREPER II)102 Working Groups are responsible for preparing the 
Committee discussions. 
 
In this sense, the permanent representatives are seen as the “guardians” of state 
interests in Brussels, serving as exemplars “state agents”. Therefore this is a perfect 
                                                          
98
 Unless decided differently by the Council (unanimity) or COREPER (simple majority).  
99
 The inclusion of an item in Part I does not represent that this item has to be approved by the COREPER. 
Members of the COREPER have the power to raise an objection on one or more items included in Part I, and this 
automatically transfers the item to Part II agenda, however this almost never happens.   
100
 According to Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1995: 562), ca. 70% of the issues are agreed in instances below the 
COREPER. The Committee then agrees on ca. 15-20% of the Part II agenda. The Council then focuses on the 10-15% 
of Part B items that still need to be resolved.   
101
 The Council’s agenda is also divided into Part A – items ready for approval  and Part B – issues under discussion.   
102
 The Antici Group started its activities in 1975 and is responsible for organizing the agenda for the Coreper II 
meetings and settling technical and organizational details of the meetings. It also informally presents the positions 
that the delegations will adopt at the meeting.     
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locus to infer on the impact of socialization in daily politics. Recent extensive research 
on the socialization in the Committee103  points to the development of a decision making 
process that is anchored in informal norms, rules and discourse. Besides this, a long 
time before the PSC the COREPER was already known for its esprit de corps, “club-
like” atmosphere and consensus-seeking based on collectively legitimate arguments. 
According to Lewis (2005: 138-139):  
 
“Joining the COREPER “club” involves more than behaviorial adaptation to institutional 
norms that alter incentives and strategies. EU permreps104 also internalize group-
community standards that become part of an expanded conception of the self. This 
internalization includes a distinct epistemic value in the collective decision-making 
process itself. The standards of appropriateness found in COREPER include norms 
ruling out certain instrumental behaviour (such as “pushing for a vote” under conditions 
of qualified majority voting), obligations to practice mutual responsiveness and 
collectively legitimate arguments (including appropriateness standards for dropping 
arguments that fail to convince the group), and a duty to “find solutions” and keep the 
legislative agenda of the Council moving forward …”   
 
The Permanent Representatives are placed between policy-experts located in the 
CWGs below and the Ministers in the level above and have to discuss a variety of topics 
from fisheries to foreign policy. According to Bostock (2002: 215), “[the COREPER]… is 
a body composed of officials with the seniority and proximity to the ministers to take a 
politically informed view, but with the diplomat’s and bureaucrat’s obligation to master 
the technicalities of the dossier before him”. This position within both the EU and 
national politics gives the members of the COREPER a good overview of the whole 
work being done in the Council. In this context, the quality of the contacts in the 
COREPER is marked by the density of the issues being discussed, unlike the PSC 
                                                          
103
 See Lewis, 1998; 2002; and 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1995; 2003; and 2006; Lempp, 2007; Bostock, 
2002. 
104
 Acronym used for the Permanent Representatives.  
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where the number of contacts in the meetings plays a major role in socialization. 
Moreover, it is important to highlight the point that the issues being discussed in the 
COREPER are those that were not agreed at the CWGs and PSC levels, and besides 
this the COREPER is the last instance before the Council and therefore has a major 
amount of pressure to find a solution to the dossiers before they reach the Council. 
Nevertheless, with the density and cross-sectoral responsibilities of the Committee the 
permreps also fulfil an intense agenda of meetings in different domains of EU decision 
making while also sitting beside their Ministers during the Council’s sessions and 
serving as consultants “behind the curtains”. Also, the relationships with the EP occupy 
a great deal of work in the COREPER. This intensity of interactions is also 
strenghthened by the high level of experience that senior Ambassadors have with not 
only the issues being discussed but also the functioning of the Committee. Contrary to 
the other bodies, the ambassadors in the COREPER participate in the Committee for 
longer periods of time (around 5 years), but due to the specificity of the work in Brussels 
many ambassadors stay for a decade or their whole career. In addition to the weekly 
meetings, before the Council’s monthly meetings the COREPER II prepares a 
luncheon105 that is used to deal with the most complicated issues that could not be 
solved in the normal meetings. The participation in the lunches is very restricted with no 
notes being taken, and even translators are not allowed to participate. Other informal 
mechanisms are the COREPER trips organized by the presidency, when members of 
the Committee travel together to the capital of the rotating presidency (Lewis 2005; 
Bostock, 2002; Butler, 1986). 
 
Another very important characteristic of the COREPER that facilitates the socialization 
is the high degree of insulation of the ambassadors in regard to the normal currents of 
domestic pressures. According to the interviews there is a clear sense of confidentiality 
                                                          
105
 The COREPER Luncheon also takes place on an ad hoc basis. 
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around the meetings106. In the meetings the national positions are fine-tuned and 
ambassadors are able to talk freely without the concern that their position will be 
exposed to their superior back in the capital or in the media. The meetings also include 
a brainstorming session on how the deal will be sold back in the capitals with convincing 
arguments. The participation in the COREPER meetings is so restricted that even 
experts from national capitals and foreign ministries are not allowed to be present in the 
meetings. According to Lewis (2005: 146), “The role of insulation in COREPER 
diplomacy supports Checkel’s hypothesis that persuasion and socialization are more 
likely in “less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings”.” This insulation also 
allows the permreps to reshape their instructions because they are not exposed to the 
control of their principal during the negotiations. As a result, in cases where the 
representative perceives that their position is unsustainable in the group and could harm 
the delegate’s reputation he/she simply drops it, and with the help of their colleagues 
they make up good and convincing arguments to justify the position back home107. This 
also includes a high degree of autonomy or input of the ambassadors in the formulation 
of the instructions together with their capitals and preparation on how the instruction can 
be articulated and defended using the Committees’ language. The creation of such an 
insulated Committee also represents the fact that States are committed to keeping the 
work of the Council moving forward, and they avoid tough public battles between their 
ministers/heads of government (Lewis, 2005). Stasavage (2004: 673 see Lewis, 2005: 
146) shows that insulated negotiations decrease the levels of negotiators’ “posturing” 
because they do not have to show their local constituency that they are “effective or 
committed bargainers”. 
 
                                                          
106
 This makes it hard to scientifically “open the black box“ of the COREPER negotiations because ambassadors are 
unwilling to speak about the content of their meetings.  
107
 For a good example on how this mechanism works see the French and Greek positions in the case of the 1994 
local elections directive in Lewis, 2005.  
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Jeffrey Lewis studied the Committee for 10 years, and in his acclaimed work on the 
socialization in the COREPER (Lewis, 2005) he identifies three socialization 
mechanisms at stake: strategic calculation; role playing and normative suasion. The 
former is observed in the strong “self-binding” unwritten, informal decision-making 
norms that permeate COREPER’s institutional environment. The permreps comply with 
those norms in the absense of external sanctioning due to the insulating nature of the 
Committee. This pro-norm behaviour is suggested to stem from the willingness to gain 
social influence and “social capital” in the group and avoid shaming and damaging their 
reputation. This behavioral adaptation in order to increase social influence is what 
Checkel calls strategic calculation. Additionally, in order to move your proposal forward 
in the group the participant must use the accepted language, arguments and standards 
of behavior, which would support the idea that besides strategic calculation there is a 
Type I internalization, or role-playing socialization. This case can mostly be seen in how 
the informal norms work at molding the newcomers to the accepted group standards108, 
and if a member does not fit in the expected role he/she becomes ostracised in the 
group (Lewis, 1998; 2003; and 2005). However, it is clear that when a new member 
joins the group he/she has to undergo a period of “social learning”, as stated in Lewis 
(2005:151): “On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have relatively high 
levels of ingrained cognitive priors […] The COREPER novice who “treats colleagues as 
opponents” undergoes a period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt 
new cognitive templates in order to operate in an unfamiliar environment.”109 
 
Lewis identified five informal norms at work in the Committee. The norm of diffuse 
reciprocity of concessions represents the notion that once a delegate compromises his 
position in order to achieve a consensus in the group (including dropping reserves 
and/or abstaining) he can expect to be “rewarded’ with future concessions and 
                                                          
108
 For a concrete example see the Austrian position in the case mentioned above. 
109
 On the other hand, new members are more easily socialized when they have fewer ingrained norms, values, 
principles and beliefs that go against the standard cognitive priors of the COREPER.   
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derogations. The delegate also receives support to persuade the capital that the 
changes in the position are utterly important to keep the work moving forward. 
Secondly, the norm of thick trust represents the fact that ambassadors are motivated to 
speak frankly, and this reliability is reinforced by the constant contact among 
ambassadors in formal and informal settings. The norm of mutual responsiveness 
characterizes a willingness to understand each other’s problems, and therefore to 
receive the understanding and support of the group one has to be willing to understand 
and support the other’s interests and arguments first. In this sense, mutual 
responsiveness is the group’s answer to the collective legitimation of one’s claims. The 
fourth norm identified by Lewis is consensus-seeking, and this embodies the Committee 
willingness to reach a consensus, even under conditions of qualified majority voting 
(QMV). Empirical data on this norm is difficult to gather due to the confidentiality of the 
meetings, however the ambassadors in the COREPER claim that most of their 
decisions are taken consensually and that they would rather stay longer with their 
colleagues to reach a consensus than approve an issue by QMV. Following this norm 
therefore imprints a high rejection for explicit pushing for a vote in the Committee, thus 
making consensus-seeking a reflexive practice. Last but not least, the norms mentioned 
above influence the norm of compromise and the ambassadors’ disposition to flexibilize 
their positions in order to house divergent interests. This norm is facilitaded by the 
densisty of the work and issues being discussed in the COREPER and is characterized 
by moderation when presenting their national positions and defending their national 
interests. Therefore Lewis (2005: 148) concludes by arguing that, “Taken together, 
these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institutionalized in COREPER’s 
organized culture … That is, pro-norm behaviour is rooted in a complex combination of 
both strategic calculation and role-playing socialization.” 
 
The third socialization mechanism observed by Lewis at work in the COREPER is the 
normative suasion. The Committee has its own specific language, signals and 
unspoken meanings that are very important to enable the constant issue-dense debates 
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to keep rolling. Also, this “jargon” is expected to develop in high level diplomats’ circles 
with interpersonal relationships, especially when sitting in insulated settings and 
discussing intensive issues. Therefore, whatever the content the procedure that a 
diplomat uses to present their claim has a lot of influence on the outcomes, and of 
course the “collective legitimating arguments” that he/she uses, and as a result 
ambassadors use specific language when presenting their case, thereby justifying their 
position by persuading their colleagues of the rightheousness and fairness of the claim, 
especially in the “derrogarion discourse110” where we can observe that diplomats with 
longstanding positions in the COREPER use this mechanism well, where newcomers 
normally misuse this mechanism and are rapidly censored by their colleagues. As a 
result, in COREPER we see the fundamental importance attached to the argument 
where the persuasive power of ambassadors’ arguments has a strong impact on the 
decisions adopted. When they go to the meetings ambassadors are not only ready to 
convince the others of their interests, they are also open to be persuaded by the force of 
the other’s arguments. In this sense, with the use of their specific language COREPER 
members signal that they need support and understanding from the group or that 
something is particularly important with arguments and persuasion. The possibility of 
persuading the others with the power of a convincing argument and the mutual 
responsiveness in the Committee enables ambassadors of smaller member-states that 
display the appropriate rethoric code and powerful arguments to “punch above their 
weight”. We can also observe normative suasion at work in the COREPER in a 
negotiation pattern named “plotting111”. In plotting, one member uses the collective 
pressure in the group to justify back home that a national position has to be changed or 
that the domestic constraints need to be redefined. According to the interviews carried 
out by Lewis (2005: 150), one ambassador says “To get new instructions we have to 
show [the capital] we have a black eye […] We can ask COREPER for help with this; it 
                                                          
110
 Lewis identifies idyiosincratic methods that senior diplomats use when they want to signal special dispensations 
(Lewis, 2005). 
111
 Two-level game theorists call it “COG collusion”. For a concrete example of “plotting“ in the COREPER see Lewis 
2002.  
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is one of our standard practices”. Indeed overstating the group’s rejection is also a tool 
which can be used to jointly support or refuse claims. (Lewis, 2005; Lempp; 2007)               
 
As a result, we generally see that in the COREPER the collective interest of keeping the 
Council working stands above the unwillingness to compromise a particular national 
position. More than just strategic calculation or role-playing, the cases that show the 
permanent representative influencing their national capital to accept another delegate’s 
claim while dropping their own claim down (even when it is possible to exercise the veto 
power112), shows that type II internalization is at work in the Committee. This normative 
suasion is a practice that occurs often and is well documented in the COREPER (Lewis, 
1998; 2003; and 2005; Lempp, 2007; Beyers, 1998; Beyers and Dierickx, 1998). 
However, we agree that socialization in the COREPER is not automatic but partial, 
therefore it would be incorrect to argue that the group standards are “taken for granted” 
or irreversible all the time. Nor do ambassadors change their identity as a cause of the 
socialization in the Committee. Instead they act as “double-hatted” by defending their 
national interest while at the same time being flexible to compromise in the cause of the 
European interest. It is also not possible to assure that the Committee would continue to 
act with the actual standards of appropriateness if the scope condition for socialization 
in the COREPER would change (density, insularity, etc). In all likelihood the 
negotiations would be more self-interested and instrumental and the consensus-seeking 
orientation would be substituted for national battles over self-serving interests.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112
 For an interesting case on how informal norms operate in the COREPER and promote pro-norm behaviour even 
in cases when veto power (or threat of veto) can be used see Portugal’s position in Lewis,2005. 
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Transgovernmental networks and socialization in South American Political 
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As seen in the previous chapter, transgovernmental networks and socialization 
processes played an important role in the institutionalization of the European political 
integration. This phenomenon illustrates the importance of looking at factors beyond the 
simple dichotomy between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists over the ends of 
the integration process. In order to demonstrate the independent impact of 
transgovernmental networks and socialization to the creation and development of 
institutions we will compare our findings in the previous chapter on the European 
example with institutionalization in South America. 
 
In South America we can see a high number of regional institutions (just as in Europe), 
and some with a considerable degree of success (such as Mercosul) but no level of 
supranationalism. This fact points to the rejection of the premise that supranational 
institutions are the driving force of integration (Smith, 2004). 
 
There are quite a few regional institutions in South America, but those that aim to be 
more than trade blocs or specific international regimes are the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI), Andean Community (CAN), Southern Cone Common 
Market (Mercosul), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). There are 
other regional regimes which were formed to deal with specific issues such as the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), 
and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (OTCA). Other institutions with a 
hemispheric character which include South American countries are also worth a 
mention, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Grupo do Rio, and 
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OPANAL). 
 
Among these institutions we will take a close look at those which have developed more 
significantly and in a similar way to the European Union, namely the Andean 
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Community (CAN), Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul), and Union of South 
American Nations (Unasul). In this chapter we will see how those institutions were 
created and developed and how they interact, merge and overlap with other institutions. 
Most specifically, in this chapter we will focus on the role of transgovernmental networks 
and socialization processes, not only in the creation of those institutions but also in how 
those institutions further impacted on those transgovernmental networks and on the 
changing norms of South American politics. 
 
4.1 - From Pan-Americanism to regionalism 
 
Before we analyse the actual developments of the South American political integration 
processes it is important to first give an overview of the past experiences and why they 
did not work. As a result we can observe that historically speaking any proposition on 
political integration in Latin America had a “Pan-American” or “hemispheric” character. 
This “Pan-Americanism”, especially sponsored by the United States of America, can be 
divided into three consecutive parts. The first part is called the Hemispheric Defence 
System, and this aimed to create an alliance against external threats. This was 
characterised by the Monroe Doctrine and lasted until the end of the Second World 
War. In the second part, which is characterized by the National Security Doctrine, 
cooperation was seen as an instrument to neutralize the communist movements that 
were spreading in Latin American countries. The third and actual Hemispheric Security 
System aims to respond cooperatively and multilaterally to transnational threats, with 
special emphasis on the fight against terrorism. Besides this there is also the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which constitutes the main 
instrument of collective security for the Americas. Those initiatives were led by the 
United States and put forward in the Organization of American States (OAS), but they 
received strong criticism from other Latin American countries due to different 
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perceptions and conceptions on security and defence issues and on how political 
coordination should be achieved.  
 
As a result the idea of a hemispheric security system that could lead to a deeper 
political integration among its member-states is not foreseeable in the OAS due to the 
strong asymmetries among its member-states and the very different motivations 
involved. This also justifies the fact that the institutional mechanisms are characterised 
by weak infrastructures and very limited influence (Diamint, 2004; Medeiros, 2009; Villa, 
2007). As we will see, despite the notion that Brazil might be replacing the United States 
as the dominant player in South American politics, the political will to set forth political 
integration and its requirements of regional interconnectedness is much more clear in 
the South American context than it is in the Latin American or Hemispheric contexts113. 
The expression of this South American interconnectedness is seen in the recent 
developments aimed at enlarging the integration process to comprise all of the South 
American countries in the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). As will be 
explained below, the Unasul is the attempt to merge two integration processes in South 
America, namely the Mercosul and the Andean Community114. 
  
                                                          
113
 It is important to highlight the difference between the terms South America and Latin America. South America 
refers to the geographical area between the Isthmus of Panama (Colombia-Panama border) and the Tierra del 
Fuego (southern part of the Argentinian-Chilean border). Ethimologically speaking, Latin America refers to 
American countries that speak languages derived from Latin, mostly Portuguese and Spanish but also French. 
Therefore the term Latin America excludes Canada, the United States, most of the Caribbean, Surinam and 
Guyana. Geographically speaking, Latin America refers to the countries in North, Central and South America, 
located between Rio Grande in Mexico and Tierra del Fuego in the southmost Argentinian-Chilean border, 
excluding the Caribbean. In this sense those two terms (Latin America and South America) are not used 
interchangeably here. 
 
114
 A good example of successfully merging two different subsystems in one integration process is the partial fusion 
between the European Communitites and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
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We can see quite a high number of economic, military and cultural interactions in South 
America that are mostly marked by cooperative attitudes. In the economic field there is 
the CAN (Andean Community of Nations), which includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru (Chile and the Mercosul countries are “associate-members”). In the 
intersection between economic and political integration we have the Mercosul (Southern 
Cone Common Market), composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Chile 
and the CAN countries are associate-members and Venezuela is in the accession 
process to become a full member).  
 
While the CAN members have presented a big political challenge to South American 
political integration due to its high level of internal (such as Colombia and Bolivia) and 
external (Colombia and Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, Bolivia and 
Chile) conflicts, despite economic divergences the Mercosul has moved forwards as the 
most promising integration process in the region. Political ties developed between Brazil 
and Argentina in the beginning of the redemocratization process have transformed the 
biggest rivalry in South America into the axis relationship for South American political 
integration. Development of joint political projects such as the Brazilian-Argentinian 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the Mercosul, and 
the growing number of joint military exercises and exchange of officials to military 
academies, etc. contributed to cementing and enhancing the prospects of integration in 
the Southern Cone. However, it is also important to highlight the contribution of the 
close cooperation and ties between Argentina and Chile in the field of security and 
defence to the stability of the sub-region. 
 
As will be seen below, the military transgovernmental ties that began to form during the 
military dictatorships for political persecution were countered and re-directed by the new 
elected democratic governments. The democratic governments in the Southern Cone 
fostered an ad hoc civilian transgovernmental network with the objective of pushing 
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forward a program to develop regional institutions and Confidence Building Mechanisms 
(CBMs) in order to gain leverage over the strong military network (for more on the 
development of the civilian transgovernmental network see Olsener, 2009; Steves, 
2001; Hirst, 1993; Hirst, 1995; Bouzas and Fanelli, 2002). According to the research, 
there is evidence that the military network has been furthered socialized into democratic 
norms and was therefore re-directed to comply with the normative objectives of the 
democratic governments. We also have evidence that this military network (Milicom) is 
more responsible for pushing forward South American integration in the field of security 
and defence nowadays than its civilian counterpart115. This fact also points to an 
apparently successful socialization of the Milicom into the norms of peace and 
democracy.  
 
Those strong transgovernmental networks being built along the years in military 
academies, diplomatic academies, joint-exercises and regular meetings have 
contributed to not only reducing the tensions among countries on the Southern Cone 
and enhancing the institutionalization in the region but have also culminated into the UN 
Haiti Mission (Minustah). The Minustah represents a breakthrough in terms of military 
and defence cooperation for countries that not long ago were on the brink of a nuclear 
arms race. The UN Mission consists of troops from eight South American countries 
(including all Southern Cone countries) under the military aegis of Brazil (Costa Vaz and 
Jacome, 2009).  
 
                                                          
115
 Interviews carried in the period of 2006-2010 with South American politicians, diplomats and military. It is 
important to highlight that in the interviews carried before the institutionalization of the Unasul and its South 
American Defence Council it was possible to confirm the influence of the military transgovernmental network in 
the actual integration projects. As seen in the methodological part of this dissertation, the results of the interviews 
were contrasted with the official positions of governments in regard to the integration process, and it is difficult to 
infer if the statements in the interviews were valid or biased. 
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4.2 - Transgovernmental networks in South America: from Mercosul to the Unasul 
and its South American Defence Council 
 
The Union of South American Nations (Unasul) was created with the Brasilia Treaty 
(also called the Constitutive Treaty) and signed in May 2008. This institutionalization 
represents an attempt to merge two different sub-regional systems that exist in the 
region, namely the Southern Cone and the Andean. The first is related to the Mercosul’s 
member-states and Chile, while the latter refers to the Andean Community’s member-
states plus Venezuela116. The institutionalization of the Unasul has the clear objective of 
unifying those two sub-regional systems under one institutional umbrella. Moreover, the 
Unasul (and its foreign policy, security and defence instance, the Defence Council), is 
designed to create a consultative forum (if not to produce coordination) on issues of 
foreign policy, especially security and defence, among the member-countries. This is a 
clear recognition that some level of coordination is necessary in order to avoid harming 
the economic interests.   
 
According to our main argument, this fact suggests the existence of two separated 
transgovernmental networks operating in the South American region. The high level of 
interconnectedness in the Southern Cone and its political/economic stability (not to 
mention the stronger and more efficient institutions) indicates that this sub-region has a 
stronger and more closely bound network than its counterpart in the north. The 
transgovernmental network in the Southern Cone has been developing since the 
redemocratization process in 1980’s117. The transgovernmental ties among Southern 
                                                          
116
 As will be observed further, I consider Guyana and Suriname as being interlinked with the Andean region but as 
part of a Caribbean system. Both countries (Guyana and Suriname) are members of another regional institution: 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
 
117
Although I consider the position of some authors that ascribe the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 as the 
departing point of the development for the transgovernmental network responsible to deescalate the tensions 
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Cone diplomats were stimulated by the newly elected democratic governments in order 
to bypass the military network developed for repressive purposes during the 
dictatorships (see Condor Operation below). This network, among diplomats and 
supported by the governments, was responsible for elaborating on and defining the 
rules of the integration process which culminated in the institutionalization of Mercosul.  
Therefore in this section we will observe the development of Mercosul and the Andean 
Community, looking at how and why they advanced as two distinct transgovernmental 
networks, and the influence they had in attempting to merge the two subsystems into 
one regional institution, namely the Unasul.     
  
4.2.1 - Southern Cone Common Market: Mercosul 
 
We can situate the legal antecedents for the creation of Mercosul in 1985’s Iguacu 
Declaration, signed by the elected presidents of Argentina and Brazil. Both countries 
had experienced long military dictatorships118, and the external agendas of both 
countries were a reflection of the internal changes they were experiencing. Both 
countries were deeply marked by a strong rivalry since the end of the 19th Century, 
which was escalated during the period of military dictatorships, and the democratically-
elected governments shared the concern of how to establish strong civilian control over 
the military. Both countries were also struck by dire economic problems which were left 
by the military, and Argentina’s morale was especially low due to the disputes with Chile 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
between Argentina and Brazil acceptable, I consider the redemocratization process as a starting point for the 
network responsible for pushing forward the institutionalization based on shared norms and principles of peace, 
democracy and stability. I ground my argument in the fact that it was only after the Sarney/Alfonsin agreement 
(Declaracao do Iguacu in 1985) that the idea of a regional institution started to take form (although I recognize that 
during the military dictatorships there were strong interactions between the establishments of both countries for 
political persecution – see Operation Condor below). 
118
The military dictatorships were in power from 1966 until 1983 in Argentina (with a democratic intermezzo from 
1973 to 1976 – peronismo) and from 1964 until 1985 in Brazil.  
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over the Beagle Channel (1978) and with Great Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands’ War 
(1982). Therefore Argentina and Brazil shared a common vision of internal and external 
problems. According to Llama (2003: 168): “The concepts of striving for greater 
autonomy, modernising productive capacity and consolidating the internal market while 
counting on human resources for technological development and promoting the sub-
regional market in view of opening up to the world formed the ideological core for both 
governments.”  
 
There were particular concerns about civilian control over the military. In Brazil the 
military were granted a full amnesty, while in Argentina the main actors of the 
dictatorship were sentenced on the eve of redemocratization but were granted an 
amnesty in 1991119. However, the ties that existed among the military during the 
dictatorships continued to exist in the democratic era. The strong relationships among 
the military in the Southern Cone date back to the 1970’s, something which is confirmed 
with Operation Condor120.  
 
Operation Condor was a transgovernmental network propelled by the Chilean 
government in order to exchange sensitive information and coordinate counter-
subversive operations against left-wing movements. The network conducted operations 
outside South America, extending its activity even to Europe (McSherry, 1999). The 
network was formed by military personnel and diplomats from Argentina, Brazil121, 
                                                          
119
 The transition period in Brazil was much softer than in Argentina, and this allowed the Brazilian military to 
negotiate a full amnesty, while in Argentina the extremely violent nature of the dictatorship (so-called dirty war – 
guerra sucia), and the lost war against Great Britain did not leave room for the dictatorship to maneuver and 
negotiate a full amnesty. After protests (highlight the importance of the movement Mothers of Mayo) the amnesty 
in Argentina was cancelled in 2005 and the investigations restarted.   
120
 I thank the Argentinian political scientist Dr. Martin Ladrone for raising this point.   
121
 In 2007 it was revealed how Brazilian diplomats were recruited by the Foreign Information Centre (Ciex – 
Centro de Informacoes do Exterior) and acted on behalf of the governments in the persecution of political 
dissidents outside Brazil. The persecutions were not only directed at Brazilian nationals but also included nationals 
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Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Once the hub of the network was established at the 
Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) it functioned very autonomously from 
their executives. According to a telegram sent from the US Ambassador in Chile to the 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976,122 “[…] cooperation among South American 
intelligence agencies is handled […] apparently without much reference to anyone else. 
It is quite possible, even probable, that Pinochet has no knowledge whatever of 
Operation Condor…” As a result we can conclude that the transgovernmental network 
formed by Operation Condor was very autonomous and operated in “the shadows”, 
often bypassing the instructions of their own governments. 
 
According to Guillermo O’Donnell (1999), the military dictatorships in the region were 
“bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes in the sense that they were fine-tuned with the 
capitalist system with a firm commitment to modernize the infrastructure and economies 
of their societies. While the military would stay responsible for countering “subversive 
behaviour” (the authoritarian part), the ministries would be left in the hands of highly 
qualified civilians and technocrats123 (the bureaucratic part). Due to this “bureaucratic-
authoritarian” nature, the Condor Operation was able to flourish despite the high level of 
external rivalry among the countries (Domingues, 2007). Therefore, in order to 
understand this Janus-faced character of the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone 
(cooperation and rivalry) we must realize that while they cooperated to cope with the 
internal “subversive movements” they tried to legitimize themselves with the adoption of 
strong national security doctrines. The external face of the military dictatorships, 
modelled after the national security doctrines, included an escalation of tensions in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from other South American countries. The web of contacts also extended the operations to Spain, Portugal and 
France. See: Correio Brasiliense, 23 july 2007: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.de/2007/07/757-o-itamaraty-
colaborando-com.html.  
122
 The telegram can be seen at: www.gwu.edu/~nsaarchiv/news/20001113/760824.pdf 
123
 In Chile known as the “Chicago Boys” due to their education in the liberal school of economics at the University 
of Chicago under the aegis of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. 
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order to justify the presence of and investment in a strong military apparatus. Argentina 
and Chile were at the brink of war in 1978 over the dispute of a group of small islands 
and sea territory in the Beagle Channel, while Argentina and Brazil had conflicting 
positions on a wide range of issues from how to manage the waters of the Parana River 
to developing a nuclear arms race. Therefore the transgovernmental networks formed 
with the Condor Operation were unable (or unwilling) to change the conflictive nature of 
their countries’ foreign and defence policies, mostly because it was a network aimed at 
reinforcing the military-authoritarian nature of the dictatorships.  
 
Following this strong external rivalry, it is interesting to observe how the relationships 
among the countries in the Southern Cone de-escalated and cooperation in foreign and 
defence policies developed and culminated with the institutionalization of the Southern 
Cone Common Market (Mercosul). To answer this puzzling question, Andrew Hurrell 
(1998b) proposed the hypothesis that connects international cooperation with the 
evolution of civil-military relations. Therefore, drawing on Hurrel’s hypothesis we argue 
that the transgovernmental network established during the military dictatorships did not 
change many of its pieces124 but was re-directed (just like in a cybernetic model125) in 
order to comply with changes in the norms caused by the redemocratization 
processes126. This re-steering occurred with the influence of another network, civilian, 
which was left with the task of developing regional institutions to promote stability, 
economic prosperity and democracy (Olsener, 2009; Steves, 2001; Hirst, 1993; Hirst, 
1996; Bouzas and Fanelli, 2002). 
 
                                                          
124
 The evidence that the network did not change many of its pieces is confirmed by the full amnesty that the 
military gained with the redemocratization and the fact that most of the high offices in the Defence Ministries are 
still occupied by military personnel that participated in the dictatorships. 
125
 For more on cybernetics see Deutsch, 1963; Wiener, 1961. I thank Ben Kamis for raising this question.  
126
 The normative change was instensified with the development of regional institutions and the civilian strive to 
gain control over the military stablishment. 
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According to Hirst (1996:218), the diplomats involved in the creation of Mercosul 
brought with them the experience of other failed integration attempts such as the ALADI 
and the ALALC. Just as in the European case, in Mercosul, the integration process was 
developed on a trial-and-error basis and can be very much characterised as a learning-
by-doing process. In this process the transgovernmental network responsible for 
developing the “rules of the game” had a major influence on the flexibilization and 
harmonization of their own government’s foreign policy (Hirtst, 1996:218). But how did 
this civilian network come into being? As mentioned above, despite the economic 
interest and the external pressures of globalization, the main goal of the integration was 
to overcome the conflictive relationship that gave fuel to the military dictatorships, thus 
enforcing civilian control over the military. This was achived by putting forward an 
agenda where democracy and political stability would be anchored in regional 
institutions and confidence building mechanisms. With this objective the governments of 
Argentina and Brazil signed 1988’s Economic Intergration and Cooperation Programme. 
According to Oelsner (2009:200): “[…] the Economic Integration and Cooperation 
Programme had more than a purely economic agenda. Instead, it was the result of the 
succesful securitization of democracy and development. Its institutionalization took the 
form of six-monthly presidential summits and gave rise to the establishment of formal 
and informal transnational networks…” In the final years of the military dictatorship it 
was already possible to observe the development of a normative change in the Brazilian 
Foreign Office which gave rise to the development of the civilian transgovernmental 
network together with the Argentinian diplomats. According to Pinheiro (2004:42): “[...] 
the slow relative autonomy regained by the Itamaraty127 in the foreign policy formulation 
was a crucial element in this process, one that meant many diplomats that were now 
occupying important offices in the institution’s hierarchy shared a strong pro-Third World 
view. This regained autonomy can be explained by the growing trust that the military 
had in the Itamaraty. This deposited trust was due to the opinion that the diplomats and 
military shared similar patterns of education and socialization, despite the political and 
                                                          
127
 Itamaraty is the name used in the diplomatic jargon to refer to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.   
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ideological devergences between the two groups128”. Sotomayor (2004:49) argues that: 
“Negotiating the foundations … of institution in the Southern Cone involved the active 
participation of the Argentine Chancellery and Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. The two presidents [of Argentina and Brazil] could then be served by a well-
trained diplomatic corps that enjoyed relative autonomy from military pressures.” While 
in Argentina the Chancellery tried to distance itself from the military connections, in 
Brazil one of the Itamaraty’s main objectives “was to soften the nationalistic stances 
defended by the Brazilian military” (Hirst 1995: 106 see Sotomayor 2004: 49)   
 
Therefore the development of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and the further 
institutionalization in the Southern Cone were caused due to the re-established 
democratic governments’ concern to gain leverage and control over the Milicom in a 
time when democracy was not yet well consolidated (Hurrell and Fawcett, 1995; 1998a; 
1998b; Sotomayor, 2004). In Hurrel’s words (1998b: 244): “In part this reflects the close 
and very concrete link between conflict resolution abroad and democratic consolidation 
at home – the need to promote regional pacification in order to deprive the nationalists 
of causes around which to mobilize opinion, to demand a greater political role, or to 
press for militarization and rearmament.” Or, as Kacowicz explains (2005: 130), “Hence, 
military and political CBMs have fulfilled an important role in strengthening peace and 
stability and promoting the institutionalization of military regional and hemispheric 
cooperation”. 
 
In this sense, the Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) in the Southern Cone were 
instrumental in enhancing the relationships between Argentina and Brazil since the 
beginning of the détente in the late 1970’s and between Argentina and Chile in the mid-
80’s. Particularly between Argentina and Brazil, these CBMs were further developed in 
parallel with the institutionalization process. These CBMs reinforced the mutual trust 
                                                          
128
 Free translation from the Portuguese version. 
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among Southern Cone countries and included military cooperation, integration of border 
areas, negotiations and agreements on border disputes, exchange of information, 
permanent communication, periodical meetings, and, most incredibly, joint military 
manoeuvres in the 1990’s. These CBMs also contributed to re-steering the military 
transgovernmental network, and because to them a range of common normative 
themes such as defence of democracy, economic integration, regional cooperation, 
non-interference, sovereignty, self-determination, maintenance of peace, protection of 
natural resources, and the ban of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were 
attached. (Oelsner, 2005; Diamint, 1994; Hirst and Rico 1992; Kacowicz, 2005)  
 
Therefore, the CBMs, vested with a normative toga, propelled the movement towards 
civilian control over the military in the Southern Cone. The military were able to maintain 
their close ties among in the sub-region while the multilevel security governance 
architecture re-directed those ties in order to reduce tensions, promote trust and 
achieve a more stable degree of security cooperation in the direction of a pluralistic 
security community (Flemes, 2005; Oelsner, 2009).        
  
Among these CBMs in the 1980’s, it is important to highlight the developments in the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and nuclear cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil. The nuclear programmes in both countries were the main 
projects of the military dictatorships, and therefore in order to gain leverage and control 
over the military the new democratic governments of Argentina and Brazil decided to 
increase cooperation on this issue. Without the de-escalation of tensions in the nuclear 
area it would be impossible to move the cooperation agenda of both countries forwards. 
In 1980 both countries has already signed a package of agreements that included 
cooperation for the development and implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy (Brigagao and Fonrouge, 1998). However, with the return of democracy the 
cooperation among both countries on the issue of nuclear energy and non-proliferation 
232 
 
further expanded and became the core of a more broad and ambitious program of 
security and economic integration, which was expressed in the creation of the Mercosul. 
The signing and ratification of the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Act and the Integration 
and Cooperation Program (ABEIP) by the presidents Raul Alfonsin and Jose Sarney in 
1985 (also known as the Iguacu Declaration) is the cornerstone for the creation of 
Mercosul. Its importance was mainly political: overcome the rivalry in order to propose a 
long-term cooperation. In the nuclear sphere it aimed at enhancing technical 
cooperation, mutual trust and transparency. It also intended to show to the international 
community that neither country wanted to develop or obtain nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, based on the foundations laid by the ABEIP the presidents Carlos Menem 
and Fernando Collor de Mello ratified the nuclear cooperation among both countries 
with the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (ABACC).  
 
The ABACC was created with the signature of the Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on 
Common Nuclear Policy in November 1990. This institutionalization of the evolving 
nuclear regime developed a common accounting and control system to apply to all 
nuclear activities in both countries. Additionally, the agreement included negotiations 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the creation of a safeguards 
agreement, which was signed in 1991. Those safeguards were further enhanced with 
the signature of the regional regime of Tlatelolco in 1994 and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). As a result the once highly nationalistic nuclear programs in Argentina 
and Brazil were now under direct control of the civilian-led Argentinian and Brazilian 
nuclear agencies, the ABACC and the IAEA (Brigagao and Fonrouge, 1998; Kacowicz, 
2005). 
 
The institutionalization of the ABACC is the most expressive attempt to control the 
military in South America, and together with the increased economic integration this led 
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to a stable peace between the two former rivals. In the following years the cooperation 
in the fields of security and defence increased dramatically. A large number of military 
exchanges (notice the importance of the Brazilian Military Academies)129, mutual visits 
and academic gatherings to discuss issues of defence and security took place. In 1996 
the presidents signed a document of cooperation in the area of security and defence 
that included space exploration, nuclear activities, physical and energy integration, and 
the establishment of a joint working group on strategic issues. With this agreement both 
countries started to carry out common joint manoeuvres for the first time since 1865 
(Kacowicz, 2005). With the development of Mercosul in 1991, the integration in the 
Southern Cone deepened and broadened to include the other countries in the region 
under a common institutional setting.     
 
After laying the basis for a stable peace in the region with the Iguacu Declaration, 
together with Paraguay and Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil signed the Treaty of 
Asuncion in March 1991. The Treaty of Asuncion founded the Southern Cone Common 
Market (Mercosul), and as we observed above it was from the beginning a shared 
political project and not just a trade agreement (Dominguez, 2007; Kacowicz, 2005; 
Flemes, 2005; Hurrel, 1998b). 
 
The Treaty of Asuncion established the Mercosul and fashioned it as an 
intergorvernmental institution. Therefore, according to the Treaty Mercosul would have 
two main institutional bodies: the Common Market Council (CMC), and the Common 
Market Group (CMG). Both bodies are populated by appointed officials from the 
member-states. In this institutional setting, the CMC is the consensual decision making 
                                                          
129
 As will be seen later, it is important to highlight the fact that the Brazilian Military Academies (ECEME, EGN, 
Universidade do Ar) are working as “hub centers” where officers from all South American countries meet to study 
and foster relationships. A more detailed discussion on the importance of the military academies to the 
development of transgovernmental networks and to the socialization of military commanders into common norms 
and values can be seen in the second part of this chapter.  
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body and is composed of Ministers of the Foreign Affairs and Economics. The heads-of-
state gather in this Council at least once every year, and the presidency is held by each 
member-state for a six-month period on a rotating basis. The CMG works as the 
executive body and is populated by member-states’ representatives from the Foreign 
Affairs and Economics Ministries and the Central Banks’ Chiefs. The CMG is 
responsible for taking measures to comply with the decisions of the Council, proposing 
policies for the development of the bloc, coordinating macroeconomic policies, 
negotiating with third party countries, and the constitution with Working Groups to help 
with the policy-areas. In 1994 the Treaty was amended by the Ouro Preto Protocol, 
which broadened the bloc’s institutional setting by incorporating four new bodies: the 
Mercosul Trade Commission (MTC), Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), the 
Socioeconomic Advisory Forum (SAF), and the Administrative Secretary of the 
Mercosul (ASM)  (Hoffmann, Coutinho and Kfuri, 2008). 
 
After consolidating this first phase of economic integration the Mercosul institutionalized 
some political mechanisms such as the 1996 Portero de los Fuentes declaration, which 
was signed by the presidents of the Mercosul member-states and created the Foreign 
Policy Consultation Forum (FCCP). The FCCP is populated by senior foreign office’s 
representatives and is designed to coordinate and systematize the political cooperation 
among Mercosul’s member-states. Its decisions are non-binding and consensual. This 
mechanism has proven its worth when diplomats of Mercosul countries (plus Bolivia and 
Chile) try to reach common positions for meetings of the Grupo do Río and the 
Organization of American States (OAS). It also produced results in coordinating the 
voting behaviour of Mercosul countries in the UN130. The creation of the FCCP also 
                                                          
130
 In the UN’s General Assembly, the joint-voting behavior of Mercosul member-countries increased dramatically 
after the establishment of the FCCP. While between 1991 and 1996 the member-states voted jointly in 51% of the 
cases, after the establishment of the FCCP it increased to 75% of joint-votes (for more on the statistical data and 
methodology of analysis of voting behavior see: Hoffmann, Countinho and Kfuri; 2008). To increase the level of 
political coordination in the UN the Argentinian and Brazilian governments exchange permanent liaison diplomats 
in their respective missions in the UN. This is especially relevant when one of them occupies the non-permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council.    
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stimulated the inclusion of the democratic-clause in the Mercosul. According to this 
clause which was included in the Mercosul-legislation in 1997, any member-state whose 
political system does not comply with the democratic norms must be immediately 
expelled from the integration process. This clause gave support to the Mercosul position 
in the Paraguayan political crisis, thereby avoiding disruption of the democratic system 
in this member-state. The member-states also coordinated their positions in the FCCP 
and used the democratic clause to pressure the governments of Peru and Haiti to 
respect human rights and maintain democratic institutions (Flemes, 2005). The FCCP 
also negotiated the Ushuaia Agreement, which declares the Mercosul as a Peace Zone. 
In this sense, it is correct to observe that the FCCP plays an important role as a 
mechanism for crisis prevention and secure regional stability. 
 
Since 2003 the Mercosul has focused on the institutionalization of norms and values 
which are important to the region. As a result we can see the creation of new bodies in 
the CMC structure that deal exclusively with issues of human rights (the High-Authority 
Meeting for Human Rights), rule of law (Centre for Promotion of the Rule of Law), 
democracy (Democracy Observatory131), and other bodies for social inclusion, 
education and employment. In order to reduce the complaints over the democratic 
deficit in the integration process, Mercosul also created a consultative forum composed 
of members of municipalities, federal states, provinces and departments; and in 2005 
the CMC approved the creation of the Mercosul’s Parliament132. Another important step 
for the consolidation of the integration process was the establishment of the Fund for 
                                                          
131
 This new body is responsible for following up on the state of the democracy in its member-states (supervising 
the Democratic Clause), and is designed to be sent abroad in order to observe the transparency and fairness of 
elections.  
  
132
 The Mercosul Parliament has a consultative character and is initially composed of representatives of national 
parliaments, but it has already foreseen the need for direct elections (the pace depends on how fast the member-
states internalize the legislation and organize the elections).  
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Structural Convergence and Institutional Strengthening of the Mercosul (Focem), which 
eased the asymmetries and promoted competitiveness in the bloc.    
 
  Figure 3: Simplified view of Mercosul’s institutional structures133 
 
Source: www.wikipedia.de 
 
In 2011 the Mercosul took a substantial step towards the institutionalization of political 
integration and external representation. The Foz do Iguacu Declaration created the 
office of the High-Representative of Mercosul as a body of the Common Market Council 
                                                          
133
For a more detailed institutional chart see: http://www.mercosul.gov.br/organograma/organograma-
mercosul/view  
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(CMC). The duties of the High-Representative include foreign policy coordination 
among the member-states, coordinating activities with the Common Market Group 
(CMG), developing action plans to be presented in the CMC, and presenting Mercosul’s 
common positions to third party countries, international organizations and regional 
blocs. The High-Representative has a three-year mandate and can be appointed once 
more. The first High-Representative of Mercosul was the Brazilian Ambassador, Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimaraes134. 
 
In 1996 Chile and Bolivia signed associate agreements with the bloc. Chile did not join 
Mercosul because it did not want subscribe to Mercosul’s common external tariff and 
did not want to give up its freedom to sign free trade agreements with third party 
countries. Bolivia is member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In 2003 and 
2004 Mercosul extended the association agreements to Peru, Colombia and Ecuador 
(all of them are members of the CAN). Venezuela applied for full membership in 2006, 
however due to the nature of the Venezuelan democracy and the anti-capitalistic and 
anti-American rhetoric of Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez the Parliaments of some 
countries were hesitant to ratify it as a member-state of Mercosul. Therefore, with the 
association agreements Mercosul comprises the two most dynamic regions of South 
America (Southern Cone and the Andean Community).             
 
Despite the difficulties of carrying out the integration process in the Southern Cone (not 
to mention in South America), Mercosul is the culmination of a great transformation in 
the region from an unstable nature with strong rivalries among the countries to a kind of 
“pluralistic security community”. This term, coined by Karl Deutsch, represents the 
notion that among a set of states, “there is real assurance that the members of the 
                                                          
134
See:http://www.mercosur.org.uy/innovaportal/file/2810/1/DEC_063-
2010_PT_ALTO%20REPRESENTANTE%20GRAL.pdf 
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community will not fight each other physically but will instead settle their disputes in 
some other way” (Deutsch, 1957: 5-6). This represents the idea that war is not an 
alternative for members of that community, and it is completely absent. More than that, 
according to Hurrel (1998) new shared interests and identities were constructed by the 
elites of the newly democratic Southern Cone countries. Meanwhile, new norms were 
internalized in order to gain leverage over the Milicom and re-direct this network to 
comply with them. It remains to be seen whether the northern part of South America 
also shares the same values of the Southern Cone, how strong its transgovernmental 
networks are, and if it can contribute to the political integration of the region. 
 
4.2.2 - Andean Community of Nations: CAN 
 
In 1969, after the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Association – LAFTA 
(Asociasion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio - ALALC) five South American 
countries in the Andean region135 with similar economies (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru), signed the Cartagena Agreement, thereby creating the Andean 
Pact136. Venezuela joined the bloc in 1973. The Andean Pact was initially fashioned as 
a protectionist trading bloc, establishing barriers for trade between the member-states 
and the rest of the world, and it was hoped that this would increase the intra-bloc trade. 
However, this first aim of the Andean Pact failed miserably due to the lack of capital and 
                                                          
135
 Geographically speaking, the Andean countries are defined by their location in South America, and particulary 
those which have in their territory part of the Andes mountain range. Therefore, according to the geographical 
definition the Andean countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. However, 
the initial idea of the Andean Community was to comprise all of the Andean countries in its institutional structure, 
but not all of them are part of the institution, f.i. Argentina and Chile. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that 
when we refer to the “Andean countries” or ”Andean region” we are counting the members of the Andean 
Community, or the countries located in the Northern tier of South America. Those are: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela (this last one is not a member of the Andean Community since 2006).      
136
 The official name Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones – CAN) was only formally 
introduced in 1996 with the Trujillo Protocol. From 1969 until 1996, the offical name was Andean Pact. 
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technical capacity of the member-states which were unable to sustain an 
industrialization programme. Due to these shortcomings and the restrictions on foreign 
investment and strong protectionism, Chile left the bloc in 1976. During the 1970’s Chile 
was experiencing strong growth due to its market-oriented economic policies (the 
influence of the so-called Chicago Boys mentioned above), and therefore it would have 
been contradictory for Chile to stay in the protectionist bloc (Arroyo and Roth, 2009). 
 
The Chilean decision to withdraw from the Andean Pact had a serious impact on the 
evolution of the goals agreed in 1969. In this sense, additional protocols were signed in 
1976 and 1978 postponing the establishment of the common external tariff and the 
implementation of a full-fledged free trade zone. However, in order to try to solve the 
problems with the fulfilment of the goals the Andean Pact member-states introduced a 
judicial organism in 1979, the so-called the Andean Court of Justice. Moreover, in order 
to enhance accountability and reduce the democratic deficit the Andean Parliament was 
created. Most importantly, the establishment of the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers 
as the political body (together with the Andean Presidential Council) of the Andean Pact 
took place. The Andean Council of Foreign Ministers is composed of the ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the member-states. It has the task of coordinating the positions of 
member-states in regard to the objectives of the Andean Pact and of elaborating joint-
positions of the Pact in international forums and negotiations with third parties. The 
Council can issue either decisions or declarations. While decisions are legally-binding 
(under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), declarations function as demarches, 
communicating the positions of the Andean Pact in specific issues. Both tools need to 
be approved by consensus in the Council. The Council is also responsible for preparing 
the meetings of the Heads of State and evaluating the performance of the Secretary-
General of the Pact with the possibility to renew or end their mandate (Sanches 
Avendano, 1999; Mattli, 1999; Rosales, 2008). 
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Notwithstanding those efforts in increasing the institutionalization of the Andean Pact, 
the integration process remained stagnated in the period between 1975 and 1987. This 
standstill is attributed to the impact of the withdrawal of Chile together with the 
economic crisis that affected Latin America in the 1980’s, but most of all this difficulty to 
deepen the integration was caused by the political constraints (such as border disputes, 
lack of CBMs, aggressive discourse, etc.) which inhibited the development of 
transgovernmental networks that could foster the integration process by giving flesh to 
the institutional structure established in the first place. Apparently those networks did 
not develop in the Andean countries due to a lack of political will, very different political 
systems137, the existence of strong nationalisms in the region, and the presence of 
many border disputes among the member-states.   
 
With the Quito Protocol in 1987 the basis of the integration process was re-launched, 
with the countries accepting an open form of regionalism. The less ambitious nature of 
the integration gave impulse to the Andean Pact, and after 24 years of attempts the free 
trade zone was established in 1993 followed by the creation of a Common External 
Tariff in 1995. However, once again the political instability of the Andean countries 
hindered the efforts of a less ambitious integration. In 1992, Alberto Fujimori carried out 
a Coup d’Etat in Peru and refused to participate in the free trade zone and in the 
common external tariff. Bolivia and Ecuador also did not accept the common external 
tariff. While Bolivia and Ecuador negotiated special treatment in the Andean Pact, Peru 
was reintegrated into the free trade zone in 1997 (Mattli, 1999; Rosales, 2008). 
 
In 1996 the Andean Pact experienced an ambitious institutional reform. The Trujillo 
Protocol signed by the Heads of State introduced the Andean Integration System 
(Sistema Andino de Integracion - SAI), and created an ambitious integration program. 
The Trujillo Protocol also changed the name of the bloc to the Andean Community of 
                                                          
137
 Military dictatorships in Bolivia (1969-1982), Ecuador (1972-1979), Peru (1968-1980).  
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Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones – CAN). The SAI is the unification of all 
bodies and institutions that operate in the Andean region in order to enhance the 
coordination and cohesion of the Andean Community.  
 
Figure 4: Andean Integration System (SAI) 
 
 
 Source: www.comunidadandina.org 
  
The Andean Presidential Council is the highest decision-making body of the CAN. The 
CAN Heads of State’ meet in an Intergovernmental Conference format once a year to 
define the general guidelines for the integration process. The pro-tempore presidency of 
the Council rotates every year among the member-states. The president of the Council 
represents the CAN in international forums and in negotiations with third parties 
(Rosales, 2008).  
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The General Secretariat can be considered to be the executive branch of the CAN. The 
Secretary-General is elected consensually by the Council of Foreign Ministers for a 5 
year term. The tasks of the SG include preparing drafts and decisions to propose to the 
Council of Foreign Ministers and to the Commission. Therefore the SG has the capacity 
of agenda-setting. The Commission of the Andean Community is composed of 
representatives of all member-states and meets 3 times every year in ordinary sessions. 
The functions of the Commission are exclusively related to trade and development 
policies, including advising the Council of Ministers in negotiations with third party 
countries and international forums. Besides those organisms mentioned above there 
are other financial (such as the Andean Development Corporation – CAF), advisory 
(with the participation of Civil Society, such as the Andean Business Advisory Council), 
and social/educational (such as the Simon Bolivar Andean University and the Social 
Conventions) groups (Rosales, 2008). 
 
Despite this incredible and legally advanced institutional structure, the Andean 
Community presents more problems than achievements. This is due to the high level of 
political instability in the region138 and economic fragility. According to Rosales (2008: 
52): “… each Member-Country wants to apply and maintain different rhythms (with 
different aspects) to the process of integration; … there are still border-problems which 
have not yet found a solution and which represent one of the most destabilizing factors 
of the Andean region. […] there are actually strong differences regarding ideologies and 
political tendencies between the Member States.” On the other hand, Sanches-
Avendano (1999) argues that the main problem of the Andean Community has been the 
lack of political will to make the institution work. In his view, the rapid institutionalization 
the CAN has experienced since 1996 was a response to external pressures, especially 
due to the success of the Mercosul and the necessity to interact with the European 
                                                          
138
 Just to mention some of those problems: strong political (and  ideological) polarization inside and between the 
member-states,  civil war in Colombia, Coup attempts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, war between Peru and 
Ecuador in 1995, border tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. 
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Union in inter-regional negotiations. In this sense we can observe the Andean 
Community as the institutional skeleton of an integration process without substance. 
 
The lack of common norms and values that could drive the integration forward is also 
noticed. The Andean region is stroked by historical democratic and institutional fragility, 
and therefore the power and presence of the armed forces in each of the countries is a 
reflection of this. In the next section of this chapter we will discuss the influence of the 
military in the integration process, but for now it is enough to say that the political 
instability and unresolved border disputes harm any kind of positive development of 
transgovernmental networks among the military and/or diplomats in the sub-region. 
 
The political polarization in the Andean Community reached such a level that in 2006 
Venezuela withdrew from the integration process. The official reason presented by 
Venezuela was that the integration process had failed due to the Free Trade 
Agreements signed separately by Colombia and Peru with the United States. However, 
some analysts argue that Hugo Chavez (former Venezuelan President) saw the 
possibility to join Mercosul as a more interesting opportunity,139 not only economically, 
but also politically. Venezuela expected that a rapid exit of the Andean Community 
would enhance the prospects of a fast integration in the Mercosul. However, the 
conflictive rhetoric of Hugo Chavez and his apparent views of integration140 have 
brought concerns that the presence of Venezuela as a full member of Mercosul could 
harm the integration process (Malamud, 2006).  
 
                                                          
139
 The Andean Community has an annual trade of ca. 9,000 million dollars, while Mercosul’s annual trade consists 
of ca. 150,000 million dollars (figures of 2005, Andean Community Secretariat).   
140
 Chavez has already stated that he aims to bring about 21
st
 century socialism and that regional integration 
should be a tool he can use to spread his ideology to the rest of the region.   
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Therefore the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community brought about an 
important discussion on the future of the integration process. The political and 
ideological pressure that Venezuela exerts on Bolivia and Ecuador could lead to the 
breakdown of the integration process (Rodriguez-Larreta, 2006). More realistically 
however, it would be possible to see a reorganization of the CAN without Venezuela. It 
is also lowering its aspirations and maybe negotiating with Mercosul about the 
possibility to merge both integration processes under the umbrella of the Union of South 
American Nations (Unasul) (Rosales, 2008).          
 
4.2.3 - Union of South American Nations (Unasul) and the South American 
Defence Council (CSD) 
 
In order to organize cooperation in the field of security and defence, the South American 
Defence Council (CSD) was created inside the framework of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUL). The UNASUL aims to merge the Southern Cone system 
(composed of the Mercosul member-states plus Chile) with the Andean system 
(composed of the CAN), and Guyana and Surinam who normally participate in the 
Caribbean system. It aims to create a single market with the development of the free 
trade zone starting in 2014. It also has big projects in infrastructure (South American 
Infrastructure Integration Initiative – IIRSA), and energy supply. On the political side, the 
UNASUL played an important role during the Bolivian crisis in 2008. The UNASUL, 
however, has a strictly intergovernmental character and is constituted of three councils: 
officials, Ministers, and Heads of State (Ramírez; 2008). The most important factor for 
this dissertation is the development of the South American Defence Council and its 
implications to the political integration in the region.  
 
The South American Defence Council (CSD) is a new institutional space which was 
developed in the framework of the UNASUL to foster regional cooperation and political 
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coordination in the fields of security and defence. Therefore, the CSD, is not a collective 
security mechanism (like NATO) but is first of all designed to be a consultative forum 
where governments can inform their partners on their positions on issues of security 
and defence. Therefore it can be defined as a mechanism of confidence building among 
the countries in the region to enhance mutual trust, decrease levels of tension, and 
promote at least some political coordination in order to avoid damaging economic 
interests. In this sense, the CSD can be seen as a forum that can be used by the 
member States to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual 
relationships in a less threatening way, thus promoting mutual oversight and resolving 
tensions and conflicts among them while enhancing the predictability of behaviour and 
promoting mutual understanding. The importance of transgovernmental networks for the 
establishment of the CDS is supported by interviews of the author with military advisors 
to the Brazilian Minister of Defence in 2006. One Brazilian Air Force General, for 
instance, argued that without activating personal connections in other South American 
countries, and without the diplomatic offensive of the Brazilian Defence Minister the 
establishment of the CDS would have been impossible due to strong initial reservations 
in many South American governments (and the United States). Mobilizing the support 
from military advisors in other countries together with the activation of pre-existing 
connections between them was an important factor as highlighted by the interviews. 
    
 
Secondly, it is guided by the principles of non-intervention in domestic matters, the 
subordination of the military to the democratically-constituted civil authorities, and the 
respect for human rights and individual freedoms. Moreover, in its Charter the CSD only 
recognizes the institutional forces included in its member-states’ Constitutions which are 
expressly condemning violent groups (which is very important due to mutual 
accusations of guerrilla support made between Colombia on one side and Ecuador and 
Venezuela on the other). Thirdly, in the long term the CSD is oriented towards fostering 
a common South American identity based on shared values. This can be seen as an 
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intention of changing and harmonizing the South American strategic cultures that could 
culminate in a common South American Security and Defence Policy. According to the 
words of the Brazilian President: “I am deeply convinced that it is the time to deepen our 
South American identity in the field of defence too (…) We have to articulate a new 
defence idea in the region based on common values and principles such as the respect 
for sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs.”141 In fact, in the view of the policy-makers one of the first steps towards this 
common strategic culture would be the harmonization of a regional defence market. 
This would lead to an increasingly strategic autonomy, thereby promoting the regional 
arms industries and enhancing cooperation and joint-projects among them as well as 
fulfilling targets the military corporations want to meet in an era of Defence cuts, thus 
keeping the military under civilian control and away from daily politics (Vaz and Jácome, 
2009). 
 
In this sense we can observe three main challenges posed to the development of the 
CSD as a sustainable institution to promote South American political integration, namely 
the need to guaranteed peace and democracy in the region, contribute to fostering a 
South American identity, and the development of a regional defence market. 
 
The first one is related to the fact that the South American security and defence agenda 
can be characterised by three types of conflicts: domestic crises that affect regional 
stability and threaten democracy, interstate conflicts (border disputes and territorial 
conflicts), and transnational threats (organized criminality, guerrilla movements, etc). 
These three kinds of conflict interrelate with each other, especially in border zones (see 
                                                          
141
 Translated from “Lula sugere reuniao exclusiva para tratar do Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa“, Folha Online, 
23/05/2008, original in Portuguese: “Estou convencido que é chegada a hora de aprofundarmos nossa identidade 
sul-americana também no campo da defesa. (...) Devemos articular uma nova visão de defesa na região fundada 
em valores e princípios comuns, como o respeito à soberania, à autodeterminação, à integridade territorial dos 
Estados e à não-intervenção em assuntos internos”. 
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more in Flemes and Radsek, 2009). In this sense, the first general objective of the 
CSD142 is to “consolidate South America as a Zone of Peace and a foundation for 
democratic stability”. Although the Mercosul and the UNASUL have already shown the 
ability and capacity to influence domestic crises decisively, as seen in the cases of 
Paraguay and Bolivia respectively, the normative question on the parameters on how to 
do it still remains open (in Mercosul this is more clear due to the democratic clause and 
the transgovernmental links). The political instability and the confrontational-
ideologically based rhetoric of some member-states, especially those located in the 
Andean system, is also a reason for concern. 
 
The second challenge is whether the CDS will be able to foster a South American 
identity. Besides the guiding principles of democracy and sustainable peace, the CDS 
effectiveness will also be measured on whether it will be able to promote and deepen a 
set of norms which are largely accepted throughout South America. According to 
Kacowicz (2005:4), among the South American countries there is a set of norms shared 
by all, those are: “(…) uti possidetis, peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-determination, 
convivencia (peaceful coexistence), concertación (consensus-seeking), arms control 
and disarmament, and non-proliferation and confidence building mechanisms (CBM’s)”. 
In fact, some of those norms are evident in the CSD foundation document: “respect for 
sovereignty, integrity and territorial inviolability of the States, non-intervention in 
domestic affairs and people’s self-determination”. This represents the fact that in 
whichever way it is possible to identify common principles, values and norms, the 
question on how they will be operationalised in order to produce a common South 
American identity that could be used as a driving force for integration remains. For 
many policy-makers the first step to solving this puzzle is to establish a South American 
Defence Market. 
                                                          
142
 As stated in its constitutive agreement, article 4 of the Decisao para o Estabelecimento do Conselho de Defesa 
Sul-americano da UNASUL, subscribed in Costa do Sauípe, Brazil, December 16th 2008 
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This leads to the third challenge of the CSD: develop a regional defence market. 
According to its constitutive document, one of the specific objectives of the CSD is to 
“Promote the exchange and cooperation among defence industries143”. The promotion 
of a regional defence market in South America would not only contribute to the 
technological development and more strategic autonomy for the countries in the region, 
it would also deepen the economic ties which are fundamental to the integration 
process. The establishment of this regional defence market also has the potential to 
foster a common South American identity if it contributes to the development of, if not 
common, at least compatible strategic cultures (for more on strategic culture see 
Giegerich, 2006 and Meyer, 2006). Economically speaking, even though the military 
expenditure in the region is one the lowest in the world it represents approximately 50 
billion dollars, from which 15 billion goes to new investments and maintenance144. This 
market is seen as having the potential to serve the development of the local defence 
industries. Nevertheless, the development of a common South American Defence 
Market would give member-states the possibility to better fulfil the corporate needs of 
the military while at the same time decreasing the defence expenditure. It would also 
make it more difficult for the military to find nationalistic excuses to justify an aggressive 
policy against their neighbours. Therefore the common defence market would increase 
civilian control over the military and help to socialize them into the norm of peace while 
fulfilling their corporate needs with increasing interoperability with forces from neighbour 
countries and joint South American projects.  
 
As seen above, those three challenges interrelate and offer the CDS the potential to 
develop as a sustainable institution for the South American political integration. This 
                                                          
143
 Translated from: letter f, article 5 of the Decisao para o Estabelecimento do Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano 
da UNASUL. The original text in Portuguese: “Promover o intercâmbio e a cooperacao no âmbito da indústria de 
defesa.” 
144
 Ca. 70% of defence expenditure in the region is destined to pay salaries and pensions. See SIPRI Yearbook 2008.   
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means that political integration should not be aimed at balancing other powers or 
influencing other countries/regions. As the European example demonstrates, in order to 
be sustainable political integration has to be developed to manage the region’s internal 
relationships first. In this sense, the policy-makers in the region should see that in most 
cases (especially in the formative years), the South American Defence Council (and the 
UNASUL) will not be not directed at influencing the external environment but will instead 
be used to manage mutual relationships among the member-states (interrelational), to 
strengthen or influence integration, and to affirm a common South American identity.  
 
As observed above, both in the successful case of Mercosul and the unsuccessful case 
of the Andean Community transgovernmental networks played an important role in the 
integration process. As a result the strong transgovernmental networks being built along 
the years in the Southern Cone with the permanent exchange in military schools, 
diplomat academies, joint-exercises and regular meetings can be the cement which is 
used to slowly increase the level of institutionalization of South American political 
integration. The statistical data already shows an increasing participation of Andean 
representatives in Southern Cone military and diplomatic academies in the last decade.    
 
It can be seen that in South America, just as in the European case, in the absence of 
formal structures and the codification of practices these transgovernmental networks 
have already produced important steps in the direction of integration. It is clear that 
those networks have the potential to create and enhance information-sharing 
mechanisms, and while maintaining their national loyalties they can be gradually 
oriented towards the development of common South American positions for their 
national problems, thus creating a sense of ‘ownership’ of the process. The participation 
of the CDS can lead to the development of a spirit of cooperation and mutual 
understanding among national representatives. This esprit de corps, as seen in the 
European integration process, represents at least a basic commitment and belief in joint 
250 
 
decision-making. The idea of developing a “community of thinking” or “community of 
common views” is especially facilitated by the “South American way”. By “South 
American way” we understand the social competences that South Americans have, 
especially those related to fostering interpersonal relationships, meaning the ability of 
the South Americans to discuss, exchange ideas and foster personal relationships, thus 
creating an environment of mutual trust, dialogue, openness and friendship.  This 
“family atmosphere”, which is eased by the way in which South Americans develop 
interpersonal relationships, has the potential to facilitate negotiations and create a 
sense of ownership of the process through the development of shared norms. These 
established informal practices can then be codified and further institutionalized, thereby 
offering the cement for the political integration. 
  
Another important factor is the fact that the more the political integration in South 
America develops (not only institutionally, but mostly with the spread of shared norms 
and values on which the integration is based on), the more the diplomats and military 
officials will become socialized (Regelsberger, 1988: 36). As observed in the last 
chapter, socialization, according to Checkel (2007: 5-6), can be defined as: “[…] a 
process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given community. Its 
outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In 
adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a 
logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time 
and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.” 
We are not overstating the influence of socialization on political integration, but we 
recognize that together with the development of transgovernmental ties it represents a 
fundamental “cement” for institutionalization and further political integration.  
 
This is not to say that international institutions will be built and will all follow the same 
pattern once the foundations for its existence (transgovernmental networks and 
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socialization processes) are laid down. Some other issues have to be considered if we 
want to observe how and why institutions develop sustainably in some contexts and not 
in others. According to Dembiski, Freistein and Weiffen (2006: 4): “Depending on the 
function or […] the social environment […], states will create institutions with a specific 
form […] in order to maximize benefits and to reduce risks. The term “social 
environment” refers to collective action problems involved, the number of relevant 
players, and the amount and quality of information available etc. The term “form” may 
include institutional characteristics like scope, range, voting procedures, precision of 
rules, delegation of authority to supranational bodies and escape clauses. […] form […] 
influences the effectiveness of the organization […].” In this sense, these other factors 
need to be taken into account if we want to analyse why and how institutions are built.  
 
4.3 - Norms and socialization in the South American politics of Defence  
 
Despite efforts to institutionalize the integration process in the Andean region, the lack 
of common understandings on the objectives of the integration processes allied with the 
high level of mistrust and political instability have harmed the development of the 
transgovernmental networks which could push the process forwards and give flesh to 
the institutional bones. In the Southern Cone we can see that transgovernmental 
networks already existed when the institutionalization started, and these were somehow 
controlled or re-directed with the institutionalization process.  
 
The task of this section is to discover to what extent, under which conditions, and 
through which processes the political elites (here with a focus on the military) of South 
American countries incorporated the idea of a positive integration process145. As a result 
                                                          
145
 We argue that although the civilian network was responsible for the first movement towards institutionalization 
in the Southern Cone, the military network is nowadays much more advanced and active in furthering security and 
defence integration in South America. The main objective of the civilian network was to gain leverage over the 
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we are basically interested in how the political actors in the region relate not only 
through the so-called “military diplomacy146”, but also how and if they are socialized into 
common norms of behaviour that promote democracy and stability. According to our 
hypothesis, the socialization into common norms and values is one strategy used to 
promote the control/steering of transgovernmental networks. In this section we will 
locate the “hubs” where those networks are socialized, the strategies (strategic action, 
role playing, or normative suasion) and the outcomes of socialization in the Southern 
Cone, Andean countries, and Brazil147.  
 
Unlike from the European case where we observe the development of 
transgovernmental networks among diplomats (Diplocom) and further socialization in 
European institutions, in the South American case the stronger transgovernmental 
activity occurs among the military (Milicom), and their socialization occurs mostly in 
national military academies but also in technical cooperation programmes and joint-
exercises. Therefore we need some short explanation on the different ethos of the 
South American military before we start to analyse the socialization processes. 
 
4.3.1 - Military ethos in South America: what the military think? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
military network in order to guarantee the democratic transition with the help of regional insitutions. The 
objective of this section therefore is not to show how the civilian network was socialized but to observe how and if 
the military network is being socialized into the common norms of peace and democracy. 
146
 According to Soares, 2003:4, military diplomacy refers to foreign policy initiatives carried out by the military (or 
Defence ministries). Medeiros (2010:116) observes that foreign policy initiatives carried out by the military are 
eased due to a common “military ethos”. As a result, in the South American case it is possible to speak of a paralel 
integration process established on the basis of the military diplomacy.     
147
 Due to its political relevance for the development and socialization of norms to the integration process, Brazil 
will be analysed separatedly. 
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When we consider the role played by the military in South American politics, two 
important characteristics must be analysed: the nationalism and the “culture of 
confidentiality”. The military ethic is traditionally realist and conservative, and therefore 
we must look at the extent to which those characteristics represent an obstacle to the 
possibility of international cooperation (Huntington, 1957). 
 
The nationalist character of the South American armed forces has been constant. 
Deeply influenced by the French nationalism at the beginning of the 20th Century, the 
military in the region believe their role goes beyond the technical aspects of war and 
includes a strong political-ideological content. According to Rattenbach (1972:60), the 
military profession in the region includes some common beliefs, such as the fact that the 
professional military official believes that he is not simply a “military employee” but has a 
very important social role, he believes he is part of a very (if not the most) prestigious 
institution148, the military person believes he is the last source of “nationality”. In their 
view, their constant intervention in daily politics in South American History is due to the 
high level of internal political instability, and not the opposite. 
 
The so-called “culture of confidentiality” is another characteristic of the military ethos 
which harms the prospects of cooperation. According to Almeida (2008:51), the culture 
of confidentiality is the inappropriate extension of the secrecy characteristics of specific 
themes to others that should be of general knowledge. This leads to a difficulty in 
communication because ordinary issues are treated as secrets. The culture of 
confidentiality contradicts the construction of confidence building. The highest 
                                                          
148
 In fact, the Armed Forces are pointed by the polulation as the most reliable institution in most South American 
countries, far more popular than the political parties and the Congress, and astonishingly more popular than the 
Catholic Church. For instance, in Brazil the two most reliable institutions are the Armed Forces with 73% approval 
and the Catholic Church with 56%, Political Parties have only 5% and the Congress has 22% approval rate (see the 
results in http://fgvnoticias.fgv.br/pt-br/noticia/pesquisa-do-icjbrasil-avalia-confianca-nas-instituicoes-do-
estado#.Updz-cRDvSg).  
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expression of this misleading culture of confidentiality is the inability of South American 
nations to develop regional mechanisms for the transparency of defence expenditure149 
(Medeiros, 2010). 
 
These characteristics are harmful of the integration process in South America. As we 
observed at the beginning of this chapter, one of the fundamental changes which 
enabled a sustainable integration process in South America was the establishment of 
the civilian control over the military. As seen above, while we can see a high degree of 
civilian control in the Southern Cone the Andean countries present high levels of 
institutional crisis and direct military interventions in internal politics (Diamint, 2001). As 
observed by Iglesias (1999), there are two ideal-type models of civilian-military relations 
in South America: total subordination of the military to civil authorities (Argentina) and 
total autonomy of the military (Peru). Diamint (1999) presents an interesting insight on 
the idea of “professionalization as an aspect of civilian control”. Unlike to Huntington 
(1996), she argues that in Latin America the more professional the armed forces 
become the more military autonomy they have, and “the more organized and efficient 
the institutions and armed forces are the more capacity they have to influence other 
governmental agencies” (Diamint, 1999:19).  
 
As a result, due to a shared past of military dictatorships and the constant influence of 
the military in politics, the question of the autonomy of the military in a democratic 
system persists in South America as an important point for discussion. In most countries 
in the region topics such as defence policy and military strategy which, at least 
theoretically, should be in the hands of civilians remain under military responsibility. 
                                                          
149
 Here it is important to highlight the efforts made by the Argentinian and Chilean governments to establish a 
common methodology to measure the defence expenditures of both countries. This effort to enhance 
transparency and mutual trust started with the signature of the El Salvador Declaration in 1998. The project to 
elaborate the methodology was carried out by the UN Economic Comission for Latin America (CEPAL). (CEPAL, 
2001)  
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Although the office of the Minister of Defence has been occupied by a civilian, the 
directory structures have been occupied by military personnel (many already retired). 
(Medeiros, 2010) 
 
The big picture presented above points to the important position that the military in 
South America occupies in the forums of the elaboration and discussion of cooperation 
and integration policies regarding security and defence. Furthermore, the military 
actions in the foreign policy field have been eased by the military channels, which has 
been called “military diplomacy”. The shared military identity which includes patterns of 
character, friendship and comradeship150 constitutes a feature in the relationships 
among the military in South America151. Moreover, those characteristics are especially 
present in the military meetings and make the exchange of ideas more straightforward 
and objective (Amaral, 2004; Medeiros, 2010). According to a retired Brazilian officer: 
“In regard to the military field (…) persists a tradition of good relationship, at the 
institutional, organizational, personal, and family levels (…) I have held very good 
relations with Argentinian military in the last 50 years.” (see Correia Neto, 1994: 112). 
This statement is validated by the interviews we carried out in the period between 2006-
2011 with military personnel from South American countries, and it is especially 
observable between Brazilian and Argentinian officials.  
 
The relationship among the military forces in the region was especially enhanced with 
the military dictatorships and the establishment of the Condor Operation (described 
above). According to Martin (2001), during this period the armed forces perceived 
                                                          
150
 Those characteristics are not only part of the military habitus but are codified in the regulations of the armed 
forces (see Regulamento de Continencias, Honras, Sinais de Respeito e Cerimonial Militar das Forcas Armadas; 
Brasil, 1997: §2o Art. 2o) 
151
 According to Huntington (1996) the military identity pressuposes States in competition, with no possibility of 
cooperation.  
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themselves to be members of an informal-supranational league involved in political 
repression and government control. At that time the contact among the military forces 
mostly happened informally, but also bilaterally and multilaterally at the Conference of 
the American Armies (CEA). The Conference of the American Armies was an initiative 
of the United States in 1960, right after the Cuban Revolution, to constitute a forum for 
the exchange of experiences among armies in the continent (Amaral, 2004). With the 
redemocratization of Latin American countries the CEA lost its importance, and the 
contacts among the military now occur under the aegis of the civilian Defence 
Ministries. However, the defence policy and military strategy are still in the hands of the 
military. The next step which is required to increase transparency and control over this 
influential transgovernmental network would be to enhance the civilian interest, 
expertise and responsibilities in the Ministries of Defence (Diamint, 1999). 
 
While for the armed forces military diplomacy is about the possibility they have to 
influence their country’s foreign policy, for their governments this transgovernmental 
network conducts an organic function by bringing together the armed forces of the 
region, thus enhancing mutual understanding and regional cooperation (Pinto, Rocha 
and Silva, 2004; Medeiros, 2010). Particularly during the recent democratic period, the 
strength of this transgovernmental network has compelled governments to push forward 
transparency mechanisms in defence issues. At the same time, military diplomacy can 
help to cement a common perception where the possibility of military conflict among the 
participants of the network is very remote. According to the military, the level of common 
understanding has been interpreted as the basis for the establishment of a future 
common security and defence policy (Rabello, 2006). 
 
Moreover, the democratic values being internalized in this transgovernmental network 
along the years and the participation of South American military in UN Peacekeeping 
Missions have contributed to the incorporation of humanitarian law into the military 
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doctrines. This is especially seen in the countries that already have UN approved 
Peacekeeping Training Centres such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In this sense, the 
necessity to work with diversity during the participation in UN Missions has a 
democratizing effect because it brings the principle of tolerance to the soldiers (Diamint, 
2001). Beyond increasing the ties of friendship and camaraderie that are already 
present among the armed forces in the region, the participation in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations encourages the military to incorporate subjects such as Human Rights, 
International Humanitarian Law, and International Relations, etc in their academy’s 
curricula. (Medeiros, 2010)   
 
4.3.2 - Socialization in the Southern Cone 
 
Since the 1990’s Argentina has been the country that has pushed forwards the 
construction of mechanisms for regional defence. According to the Argentinian Minister 
of Defence: “[it is necessary] to stimulate the creation of forums for political and 
strategic reflexion, the development of which leads to the construction of regimes, 
systems or security communities, bilaterally or multilaterally, in the context of the sub 
region.” (Argentina, 2006). This speech echoes a position adopted by the Argentinian 
government since redemocratization. The National Defence Law of 2006 also codifies 
this practise and commits the government to: “(…) put forward a reconversion of the 
traditional schemes of defence actually based on out dated geopolitical realities and 
archaic conflict possibilities. This process of reconversion and institutional 
modernization is based on the necessity to, together with the neighbour countries, 
project a Sub-regional Defence System (Argentina, 2006b). This official document is a 
reflection of the good relationships with other South American countries that the 
Argentinian military cherishes since the redemocratization. 
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As a result, the perception of the Argentinian military in relation to the regional 
integration process has been very positive. According to our interviews and based on 
secondary sources, it was possible to see that for most military personnel the possibility 
of war with a neighbouring country represents the most distant threat. The most positive 
relationship that the Argentinians pointed to are with former rivals: Brazil and Chile. 
According to one official: “I don’t know if integration should be extended to all countries 
in the region. I think it can work well in the Southern Cone” (see Medeiros, 2010). The 
good relationship among Argentinian and Brazilian officials is also an important feature 
highlighted by the interviews: “Unlike how it might appear, the Argentinian officials 
admire Brazil (…)”; and “In Argentina, the military are in favour of pro-integration 
initiatives, especially with Brazil (…) the problem is the civilians that have political 
control and sometimes don’t have the same perception”. The relationships developed 
during the Argentinians’ stay in the Brazilian military academies are maintained and 
deepened, especially in the border areas where the commanders exchange informal 
visits to each other (including their families), and assist each other in any material or 
political way possible152. Besides this, especially for the Army commanders, the 
equestrian events are an opportunity to maintain and deepen their relationships.   
 
Two examples are mentioned when referring to the Argentinian commitment to the 
development of regional political integration in the fields of security and defence: the 
Cruz del Sur Bi-national Force, and the join-project for the development of a General 
Employment Airborne Light Vehicle (VLEGA). The Joint Peacekeeping Force Cruz del 
Sur is a joint-force composed of an 800 strong Argentinian and Chilean military to 
operate in Peacekeeping Operations. The agreement was signed in 2005 in Santiago 
de Chile, and the force was operational in 2007 with the headquarters located in 
Argentina. The Cruz del Sur is also composed of a Permanent Combined Joint 
Command Centre (General Staff). Besides the joint-Peacekeeping force, the 
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 One commander told me that he helped his Argentinian counterparts by lending them hardware for a training 
operation or helping to secure political authorization for a military maneouvre.  
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Argentinian Defence Ministry created an Argentinian Joint Peace Keeping Operation 
Training Centre (CAECOPAZ) in June 1995. Besides training for the Argentinian military 
and civilians that take part in Peacekeeping Missions, the CAECOPAZ also organizes 
joint-training and exchange programs for the military of Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. The CAECOPAZ also includes permanent trainers from Brazil and Chile and 
has invited trainers from Uruguay. 
 
As seen in the first part of this chapter, the fear of backlashes in the redemocratization 
process compelled the Argentinian government to impose rigid civilian control over the 
military. As a consequence, the military lost the ability to set the defence policy agenda 
and saw their budget decrease to the lowest percentage of military expenditure in the 
region. Besides this, unlike other countries in South America there is a clear definition 
for the employment of military forces. In Argentina the military can exclusively be used 
for defence missions and not security. In the absence of a concrete threat153 and the 
impossibility to participate in internal missions, the Argentinian armed forces have 
concentrated their efforts in enhancing their participation in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations as the only way to keep their operational capability active. The Argentinian 
military sees the development of a South American Defence System as the way to 
project itself politically. These focuses, allied with the change in the military academies’ 
curricula154, increase the exposure of the Argentinian military to democratic values and 
contributes to socializing the military exchange students from other countries into those 
values (Medeiros, 2010).    
  
                                                          
153
 The most concrete external threat would be a military conflict due to the Malvinas/Falklands issue. However, 
the perception of the military and the government position is that the question of the Malvinas/Falklands has to be 
solved diplomatically.  
154
In 1993 Argentina adopted a new curricula for their military academies that included obligatory courses on 
International Relations, Humanitarian Law, etc. For more on the curricula reform in the Argentinian military 
Academies see: http://www.mindef.gov.ar/educacion.html. 
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Chile is positioned in a very particular geographical spot in South America, and this 
contributes to a sense of isolation from the region. Besides this, Chile still has border 
disputes with Peru and Bolivia. Unlike Argentina, the military in Chile is also assigned 
with internal tasks such as ensuring law and order and humanitarian and disaster relief. 
Just as in other South American countries, Chile strives to establish efficient institutional 
control over the military (Pior-Berlin, 2010). Moreover, the military in Chile has 
maintained some of the privileges it acquired in the Pinochet’s era, such as the Copper 
Law. According to the Copper Law155 (dated from 1958), 10% of the copper revenue 
flows directly to the armed forces. As a result Chile is the South American country with 
the highest rate of military expenditure per capita.  
 
The Chilean military sees the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as positive. 
As mentioned above, Chile and Argentina have a joint-Peacekeeping Force named 
Cruzeiro del Sur, and since 2002 Chile has also hosted a Peacekeeping Training 
Centre called the Chilean Joint Peacekeeping Operations Centre (CECOPAC). They 
also see the development of a sustainable regional arms industry positively, especially 
one involving Argentina and Brazil. In terms of joint weapon projects, Chile participates 
in the development of fighter jets with Brazil (Medeiros, 2010). 
 
Constitutionally speaking Paraguay renounces war156 as a political possibility and 
considers it only as a matter of self-defence. As a result the perception of Paraguayan 
military being involved in the participation of possible conflicts is null. Paraguay also has 
the lowest net defence budget157 and possesses the smallest military force in the 
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 Chile is the world’s larger copper exporter.   
156
 See Paraguayan Constitution Article 144. 
157
 Around 52 Million USD in 2003 (source www.indexmundi.com, accessed 08.07.2011). 
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region158. Despite those reduced numbers the military still has a strong amount of 
political power in Paraguay.  
 
The cooperation with other South American countries is seen a necessary condition for 
Paraguay. Only through this cooperation is Paraguay able to have access to military 
equipment as the country has no important arms industry, and the Paraguayan defence 
industry consists of clothing, parts of weapons and ammunition. As seen above, 
Paraguay and Brazil have an important relationship, especially between the armed 
forces. The military cooperation between both countries started in 1942 with the 
establishment of the Permanent Brazilian Military Mission in Paraguay, which ended in 
1994 and was responsible for training and equipping the Paraguayan military. However, 
in 1996 the governments established a broader agreement called the Brazilian Military 
Cooperation in Paraguay (CMBP) which includes duties beyond the tasks of training 
and equipping, including tasks of “planning, reorganizing, military intelligence, social 
communication and other necessary operations” (Brasil, 2011). The exchange of 
Paraguayan senior officials to Brazilian academies is also very high. According to one 
official it is an unspoken pre-condition to achieving higher ranks in the Paraguayan army 
that the official has previously studied or worked in Brazil. The relationships between 
Paraguayans and Brazilians are so deep that one Brazilian commander we interviewed 
told us that during an official Paraguayan presidential visit to Brazil: “the [presidents’] 
agenda was organized partially by one Paraguayan colonel and one Brazilian major that 
had studied together at the ECEME. Both shared not only personal bonds … but also 
family relations … which facilitated mutual understanding and helped to move forward 
the political agenda.” The military cooperation with Argentina mainly occurs with the 
training of Paraguayan troops for UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Argentinian 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (CAECOPAZ). In the preparation for participation in the 
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Active military in Paraguay: ca. 10.000 troops (source: Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies London, 2004.)  
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Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Paraguayan troops were trained in the Brazilian 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPAZ) (Medeiros, 2010). 
 
In the same situation observed in Paraguay, the relationships between the military of 
Uruguay and Brazil are also very positive. The top priority for the Uruguayan military is 
the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. They see the participation in UN 
Missions as an important opportunity for professional training, and it represents a 
source of international prestige to the country (Uruguay, 1999). Just like Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, Uruguay has its own Peacekeeping Training Centre, the so-called 
Uruguayan National School for Peace Operations (ENOPU), which was created in 
2008. Uruguay is the South American country with more participation in Peacekeeping 
Missions, with a lot of military personnel with participating in different UNPKO’s. Some 
official have participated in PKOs more than once.    
 
The Uruguayan Defence Policy of 1999 includes a clear pro-integration view in its 
objectives: “Enhance the armed forces’ combined operational capabilities with the other 
Mercosul member-states”; “Steer the equipment acquisitions of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force to (…) guarantee the standardization of the equipment of the three forces in the 
first step, and in a second step to standardize our equipment with the armed forces of 
the other Mercosul countries” (Uruguay, 1999). In regard to the relationship with Brazil, 
there is a very intense exchange of Uruguayan military to Brazilian academies, mostly 
financed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of External Relations 
(MRE). During the interviews a Brazilian official that served with Uruguayans mentioned 
that they share “identity and interests, including the commitment with democratic values, 
protection of human rights, and integration of the continent – having Mercosur as its 
central axis”. (Medeiros, 2010:139)        
 
4.3.3 - Socialization in the Andean Countries 
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Bolivia is the second poorest country in the region159 and presents high levels of political 
instability. Bolivia’s relationships with neighbouring countries have been very unstable, 
with alternating periods of friendship and mistrust. Those changes are attributed to the 
fact that Bolivia has borders with former adversaries160 and still nourishes revisionist 
feelings, especially towards Chile due to the Ocean access which was lost in the War of 
the Pacific. Another factor is the high level of political instability, with governments 
constantly shifting the States policies (Rosales, 2008). Nevertheless, the biggest threat 
to Bolivia is not a war with one of its neighbours, and instead it is the high level of social 
unrest and the uncontrolled transnational criminality161. 
 
Recently, since the election of Evo Morales to the presidency in 2005 Bolivia has 
fostered a strategic partnership with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. This close relationship 
and the incendiary character of the Venezuelan president has caused some worries 
among the Brazilian and Paraguayan military that Bolivia could breed in the nationalistic 
feeling to wage war and appease the military. One of the objectives of this strategic 
relationship162 was to build strong transgovernmental ties between Bolivian and 
Venezuelan officials. This objective is being successful due to the commitment of the 
Venezuelan government to finance a permanent exchange of officials and troops of 
both countries, focusing on training and equipping the Bolivian armed forces. The 
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 The first is Guyana (source: European Comission, 2002). 
160
 Right after its independence Bolivia fought wars with Chile and Argentina. Then it lost the access to the Ocean 
in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) against Chile. Bolivia also had to sell part of its territory to Brazil due to an 
imminent Civil War (1903). The most recent large scale war in the region was fought between Bolivia and Paraguay 
(Chaco War – 1932-35), when Bolivia lost a big part of its territory. 
161
Bolivia is one of the largest cocaine producers in the world. Recently the Morales administration expelled a DEA 
(Drug Enforcement Administration) Mission in Bolivia and accused the United States of planning a Coup in Bolivia 
(source: www.estadao.com.br, accessed 03.03.2009)  
162
 The Military Agreement establishing the strategic cooperation between both countries was signed in 2006.  
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Agreement also includes financing the construction of military bases on the borders 
between Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil (Figueiredo, 2006, Medeiros, 2010). According to 
the interviews, there are many Venezuelan military personnel in the Bolivian academies 
who are teaching doctrine and training. 
 
Nevertheless, with the recent strong relationship with Venezuela the Bolivian military 
have welcomed the proposals to develop regional security and defence mechanisms. In 
particular, the creation of the South American Defence Council in the Unasul was seen 
as a very positive development by the Bolivian establishment. One of the first and 
hardest tasks of this Council was to deal with the Bolivian Crisis in 2008163. Moreover, 
due to the fact that the country has many deficiencies, opportunities for cooperation 
have been especially welcomed (Medeiros, 2010). 
 
Therefore the Bolivian position is complex, because while in one hand it carries some 
mistrust in regard to their neighbours, on the other hand they need the support of the 
neighbour’s capabilities in order to fulfil their own mission. In this situation the possibility 
of regional political integration is seen as the most interesting solution to Bolivia. Like 
the other countries in the region, Bolivia also sees the participation in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations as a good possibility to keep the military operational164. 
 
Colombia occupies a singular position in the South American defence and security 
context. After more than 40 years of civil war and after receiving consecutive rejections 
of other countries in the region to assist with their military, since 2001 Colombia has had 
strong military support from the United States (so-called Plan Colombia). In particular, 
                                                          
163
 For more on the Bolivian Crisis and the Unasul mediation see: Malamud, 2008. 
164
 Bolivia has 215 soldies in the MINUSTAH, mostly trained in the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPaz). 
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after the Plan Colombia a restructuring of the military ability to fight internal missions 
was observed (Rosales, 2008). 
 
As a consequence of the Plan Colombia neighbouring countries felt threatened by the 
US military presence and the possibility that the Colombian conflict could spill-over to 
their territories, including the issues of drug-trafficking, guerrillas, paramilitary forces, 
and the fumigation of farms, etc. (Pacheco, 2002; Rosales, 2008). This spill-over of the 
Colombian conflict led to border problems with Venezuela, and the situation reached the 
brink of war with Ecuador in 2008. 
 
As a result we can see that the Colombian conflict harms any development of the 
emergence of transgovernmental networks between the Andean countries which are 
directly affected by the conflict. Due to the specific tasks of the military (mostly steered 
towards fighting internal issues), and the priority given to exchanges with the US (Plan 
Colombia), it is also very difficult for some kind of socialization process to emerge into 
common South American norms. 
 
Peru and Ecuador have been involved in the last classic armed conflict in the region 
(1995)165. Since the Brasilia Agreement which ended the hostilities and established the 
border limits relations between Peru and Ecuador have stabilised, and nowadays there 
are no imminent tensions between the countries. On the other hand, Ecuador has been 
severely affected by the spill-over of the Colombian conflict166. In this sense the 
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 The conflict was called the Cenepa War and occurred on the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border in the disputed region 
of Cenepa and Paquisha. The conflict was permanently solved by an agreement which was mediated through 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States.    
166
 According to the Ecuadorian Defence Policy (2006:38): “Ecuador is the most affected country by the 
consequences of the Colombian conflict. Ecuador is affected not only in terms of its relationship with their 
neighbour and the border security, but also due to the economic, political and social impacts.”   
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northern border (with Colombia) is the actual strategic priority. The relationship with 
Colombia worsened after the March 2008 events when the Colombian military attacked 
installations of the FARC167 located in Ecuadorian territory without asking permission or 
communicating the attack to the Ecuadorian local authorities. 
 
The unexpected attack of the Colombian forces in Ecuadorian territory demonstrates 
the instability of the security relationship in the northern part of South America. It also 
demonstrates the inefficiency of regimes/institutions in this part of the region, even 
though since 1996 both countries (Colombia and Ecuador) have organized a Bi-national 
Border Commission (COMBIFRON). The objective of this organization is to strengthen 
the relationships between the police and armed forces responsible for the border 
security. Since 2006 the organism also elaborates and exchanges reports on the 
activities on the border. The incident in 2008 demonstrated the impotence of this 
confidence building mechanism and contributed to enhancing the feeling among the 
Ecuadorian military that the Colombians are not transparent enough in their relations. 
Ecuador, like the other South American countries, strongly defends the principle of non-
intervention in internal affairs, something which contributes to dramatically decreasing 
the possibilities of a joint military strategy with Colombia to fight the guerrillas (Medeiros, 
2010). 
 
The tensions between Colombia and Ecuador are enhanced by the perception that the 
impact of the United States participation in the Colombian conflict affects the strategic 
balance in the Andean region (Marques, 2009). In this sense the Correa administration 
implemented a security agenda named “Plan Ecuador,” with a special focus on the 
northern border, thereby rejecting any external intervention and reinforcing its 
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 FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) is the biggest guerrilla group (also called narco-terrorists 
due to its involvment with drug-trafficking) fighting in the Colombian Civil War. 
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commitment to the non-intervention of the internal affairs of other countries (Ecuador, 
2007:1). 
 
Peru is the South American country with the lowest level of control over their military. 
The difficulty to establish a clear cut division of the military and police functions 
enhances the vulnerability of the Peruvian civilian governments. This difficulty is justified 
by the different threat perception of Peru. The increasing tensions with Chile168 and the 
conflictive relationship with Ecuador in the 1990’s allied with general political instability, 
guerrillas, and transnational crimes all combine to intensify the grey zone between 
police and military roles, especially in border areas (Medeiros, 2010). 
 
As a result Peru is the classic example of a country facing problems to establish civilian 
control over the military and to increase political stability. Among the South American 
countries, Peru experienced the most recent dictatorship169 with Alberto Fujimori in 
1992, supported by the armed forces. 
 
In Venezuela the armed forces have undergone a deep transformation since the 
establishment of the new Constitution in 1999 during the Hugo Chavez government. 
These transformations include a high level of politicization of the military170. For Chavez, 
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 Peru disputes a maritime border with Chile and the tensions escalated in 2006 when Peru unilaterally 
established a new border disregarding the treaties of 1952 and 1954. 
169
 In 2000 a Coup in Ecuador led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) resulted in 
the exile of President Jamil Mahuad but failed to establish a dictator due to a military counter-Coup that 
empowered the Vice-president and imprisioned the Coup leaders. Other failed Coups in South America during the 
2000’s: Venezuela in 2002 and again Ecuador in 2010.  
170
Is it important to highlight that Hugo Chavez was an Army Colonel when he participated as one of the leaders of 
the failed military Coup in 1992. 
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the military occupies a key role in the “Bolivarian revolution171” and the establishment of 
“21st century socialism172”. As a result, in the first years of the Chavez government, 
there were many military officers heading ministries and other administration offices. 
(Rosales, 2008) 
 
In this sense, it is clear to see that there is a strong level of socialization of the 
Venezuelan military into the values, norms and principles of the so-called “Bolivarian” 
discourse. This strong participation of the military in politics contrasts sharply with the 
Southern Cone model of civilian control over the military. As seen above, since the 
reestablishment of the civilian governments there is an effort to distance the military 
from the politics in the Southern Cone, and a reorientation of priorities to the effect that 
the Armed Forces should restrict their tasks to defence against external aggression. 
There is the perception that the instrumentalization of the military for political projects 
could harm the professionalization of the military and compromise the civilian control 
(Sotomayor, 2004). 
 
The regional political integration is seen by the Venezuelan government as being 
fundamental to the spread of the “Bolivarian revolution” to other Latin American 
countries. Due to the explosion in the oil prices173 in the 2000’s it was possible for 
                                                          
171
This is the term coined by Chavez to describe the transformations in Venezuelan politics during his government. 
Deeply influenced by the nationalistic thoughts of the Venezuelan historian Frederico Figueroa and the anti-
American positions of the Argentinian political scientist Norberto Ceresole, the Bolivarian revolution is in its 
essence anti-liberal and anti-American. Simon Bolivar was the main character during the wars of liberation in many 
South American countries. (Magnoli, 2007)   
172
 This term was created by the German sociologist Heinz Dieterich. This doctrine advocates a Marxist economic 
agenda and the use of plebiscits to substitute the representative democracy (Magnoli, 2007). 
173
 Venezuela is the fifth largest exporter of crude oil and has the biggest oil reserve in the world. (data from El 
Pais, see: 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Venezuela/supera/Arabia/Saudi/principal/reserva/crudo/mundo/el                                               
pepueco/20110719elpepueco_15/Tes, accessed 22/07/11)  
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Venezuela to finance its political project in Latin America. Besides supporting many 
presidential candidates in Latin American countries (Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael 
Correa of Ecuador, Ollanta Humala of Peru, etc.), Venezuela pushed for stronger 
integration among Latin American countries with the creation of joint infrastructural 
projects and regional institutions. This tour de force of the Venezuelan foreign policy 
encompassed the project for the development of a military alliance among South 
American countries, with a special focus on the Mercosul countries. The increasing 
influence of Venezuela in the region was balanced by a more active Brazilian foreign 
policy oriented towards South America, which eased the Venezuelan impulse to build 
regional institutions according to the “Bolivarian” political project. 
 
4.3.4 - Socialization in Brazilian Military Academies174          
 
As seen above, the Brazilian Military Academies harbour a tradition of cooperation, 
educational and technical exchange with other South American countries, especially 
those located in the Southern Cone. In the cases of Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina 
to a lesser extent, the Brazilian Military Academies function as an obligatory stop to 
senior officials of those countries. As a result the study of the Academies is of 
fundamental importance, not only for the process of socialization into common norms, 
values and principles, but also with regards the formation of transgovernmental 
networks in South America. Those Academies are the “resonance boxes” of the 
Brazilian military mind-set (Soares, 2006). 
 
                                                          
174
 This section is based on interviews carried out with officials from the Brazilian Military Academies of Command 
and General Staff, Air Force College (Universidade do Ar), Naval War College (Escola de Guerra Naval), Superior 
War College (ESG), Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPAZ), and secondary literature.  
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Since the consolidation of the redemocratization process in the 1990’s the possibility of 
a “military integration” in a regional perspective has been discussed among military 
personnel in Brazil175. Two aspects of the geopolitical context in post-Cold War South 
America were highlighted by the military: on one hand the necessity to deconstruct the 
mistrust and negative rivalry between the two major players in the region176 (Brazil and 
Argentina), and on the other hand, the development of sub-regional security 
mechanisms excluding the United States. As a result, in this initial moment177 the 
integration model thought of by the Brazilian military was a response to the 
unpredictability of international politics at the end of the Cold War and the globalization 
process. It was also a reply to concerns of the military redefining its mission in the new 
democracy and securing funds for new projects. Besides this, the discussion prompted 
by the US raised concepts such as “shared sovereignty”; “internationalization”; and 
“intervention rights” with relation to the natural resources in South America, and this was 
also instrumentalized by the military in South America to justify their new role (and new 
funds). This preoccupation led Brazil to push forward the establishment of the Amazon 
Treaty Cooperation Organization (OTCA), created in 1998 by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. The objective of this organization is 
to coordinate infrastructure, communications and transport initiatives among the 
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 According to Medeiros (2010:167), the first public exposition of this thought was made in 1993 by General 
Gleuber Vieira in a conference between Argentinian and Brazilian officials in Buenos Aires. In his exposition, 
General Vieira suggested that a “collective system of security and defence” should be implemented by “the 
military, with the creation of a conflict prevention centre, established according to the political will of the member-
states”.  In this sense the General proposes “the establishment of permanent or periodic forums for joint analysis 
and the evaluation of threats and strategic concepts and the dynamic exchange of information” (Vieira, 1994: 18-
19).  
 
176
 In this sense, the retired General Jonas de Morais Correia Neto argues that: “[the military integration] is viable 
with the condition that is understood as a cultural and professional exchange, technical and operational. In a 
broader sense, it can also be understood as the participation in joint activities and missions” (Correia Neto, 1994: 
110). 
177
 Since 1997 the thematic of regional integration has been discussed systematically in the Brazilian Military 
Academies. The first thesis on this subject defended in a Brazilian Military Academy was presented by the 
Argentinian exchange student Major Eduardo Luis Doval.  
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countries that conform the Amazon basin. In this sense, Brazil occupies an important 
role as the link between the two subsystems in South America: the Southern Cone and 
the Northern tier. 
 
For some people, the Brazilian ambition to push forward the integration of both South 
American systems represents the consolidation of the Brazilian regional leadership. For 
Brazilian politics this leadership would represent the credentials to obtain a permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council178. 
 
In order to fulfil this political ambition, regional integration in South America is perceived 
as being positive by the Brazilian military. According to the data presented by Medeiros 
(2010:174), 2/3 (69,6%) of the students in the Brazilian Military Academies agree that 
South American integration is advancing, and 73,1% believe that the development of a 
regional South American security council is possible. Also, according to the data this 
positive view of the integration process is mainly observed in the younger generation of 
military officials. This is especially seen in the military personnel that have participated 
in a Peacekeeping Mission with other South American countries. Therefore, as seen 
above it is clear that the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations goes beyond 
enhancing the friendship and comradeship ties among the armed forces in the region 
and also immerses the military in concepts such as Human Rights, International 
Humanitarian Law, and Democracy, etc, thereby exposing the military to a “culture of 
peace”. Those concepts are especially highlighted in the interviews with officials that 
served in the UNPKO, but they are also seen in a lesser extent in regular military 
academies. This fact is derived due to the intensive training and socialization into those 
concepts in the Peacekeeping Training Centres. This socialization is reflected in the 
                                                          
178
 Brazil has pleaded for a permanent seat in the UNSC since the San Francisco Conference in 1945. In the 
beginning of the 2000’s Brazil entered the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), to pressure for a UNSC reform 
that would include a permanent seat for those countries (Landau, 2010).   
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statistics179: according to 2/3 (61,1%) of the students in Brazilian Military Academies the 
development of a South American joint Peacekeeping Force is viable180; and moreover, 
for 89,5% of the students, subjects of citizenship and Human Rights must be part of the 
academies’ curriculum. This suggests the successful internalization of democratic 
values among the military. This data is even more important when we compare the 
generational factor (values being socialized strongly among younger generations than 
older generations). 
 
Therefore we argue that institutions have an impact on the individuals as sociable 
agents. In the absence of a common regional South American institution where these 
agents can be socialized, we found that the military schools are a fertile locus for agent 
socialization among the South American military. The most important instruments for 
socialization in the South American context are developed in the School for High 
Command and General Staff of the Brazilian Army (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior 
do Exercito - ECEME). The ECEME is a necessary stop for officials willing to achieve 
the post of General in the Brazilian Army and is an important step for the promotion of 
foreign officials from other South American countries. Officials from all South American 
countries gather there in intensive courses for the approximate duration of 2 years, 
living together and sharing personal and familiar ties. Besides this, officials are 
immersed in high level courses that involve the disciplines of human rights, international 
law, peaceful resolution of conflicts and participation in PKOs181.  Although these 2 
years are not enough to develop ingrained interests or even the identity of the 
community to which they belong (type II internalization), we can see that during these 2 
years the officials may learn a role and therefore behave appropriately, independent of 
whether they like or agree with the role (type I internalization) (Checkel, 2007; Lewis, 
                                                          
179
 Statistical data collected from Medeiros, 2010: 178. 
180
 In this case, the success of the South American participation in the MINUSTAH contributed to such perception. 
181
 The courses are created, developed and managed by the Army Educational Department (DEP – Departamento 
de Ensino e Pesquisa) but were sanctioned by the civilian-led Ministry of Education. 
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2007). We also found that due to the increasing strive for control over the networks 
agents act according a strategic calculation logic, recognizing that if they comply with 
the norms and values put forward in the schools they can receive social (status) as well 
as material (promotions, projects) incentives and rewards. That doesn’t mean that 
individuals take the norms and values being socialized for granted (normative suasion). 
As the statistical data above shows, this resistance is especially seen in the older 
generation of officials182, while it seems that the younger generation are more prone for 
type II internalization. As the recent events in South America have shown183, the military 
act according to a calculation of costs and benefits involving their acceptance of the 
new socially defined roles. In this sense we can see that in South America agents 
assume determined roles due to its appropriateness in one particular setting, thus not 
involving reflective internalization guided by communicative processes. 
 
Nevertheless, we can still see the centrality of the pieces of the transgovernmental 
networks in national and regional politics, especially in terms of security and defence184. 
These representatives act as local gatekeepers to their national governments, while at 
the same time exercising their network contacts when needed. They have the ability to 
influence the policy orientations of their respective countries and cooperate with the 
members of the network when it is necessary185. Of course, the degree of influence 
                                                          
182
 This older generation was socialized in an era called “populism” by the literature (1945-1964). Socialization in 
this era is characterised by a mindset composed of views of: elitism, moralism, difuse religiosity (in a secular state), 
historic positivism (the military as savior and promoter of the republic), and pro-US beahviour (Pion-Berlin, 2001).  
183
 Recently, the senior officials from the Military Club in Brazil issued a very critical and politically oriented letter 
contesting the president’s decision to create a truth commission to investigate the crimes commited during the 
dictatorship. The reaction of the military in Chile to the imprisionment and judgment of former dictator Augusto 
Pinochet reveals the same logic.  
184
 We contrasted the list of the former foreign ECEME students and their actual positions in their countries. We 
observed that most of them have moved up to high ranks in their career and either work with issues related to 
education and foreign relations or as close advisors to the presidents (see the list of individuals in Annex III).   
185
 This was especially seen in the interviews regarding the creation of the South American Defence Council and the 
formulation of the National Defence Policies.   
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varies according to the country. As we explained above, the actual political relevance of 
the military is attached to how the redemocratization process was managed186 and how 
much leverage the military managed to gain during this period. Naturally, issues of 
security and defence are still mainly dealt with by the military, however the most evident 
impact of the transgovernmental networks occurs in the border areas, where 
commanders that studied together at the ECEME share operational capabilities, carry 
out small joint-exercises, and even influence their capitals to grant authorization for 
manoeuvres in border areas187. According to the interviews they maintain the contacts 
with a constant exchange of personal and professional emails, family gatherings, and 
equestrian contests188, and use the alumni social network of the ECEME, named 
Actualization Programme for the Former ECEME Students (PADECEME – Programa de 
Atualizacao para os Diplomados da ECEME). The PADECEME offers a continuous and 
actual database of former students, helps them to get in touch with one another, and 
produces scientific and non-scientific journals produced by former students and 
distributed among the alumni network.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
186
 According to Guillermo O’Donnel, the transition patterns are differentiated between controlled transition 
(when the military were able to highly influence the transition to democracy), balanced transition (low military 
influence) or collapse (no influence at all). 
187
 Interviews. 
188
 It was mentioned in more than one interview that the equestian competitions organized by former students 
play an important role in fostering contacts.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
Political integration and beyond: suggestions for a research agenda on 
institutions and transgovernmental networks 
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“We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being a European as of 
belonging to their native land, and that without losing any of their love and loyalty of their birthplace.” 
Winston Churchill 
 
“La unidad de nuestros pueblos no es simple quimera de los hombres sino inexorable decreto del 
destino
189
” 
 Simón Bolívar 
 
Churchill’s quote represents the “double-hatness” of transgovernmentalism well. While 
individuals participating in transgovernmental networks are socialized into norms and 
rules of behaviour that define how policy-making is conducted, they are still subunits of 
national states. There is no contradiction whatsoever that a representative develops 
“we” feelings towards their peers while maintaining their love and loyalty (and 
professionalism) towards the state they represent. These transgovernmental networks, 
besides creating links and identity between the individuals, also foster convergence, 
compliance with international agreements, and enhance cooperation among national 
states and even influence state’s preferences. This governance structure is able to 
engage, socialize, support, pressure and constrain government officials to act in 
accordance to the rules and norms of behaviour defined in the network. To understand 
the impact of this governance structure we must go beyond the intergovernmentalist – 
supranationalist debate and look at how globalization affects states’ ability to act alone 
to solve problems.  
 
The challenges presented by globalization represent the fact that the necessity states 
have to either cooperate in order to solve common problems or create an unrealistic 
global government. Besides this, national governments are unable to attend to all of the 
issues in the international agenda, thereby leaving the solution for common problems to 
                                                          
189
 “The unity of our peoples is not a mere illusion of men but an inexorable decree of fate” free translation from 
Spanish. 
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the expertise of their representatives. According to Slaughter (2004: 263): “The old 
model of the international system assumes unitary states that negotiate formal legal 
agreements with one another and implement them from the top down, with great 
emphasis on verification and enforcement. The new model advanced here assumes 
disaggregated states in which national government officials interact intensively with one 
another and adopt codes of best practices and agree on coordinated solutions to 
common problems.” Trasngovernmental networks offer the perfect setting where 
representatives gather to address common specific problems. In this setting, the 
members can educate, bolster and regulate one another. Governments can promote the 
development of these networks, thus institutionalizing the cooperation that already 
exists. This institutionalization can also create a framework for enhancing future 
cooperation. 
 
This final chapter will be divided according to the general theoretical implications of the 
research, future research possibilities in the field, and finally some topical policy 
prescriptions on how to enhance integration with the help of networks.     
 
5.1 - General theoretical implications 
 
In the first part of this research we aimed to present the theoretical debate on 
integration. The second chapter presented the different theoretical frameworks used to 
analyse integration. We observed the theoretical gap between IR and EU Studies until 
the 1990’s, when metatheoretical debate avoided theoretical dialogue and empirical 
work. It is possible that between the 1970’s (with the demise of neofunctionalism) until 
the 1990’s EU Studies experienced its greatest intellectual isolation and lowest level of 
theoretical ambition. 
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The developments in new institutionalism, and especially the debate between 
neoliberalism and constructivism, gained weight during the 1990’s, thereby providing a 
possible intellectual bridge towards the development of a general theory of integration 
(Milner, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003). Based on this 
“institutionalist turn190” and the multilevel governance approaches, in this research we 
seek to aid in the development of a theory to understand how political integration 
emerges in different parts of the world. Besides this, we also aim to improve our 
understanding of the diverse governance levels which operate inside integration 
processes and promote awareness of political integration, thereby contributing to the 
literature.     
 
In this sense, this research ultimately aimed to contribute to the understanding of how 
political elites are replicated and socialized and their influence in the process of 
integration. We intended to do this by opening the black box of interest and identity 
formation, observing where agent interests come from and the agents’ interaction with 
institutional structures. The creation and development of transgovernmental networks 
and the socialization processes inside these networks play a major role in the path 
towards policy convergence and boost integration. As seen in section 3.2, through an 
emphasis on arguing/deliberation and appropriate behaviour driven by complex learning 
processes and socialization, we argue that both agents have an impact in the 
institutionalization process and that institutions have deeper effects on the core 
properties of agents, thus affecting meanings, interests and identities (Risse, 2000; 
Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel: 2003). 
 
5.2 - Future research possibilities 
 
                                                          
190
 On the institutionalist turn in EU Studies see Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999. 
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It is possible to identify three main venues of research deriving from this dissertation. 
These research possibilities stem from the conclusion that regional integration 
processes are in fact influenced by the role played by transgovernmental networks. In 
this section the impact of this research for the study of sovereignty, 
democracy/accountability, and inter-regional comparison will be presented. 
 
  5.2.1 Sovereignty  
 
Sovereignty is traditionally understood as the absolute authority of a political entity 
acting as a unity over its own affairs. This authority is related to the complete control of 
a territory in a given period of time. Besides this, the rights of this authority over the 
given territory (including the monopoly of violence) are recognized by the other units 
(Weber, 1978: 54; Herz, 1957; Diez; Bode and da Costa, 2011: 215). This traditional 
conception of sovereignty is inadequate for understanding the complexity of 
contemporary international politics, and the debate on the changing nature of 
sovereingty is an important puzzle in International Relations. The increasing 
interconectedness between internal and external issues erases the “wall of defensibility” 
of the Westphalian nation-State. According to Chayes and Chayes (1995 see Slaughter: 
2004: 267):  “… the ‘new sovereignty’ … [is defined] as the capacity to participate in 
international institutions of all types – in collective efforts to steer the international 
system and address global and regional problems together with [States’] national and 
supranational counterparts. This is a conception of sovereingty that would accord status 
and recognition to states in the international system to the extent that they are willing 
and able to engage with other states, and thus necessarily accept mutual obligations.” 
The question to be answered here is under what conditions this new concept of 
sovereignty promotes cooperation and the solution of common problems (see Krasner, 
1999).      
 
281 
 
In this sense, we can see that in this new definition of sovereignty regional integration 
processes play a major role in interconnecting the local, national and international in a 
very efficient fashion. Integration processes in Europe and South America have led to 
an increasing political and economic stability inside these regions. Integration also 
boosted a convergence of norms and rules of behaviour among the member states, with 
them in some cases even developing the political ability to influence events outside the 
region (Sperling, 2007). Understanding how this convergence took place points towards 
the study of transgovernmental networks, unveiling how common norms are 
constructed, and most of all how common policies are developed/implemented. Besides 
this, in this new sovereignty the key to success is not autonomy but the ability to 
connect to the rest of the world and the political capacity to be an actor (Slaughter, 
2004). Studies on the EU as a “civilian” or “normative” power enhance our 
understanding on how norm compliant behaviour is gaining leverage over the 
maximization of material interests in a post-Westphalian world. 
 
In this post-Westphalian world sovereignty must be understood as a more flexible and 
practical characteristic of States. National government institutions should become more 
engaged and entangled with the development of transgovernmental networks. With the 
support of their national governments these networks would be responsible for the 
“formulation and implementation of professional norms and the development of best 
practices on substantive issues” (Slaughter, 2004: 269). As a result, besides influencing 
their national positions on specific issues these networks would be influenced and 
influence the perspectives of their counterparts, thereby reaching common solutions for 
common problems. Because the members of the network would know they are under 
scrutiny of their constituents, their peers and the national governments, they would 
perform in order to guarantee that an agreement is reached in the best normative basis 
(societal and international). (Sperling, 2007) Finally, in a world where sovereignty 
represents the ability to join in cooperative regimes in the collective interest of all states, 
national states should engage with and expand the formal ability of national 
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institutions/agents to interact with their counterparts across borders. These interactions 
and interconectedness across borders, being influenced and influencing the interests of 
the others, represent not a loss of sovereignty but an expansion of state power. 
(Slaughter, 2004) According to the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, this 
new reality of international politics requires a redefinition of American global leadership 
that she terms networked leadership. She defines this networked leadership in terms of 
soft (or smart) power in the new context of sovereignty in the sense that191: “a nation’s 
power is defined by how networked it is. Nations that are more connected, that are the 
central nodes for other networks, are the most powerful.” Moreover, she defends the 
notion that 21st Century US leadership must rely on transnationalism: “We will never be 
able to deal with the problems of cyber-security unless there is a partnership between 
business and government”. She argues that US strategy under president Obama is 
deeply rooted in fostering transgovernmental and transnational networks using tools 
such as social media to increase networking in economics, diplomacy and military. This 
also points to the potential that the study of transgovernmental networks has to explain 
power relations in the 21st Century.               
 
5.2.2 Democracy/Accountability 
 
The development of transgovernmental networks and its increasing importance in the 
regional policy outputs raises questions of control and accountability. Accountability is a 
basic principle of democracy. In Europe we have seen a greater interest in the 
population for establishing more democratic institutions, thus cutting the “democratic 
deficit” in the EU (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Majone, 1998, etc.). We identify two main 
areas of research when it comes to accountability and transgovernmental networks: the 
study of the institutional designs of regional integration processes and the legitimacy of 
transgovernmental networks. 
                                                          
191
 Hillary Clinton, Chatam House Prize 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzeAOJc49Kc. 
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Institutions developed by democratic states generally have the ambition to be both 
effective and accountable. There is a great pressure from the citzens to increase 
transparency and accountability in international organizations. This poses a question of 
representation that according to Keohane is framed as (2008: 713-714): “How can 
multilateral institutions be designed without global government so that qualified and 
dedicated leaders are more likely to be chosen, and so that those leaders who are 
selected are held accountable to the people whose actions they affect?” It is very clear 
that international institutions are dependent on States, nevertheless the relationships 
between these organizations and the citizens of their member states are very weak, 
even if all member-states are democracies. In this sense, democratic institutions should 
play a stronger role in the integration processes such as the European Parliament. How 
the increase of transparent and accountable institutions might impact on the 
effectiveness of transgovernmental networks in finding a consensus to deal with 
common problems poses another question that should not be neglected. 
 
Transgovernmental networks are composed of subunits of national governments 
(national representatives) which interact with each other. Even though these national 
representatives were not directly elected by the people they have a responsibility 
towards their national constituencies, not only with regards their domestic activity but 
also their transgovernmental interactions. Moreover, as part of a multilevel regional 
governance system transgovernmental networks have a responsibility towards the 
regional community as a whole, not only their domestic constituencies. In this sense, 
what may be ideal from a national perspective is not achievable from a regional point of 
view, and in these cases the representative acts as a mediator between the national 
and regional dimensions (or gatekeeper in the language of social theory). Criticism that 
transgovernmentalism is leading towards “technocratic elitism” (Perez, 1996) are guided 
by the idea that these transgovernmental networks lack transparency. According to 
Alston (1997: 441, see Slaughter 2004: 219), the rise of transgovernmental networks 
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“suggests a move away from arenas of relative transparency into the back rooms and 
the by-passing of the national political arenas”. Moreover, Picciotto adds that (1996/7: 
1049) “A chronic lack of legitimacy plagues direct international contacts at the sub-state 
level among national officials and administrators”. In this sense, the answer to the 
“technocratic elitism” critique seems to reside in increasing the transparency of 
transgovernmental networks. However, transparency would increase the sectoral 
pressures over the networks and could ultimately disrupt the network due to the over-
politicization of issues been dealt with there. For instance, a senior official of the PSC 
told us that representatives feel more confortable making their decisions behind closed 
doors and without external interference. He also noticed the difficulty to reach an 
agreement on issues where his minister/superior had already positioned himself in the 
media. One interesting insight on how to make networks more transparent is to link 
them with broader networks of NGO’s and corporations as the former US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton suggests. This opening would mean increasing interactions 
between technocrats with different perceptions and awareness of non-governmental 
sectors, thereby taking a broader range of interests into account. Increasing 
transparency of transgovernmental networks would increase the fairness and 
responsiveness of the multilevel governance system and would decrease the level of 
democratic deficit for international institutions (Slaughter, 2004).      
  
5.2.3 -Transgovernmental networks and other regional organizations 
 
In this study we focused on the impact of transgovernmental networks in distinct 
regional organizations in Europe and South America. The inter-regional comparison 
sheds light on factors that we may think are unique to one region but that are able to 
explain the same phenomenon in other regions. In this research we observed that 
integration only prospered in regions where transgovernmental networks were present. 
This evidence points to factors that transcend the uniqueness approach to understand 
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regional integration. In this spirit the next steps would include comparing these findings 
with integration processes in other regions with high values in the study variable but 
with no sign of deeper integration. 
 
One of the most representing regions with highly developed transgovernmental 
networks but a low level of integration is the ASEAN (Acharya, 2001). According to a 
comprehensive study of Acharya (2001: 57), ASEAN has very similar normative 
characteristics to South America with a strong doctrine of non-interference and respect 
for sovereignty. Despite these common normatives and the development of 
transgovernmental networks, both integration processes (Mercosul and ASEAN) differ 
fundamentally. In this sense, more research needs to be done in order to observe how 
the reproduction of regional elites with the creation of transgovernmental networks 
affects the regional integration process in Asia. These findings could be contrasted with 
regional integration in South America because these two regions share a more similar 
normative (especially the patterns of non-interference and sovereingty) than the 
European case. 
 
Another interesting inter-regional comparison would be to observe regional integration 
processes in Africa and contrast them with integration processes in South America. The 
African Union is modeled after the European Union, and unlike any other regional 
integration the AU has so much potential to advance due to the security necessities of 
the region (Babarinde, 2011). Despite its EU-like institutionalized structures, the AU 
seems to have little or no power at all to be defined as an actor even inside Africa. 
According to Babarinde (2011: 293), “Unlike the EU which has leverage over other 
actors on the global stage, including its member states, the AU’s leverage over others is 
limited, if not non-existent”. The growing number of internal threats and armed conflicts 
between the member states seems to prevent the development of stable networks of 
officials which could be responsible for giving flesh to the already established 
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institutional structure of the AU. This situation seems similar to the integration process 
in the Andean Community, where despite highly institutionalized structures the 
integration process has not advanced. In this sense, the causes and solutions for the 
development of transgovernmental networks in Africa should be explored and 
contrasted with other examples of failed integration attempts that managed to reverse 
the course and learn from past mistakes in order to turn failure into success.    
 
5.3 Implications for Europe and South America   
 
5.3.1 European integration beyond the CFSP/ESDP   
 
The European experience shows that the interplay of diverse factors during the 
integration process leads national foreign policies to undergo an adaptation (also called 
Europeanization in the EU literature) to each of the other member states’ foreign 
policies (Smith, 2003; Checkel, 2007). We argue that in Europe this process of 
adaptation was facilitated by the development of transgovernemtnal networks 
composed of national representatives that deal with everyday issues related to the 
CFSP/ESDP (Foradori; Rosa and Scartezzini, 2007). The development of this 
transgovernmental network started with the EPC but continued replicating and fortifying 
itself with the institutionalization of the CFSP/ESDP.  
 
Nowadays we observe the important role played by this community of diplomats 
(Diplocom) in finding common solutions in different institutions such as the PSC, 
COREPER and Working Groups. According to Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini (2007: 
xii): “The density of contacts and communications between governmental sub-units 
facilitates the formation of a sense of collegiality, which is reinforced by the shared 
professional backgrounds of the actors. A transgovernmental network is therefore made 
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up of persons united by a common interest, by a common professional outlook, and by 
friendship.” According to Majone (1997), transgovernmental networks are “bearers of 
reputation” broadcasting the position and actions of individual members to the others. In 
these networks the credibility of individual members is enhanced because the members 
have to safeguard its reputation in the network, and they can only do that by adjusting to 
common norms (Slaughter, 2004). In this sense, under certain conditions these 
individuals that participate in these networks are not defending narrow national 
preferences but are instead trying to find common solutions to common problems.  
 
Alongside the development of transgovernmental networks, we can see the 
formalization of customs and informal rules in Europe into a set of binding laws. The 
institutionalization of procedures in the EU Foreign Policy system was one key feature 
for deeper integration (Smith, 2003). Together with these procedural regulations the EU 
was able to develop a set of substantial rules regarding the geographical and issue 
areas in which it would use its influence and the instruments at its disposal (ESS, 2003; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). In this sense, the EU actorness stems from the 
definition of the geographical space, issue areas, and the instruments at its disposal to 
act.   
 
The big question arising from the influence of transgovernmental networks in the 
European integration project is related to the concerns over a “government in the 
shadows” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007) or the “democratic deficit” (Follesdal and Hix, 
2006) in the EU. This question relates directly to problems of accountability in the EU 
multilevel governance system. The European multilevel governance system is 
associated with the delegation of rule-making authority which escapes the democratic 
inputs in important areas of policy. Besides this, authority is dispersed across diverse 
levels of the EU governance system, thus making accountability a serious problem. Two 
main considerations on the issue of democracy/accountability are identified in the 
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literature. One view posits that the people affected by a policy should have the 
possibility to debate its formulation. According to this view, in order to decrease the 
democratic defict political authority should either remain within the member states 
(Moravcsik, 1999) or be extended to liberal democratic institutions in the European level 
(for instance, increasing the powers of the European Parliament) (Follesdal and Hix, 
2006). This would make the EU closer and more accountable to their citizens. The 
second view argues that it is not possible to compare the EU with the democratic 
legitimacy of national states, firstly because the EU does not have a demos and 
secondly because it lacks the features that the national states have (culture, identity, 
etc) in order to justify majority rule. According to this view, EU decision-making has to 
be responsive instead or participatory (Scharpf, 1999), in the sense that what 
legitimises the EU multilevel governance system is not democratic representation but 
the expertise, policy consistency and problem-solving skills of national representatives 
acting on behalf of their national governments in the EU (Majone, 2006). 
 
5.3.2 - South American Defence Council: the future of integration? 
 
Unlike the EU experience, in South America we see a great battle for the control of the 
transgovernmental networks. In South America most questions regarding security and 
defence are still left in the hands of the military organisations, which have their own 
mentality and modus operandi. The recent authoritarian past of South American 
countries left deep scars in the relationships between civilians and military. This 
troublesome relationship can be seen clearly, especially in the Southern Cone where 
the dictatorships were more violent and civilians strive for greater control. This shared 
drama of dictatorship strengthened the relationship between the civilian governments. 
As a result one of the major concerns of the civilian governments is how to balance the 
civil-military relationship in order to achieve a stable democratic regime while keeping 
the policy making flowing. The answer to this question is the development of a regional 
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security governance system in the Southern Cone. This system is composed of CBMs, 
regimes and institutions and is based in the specific norms and principles of peace, 
democracy and economic development. (Mullins, 2006; Sotomayor, 2004; Kacowicz, 
2005; Hurrel, 1998a). 
 
Since the eve of the military dictatorships the transgovernmental connections among 
the military played an important role in cooperation for deterring counter-revolutionary 
behaviour and political persecution. The most expressive of these networks was the 
Condor Operation. The Condor Operation was developed and implemented by a 
network of military and intelligence agents from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, with the collaboration of the United States (McSherry, 2005). 
With the democratization process one of the main concerns of the civilian governments 
was to gain leverage and control these networks. Some countries such as Argentina 
and Uruguay did that by punishing those who participated in political persecution, while 
in other countries the pieces of the network remained the same. However, despite 
efforts to curtail those military contacts the issues of defence and security are still in the 
hands of the military (with different degrees of influence) in all South American 
countries. As a result, any analysis that wants to calculate how politics of security and 
defence are played in South America needs to take into account these important actors 
and their positions. 
 
In this sense, the biggest question involving the role of transgovernmental networks in 
South America revolves around how to control or steer these networks. The literature on 
Civil-Military relationships in South America abound (Pion-Berlin, 2001; Arceneaux, 
2001; D’Araujo and Castro, 2000, etc.). According to Mullins (2006: 154): “The process 
of transition [from dictatorship to democracy] impacted greatly on foreign policy 
formation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Mercosul project was at least in part the 
product of the dictatorships. The determinations on the part of the civilian authorities to 
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avoid a repeat of the human rights abuses of the 1970’s and 1980’s drove them to 
establish a more cooperative security regime in the Southern Cone.” As a result, in 
South America there has been a constant fight to gain control over the military and their 
networks. Civilian governments have tried to control and steer these networks in 
different ways, either by punishing uncooperative behaviour or by establishing a system 
of regional security governance. Internally speaking each country does that by imposing 
defence cuts in their respective Defence Ministries and trying to socialize the military in 
the values and norms of peace and democracy. Each of these strategies has had 
different impacts on the civil-military relations, especially because the military continues 
to have great influence in terms of security and defence192 and therefore it is so 
important for the civilian governments to increase control over the networks (Hurrel, 
1998b). In this sense, the military networks are constituted of like-minded government 
sub-units (Milicom) and play an important role in fostering cooperation in security and 
defence in the region. We have seen that in general most of the representatives which 
deal with issues of security and defence within the Defence Ministries come from the 
army. For that reason we investigated how the networks among these representatives 
are created in the Brazilian Army Academy for Command and General Staff (ECEME). 
However, it would be interesting to observe other networks and their influence in politics 
(for instance, in Bolivia it seems that the Air Force has more political influence than the 
Army). Besides this, we only researched how a specific group of commanders create 
networks and are socialized, however the literature shows that the most fertile ground to 
analyse socialization of the military in the norms and principles of peace and democracy 
(and subordination to the civilian leaders) is at the Sergeant and Lieutenant levels. Here 
the literature highlights the role played by the Brazilian Army’s Military Academy of the 
Agulhas Negras (AMAN). (Medeiros, 2010; Castro, 2009)     
 
                                                          
192
 In all South American countries (except Argentina), the military have the constitutional prerrogative of being 
the guarantor for the maintenance of Law and Order inside their countries.  
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All in all we have seen that in the Southern Cone the relationships between the 
representatives are much deeper than in the Andean region. We suggest that these 
relationships facilitate cooperation and increase stability among the countries in the 
Southern Cone, while at the same time the lack of these networks in the Andean region, 
despite the complex institutional structures of the CAN, prevents the development of 
stable and deeper political integration. According to a Brazilian official, these 
relationships are based on a: “fellow feeling, friendship and common objectives. [Our 
relationship] helps us to understand and clarify each others political objectives and 
interests. However, these feelings are not only restricted to us, they are also extended 
to our families as well. We talk and visit each other.” As a result these networks of sub-
units of governments provide the flesh for the institutional bones of the integration 
process. In the past few years we have observed a dramatic increase in the exchanges 
between the countries in the Andean region and some countries in the Southern Cone 
(Argentina and Brazil)193. Together with the development of the Unasul, and especially 
the South American Defence Council, we could be witnessing the spread of the 
transgovernmentalism culture to the Andean region. It is only in the medium/long term 
that we can confirm whether the relationships that have been created with the Andean 
countries will pay-off and whether the institutionalization of the South American political 
integration will move forward within the Unasul.   
 
On the other hand, the South American Defence Council (CSD) also has the potential to 
destabilize the region even more if it is used by some governments to promote radical 
ideologies with confrontational rhetoric or to insist on terms that are unacceptable to the 
other member-states (f.i., insist on issues such as the military alliance, or joint-army). 
Moreover, the stabilization of the Andean system, as seen above, is one of the biggest 
challenges of the CSD. The Colombian conflict led to a high level of borders’ 
                                                          
193
 Data gathered from the ECEME. 
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militarization, and the Plan Colombia is seen as a destabilizing factor and viewed by 
many as a threat to the South American security. Besides this, the CSD is also 
composed of Guyana and Surinam, which have traditionally participated in the 
Caribbean system with different aspects, agendas, priorities and strategies from the 
Andean and Southern Cone systems (Costa Vaz and Jácome, 2009). In this sense, the 
CSD will only be successful if it manages to integrate those subsystems based on 
shared values and to foster a common identity. Nevertheless, although the integration 
must be first and foremost directed towards mutual understanding and interrelational 
politics, some member-states will push for concrete political outcomes. However, before 
arriving at those political outcomes it will be necessary to have a discussion on the 
definitions of security and defence in the region. This discussion is important in order to 
overcome the limitations of a too general concept that rends its operationalization 
system void, thus making it impossible to develop a common regional security and 
defence policy (Tulchin, Benites and Diamint, 2006). Due to historical sensibilities, it is 
also important for many South American countries to see reform in the security sector. 
This reform would have the objective of enhancing the civilian control of the military, 
promoting the civilian careers in the Ministries of Defence, better defined functions and 
responsibilities of the armed forces, and making its actions and administration more 
transparent (Costa Vaz and Jácome, 2009).  
 
In order to develop itself more strongly and become sustainable the political integration 
in South America needs to build into the already existing transgovernmental networks 
(among the military and diplomats) and expand itself, particularly to the Andean region, 
and include actors from other sectors in the debate. Among those sectors we can see 
the growing importance of non-governmental organizations, universities, political 
parties, media, legislative and judiciary institutions. The CSD would be an important 
forum to socialize those actors into the norms, values and principles of peace, 
democracy, and military subordination to the civilian authorities, etc. It is also utterly 
important to:  
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- enhance the exchange of military and diplomatic officials to high-level military 
and diplomatic academies194; 
- intensify the number of military joint-exercises, thus fostering interoperability; 
- increase the joint participation in peacekeeping missions and the development of 
a joint peacekeeping training centre to harmonize doctrines195; 
- exchange the perceptions and elaboration of common scenarios; 
- cooperative integration of the arms industries and development of a common 
defence market in order to enhance autonomy and logistics, thus increasing the 
technological capacity and lowering the costs with economies of scale196.      
 
As a result we conclude that the viability of the Unasul/CSD is uncertain, firstly because 
it is a very recent experience and still lacks some of the necessary features seen in the 
European experience (transgovernmentalism and socialization mechanisms). Secondly, 
                                                          
194
 Initiatives such as the Advanced Course of South American Defence (CAD-SUL) implemented by the Brazilian 
government at the ESG (Brazilian War College). Moreover, the South American countries are discussing the 
creation of a Joint South American Defence College under the aegis of the Unasul/CSD. In regard to the diplomatic 
services, since 2011 there is an annual meeting of the Diplomatic Academies of the Unasul member-states. They 
have the objective to create, in the medium/long term, a South American Diplomatic School and foster common 
training and networking among diplomats in the region. 
 
195
 It is important to highlight the activities of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training 
Centers (ALCOPAZ) in bringing together the experiences of local Training Centers. The ALCOPAZ was created in 
2007 and has the Peacekeeping Training Centers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay as associate-members.   
 
196
 The project for the development of a South American joint fighter to be used for training by all Air Forces in the 
region represents an important step in this direction.  
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it needs to deal with the divergences and fragmentations, not only in the subsystems 
(especially in the Andean), but also between the subsystems (CAN and Mercosul). In 
this sense, despite the recent advances in terms of diplomatic and military cooperation, 
it will only be possible to observe whether the Unasul/CSD will surmount those 
difficulties in the medium/long term because the creation of new institutions does not 
necessarily allow organisations to overcome the obstacles that have already been faced 
in previous attempts to move political integration forwards.    
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Annex I – CFSP/ESDP instruments 
 
   
CFSP 
instruments Political dialogue and diplomacy Diplomatic missions 
(low intensity) 
            
  Dialogue  Declarations Démarches Special  Observation Monitoring 
  Meetings     Representatives and fact- missions 
          finding missions   
 
CFSP + EC 
instruments Sanctions 
(middle 
intensity) 
          
  Diplomatic Commercial Sanctions on  
Arms 
embargoes 
  Sanctions and economic capital movements     
    Sanctions and payments     
 
CFSP 
instruments Crisis mechanisms 
(high intensity) 
          
  Civil police Rule of Law Civilian Civil Military 
  Force Mission Administration protection deployment 
      Mission     
Tables adapted from: Barbé, Esther, and Benjamin Kienzle, (2007) Security Provider or Security Consumer? The 
European Union and Conflict Management, European Foreign Affairs Review 12:517-536.  
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Annex II- EU Missions and Operations Overseas 
 
Ongoing Missions and Operations: 
 
EU NAVFOR Somalia – December 2008 
EUAVSEC South Sudan – October 2012 
EUBAM Libya – May 2013 
EUCAP NESTOR – July 2012 
EUCAP SAHEL Niger – July 2012 
EUMM Georgia – September 2008 
EUTM Mali – January 2013 
EUTM Somalia – January 2010 
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine – November 2005 
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzergovina (EUFOR – Althea) - December 2004 
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) – February 2008 
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) – November 2005 
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU 
BAM Rafah) – November 2005 
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) – July 2005 
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) – June 2007 
EUPOL DR Congo – July 2007 
EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) – June 2005 
 
Completed Missions and Operations: 
 
EUFOR Libya – April 2011 to November 2011  
EUFOR Tchad/RCA – March 2008 to May 2009 
EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-
Bissau) – February 2008 to August 2010 
EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzergovina (EUPM) – January 2003 to December 2011 
EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) – 
December 2005 to June 2006 
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EU Military operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA) – 
March 2003 to December 2003 
EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA) – 
December 2003 to December 2005 
EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) – July 2004 to July 2005 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) – September 2005 to December 2006 
EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) – July 2005 to December 2007 
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) – April 2005 to June 2007 
EUFOR DR Congo – April 2006 to November 2006 
EU Military Operation in DR Congo (ARTEMIS) – June 2003 to September 2003. 
Source: EEAS Home-page: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm Accessed 4 
December 2013.   
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Annex III – Foreign Officials Studying in the ECEME (1980-2012) 
 
Rank Force  Name     Country     Year     Course 
Maj Inf HECTOR  HORÁCIO  GASQUET Argentina 1980 CCEM 
Maj Cav ADEL  MONTEIRO  CORTEZ Bolívia 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf FERNANDO  POLANCO  
GALLARDO 
Chile 1980 CCEM 
Maj Inf JOSÉ  GIMENEZ  ESCUDERO Espanha 1980 CCEM 
Maj Inf LAYTON  GERALD  DUNBAR EUA 1980 CCEM 
Maj Inf RICHARD  JOSEPH  WRIGHT EUA 1980 CCEM 
Maj Inf CELAN  MEZA  PINEDA Honduras 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf BRUNO  TOSETTI Itália 1980 CCEM 
Maj Eng DE  LOS  SANTOS  CACERES  
ROJAS 
Paraguai 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng CARLOS  CHAMOCHUMB  
MUNDACA 
Peru 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng FRUTUOSO  PIRES  MATEUS Portugal 1980 CCEM 
Maj Inf JORGE  GERMAN  GONZALEZ  
BARCO 
Uruguai 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
PM OSCAR  ELIAS  ORTEGA Venezuela 1980 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf RAMON  GUILHERMO  
SANTELIZ  RUIZ 
Venezuela 1980 CCEM 
Maj Cav ULRICH  CARL  KLEYSER Alemanha 1981 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JUAN  FELIPE  PELTZER Argentina 1981 CCEM 
Maj Inf RAUL  ESPINOZA  LORA Bolívia 1981 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art RENE  CARDEMIL  FIGUEIROA Chile 1981 CCEM 
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Ten 
Cel 
Inf GERMAN  ARAGON  BAUTISTA Colômbia 1981 CCEM 
Maj Com BAIK-YONG  SUNG Coréia do Sul 1981 CCEM 
Maj Inf DOUGLAS  C.  McCARY EUA 1981 CCEM 
Cap Com WILLIAM  PORTER  KING  
JUNIOR 
EUA 1981 CCEM 
Maj Cav JEAN-PIERRE  TREVIDIC França 1981 CCEM 
Maj Art CLÁUDIO  ALFREDO  LAINEZ  
COELHO 
Honduras 1981 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art NUNZIO  GRAZIANO  
FONTECCHIO 
Itália 1981 CCEM 
Maj Inf PEDRO  HUGO  CANETE  
PERALTA 
Paraguai 1981 CCEM 
Cel Art EURICO  ANTONIO  DE  C.  E  M.  
SALES  GRADE 
Portugal 1981 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ALBERTO  EMERICH  ESQUEDA  
TORRES 
Venezuela 1981 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf RAMON  DEL  VALLE  BRANCO  
BETANCOURT 
Venezuela 1981 CCEM 
Maj Inf CARLOS  LUIS  MONTAGUT Argentina 1982 CCEM 
Maj Inf CARLOS  JIMENEZ  MURIEL Bolívia 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  DEL  CARMEN  PRIETO  
VALENCIA 
Colômbia 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
MB MARCO  ALEJANDRO  
CISNEROS  AILLON 
Equador 1982 CCEM 
Cap Inf JOHN  FREDERICK  DIVINEY EUA 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MARCUS  WINSTON  MUNROE Guiana 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ROBERT  BERNARD  MITCHELL Guiana 1982 CCEM 
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Maj Inf ROBERTO  LAZARUS  LOZANO Honduras 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Med TRISTAN  MARTINEZ  CASTILLO Honduras 1982 CCEMS/
Sau 
Ten 
Cel 
Art MASSIMO  JACOPI Itália 1982 CCEM 
Maj Cav DOMINGO  ARISTIDES  
OCAMPOS  GODOY 
Paraguai 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JOÃO  GOULÃO  DE  MELO Portugal 1982 CCEM 
Maj Inf CARLOS  ALEJANDRO  SILVA  
VALIENTE 
Uruguai 1982 CCEM 
Maj Inf TOMAS  MARTIN  MEDINA  
PRATTO 
Uruguai 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JESUS  MANOEL  CONTRERAS  
CARRERO 
Venezuela 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JORGE  LUIS  RAD  CHUECOS Venezuela 1982 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng JOSÉ  FREDDY  SANCHEZ  
MORALES 
Venezuela 1982 CCEM 
Maj Art KARL  HEINZ  MUNZNER Alemanha 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf SANTIAGO  ROQUE  ALONSO Argentina 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf MIGUEL  KRASSNOFF  
MARTCHENKO 
Chile 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art ARIEL  BAQUERO  MORALES Colômbia 1983 CCEM 
Maj Art HO  SEI  MIN Coréia do Sul 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf EMÍLIO  FERNANDEZ  
MALDONADO 
Espanha 1983 CCEM 
Cap PM JAMES  MILTON  BRANHAM EUA 1983 CCEM 
Cap PM MICHAEL  ANDREW  FURLO EUA 1983 CCEM 
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Maj Cav MICHEL  CASTILLON França 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf ALVARO  ARMILO  REYES  
LOPEZ 
Honduras 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf PIER  GIORGIO  SEGALA Itália 1983 CCEM 
Maj Art MARIO  VICENTE  G.  DE  LA  
FUENTE  RAMIREZ 
Paraguai 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JOÃO  RIVERO  LAZO Peru 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HENRIQUE  VICTOR  
GUIMARÃES  P.  BRANDÃO 
Portugal 1983 CCEM 
Maj Cav CLÁUDIO  MIGUEL  GUASH  
GALVEZ 
Uruguai 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art EDUARDO  CESAR  MEJIAS  
ITRIAGO 
Venezuela 1983 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HECTOR  ARMANDO  PARRA  
MEDINA 
Venezuela 1983 CCEM 
Maj Art POMPEYO  JOSÉ  TORREALBA  
RIVERO 
Venezuela 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf WAYNE JULIAN SCOTT 
MCKENZIE 
Guiana 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf ROHAN SEOPAUL Guiana 1983 CCEM 
Maj Inf RAINER  GLORIUS Alemanha 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf CARLOS  ALBERTO  ANUN Argentina 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng ALEXANDRE  MARTIN  
JUNEMANN 
Chile 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JAIME  HOYO  NINO Colômbia 1984 CCEM 
Maj FAC RAYMOND  DENNIS  
McCONNEL 
EUA 1984 CCEM 
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Cap EM ROBERT  HERMAN  BATES EUA 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf FAIRBAIRN  EGERTON  
LIVERPOOL 
Guiana 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf GODWIN  FERDINAND  
McPHERSON 
Guiana 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
SAS CARLOS  ALEJANDRO  
HIDALGO  UCHOA 
Honduras 1984 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Inf TAUFIK  AZZAD  MATUTE Honduras 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art NAPOLI  NICOLO Itália 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf MARIO  COLMAN  VARGAS Paraguai 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf PABLO  CORREA  FALEN Peru 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Com JOSÉ  MARIA  DE  OLIVEIRA  
GARDETE 
Portugal 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf JÚLIO  TOMÁS  MENDES  
GALASSO 
Uruguai 1984 CCEM 
Maj Eng LUIZ  ROBERTO  ORTIZ  PARRA Venezuela 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf MANUEL  HUMBERTO  INFANTE  
D’LACRUZ 
Venezuela 1984 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Com NELSON  CLEMENTE  
SANCHEZ  URDANETA 
Venezuela 1984 CCEM 
Maj Inf HANS  JOACHIM  BOEHNHARDT Alemanha 1985 CCEM 
Maj Inf JOSÉ  LUIZ  PIEDRA Argentina 1985 CCEM 
Maj Cav BENJAMIN  LEDEZMA  GALVEZ Bolívia 1985 CCEM 
Maj Art RAFAEL  RIVAS  GONZALEZ Chile 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MARIO  LOPEZ  CASTANO Colômbia 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Com CHOI  SANG  BUM Coréia do Sul 1985 CCEM 
Cap Inf CHARLES  ANTHONY  EUA 1985 CCEM 
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ROWCLIFFE 
Cap FAC SAMUEL  KLINE  STOUFFER EUA 1985 CCEM 
Maj Cav FRANÇOIS  MAX  BLIN França 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Int ALAN  JOHN  LEWIS Guiana 1985 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Inf GUADALUPE  ANTONIO  
REYTHEL  CABALLERO 
Honduras 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Com CARLO  MARCHESI Itália 1985 CCEM 
Maj Eng ESTEBAN  FRANCISCO  
RODRIGUEZ  JARA 
Paraguai 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng LUIZ  JOSÉ  MONARD  
AVENDANO 
Peru 1985 CCEM 
Maj Eng ISABELINO  DIAZ  PEREZ Uruguai 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng CESAR  RAFAEL  TORRES Venezuela 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art FREDDY  MATIAS  
MONTENEGRO  MONAGAS 
Venezuela 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  NAPOLEON  ROMERO Venezuela 1985 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art MANUEL  SALVADOR  LEAL  
URDANETA 
Venezuela 1985 CCEM 
Maj Cav ALFREDO  ANTONIO  ORTIZ Argentina 1986 CCEM 
Cap Art CESAR  LOPEZ  SAVEDRA Bolívia 1986 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art CARLOS  ARTURO  PARDO  
SANTAMARIA 
Colômbia 1986 CCEM 
Maj FAC PARK  IN  DONG Coréia do Sul 1986 CCEM 
Maj Eng VICENTE  BRAVO  GUERREIRA Espanha 1986 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art CARLO  TRITONJ Itália 1986 CCEM 
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Maj Cav ABEL  OMAR  GUERIM  
VELAZCO 
Paraguai 1986 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Int JOSÉ  RAMON  ERNAU  ROJAS Peru 1986 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Inf ARQUIMEDES  GRATEROL  
CABRITA 
Venezuela 1986 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JÚLIO  CESAR  LAYA  GIL Venezuela 1986 CCEM 
Maj Log ERICH  JOHANNES  LUDWIG  
SOTTUNG 
Alemanha 1987 CCEM 
Maj Cav DARDO  JUAN  ANTONIO  
PARODI 
Argentina 1987 CCEM 
Maj Art LUIS  FERNANDO  SANCHEZ  
GUSMAN 
Bolívia 1987 CCEM 
Maj Inf RENE  PATRÍCIO  QUILHOT  
PALMA 
Chile 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art CARLOS  HENRY  MONTOYA  
GUTMAN 
Colômbia 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HAE-MAN  CHOI Coréia do Sul 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
MB MARCO  VINÍCIO  ALVAREZ  
MANTILLA 
Equador 1987 CCEMS/I
nt 
Cap Inf FRANCIS  XAVIER  KINNEY EUA 1987 CCEM 
Maj Inf PURL  KENNETH  KEEN EUA 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Adm HUMBERTO  ABSALON  LOPES  
MENDOZA 
Honduras 1987 CCEMS/I
nt 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf FRANCESCO  CRISTADORO Itália 1987 CCEM 
Maj Inf DOMINGO  GUZMAN  GAONA  
RUIZ  DIAZ 
Paraguai 1987 CCEM 
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Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  SEGUNDO  LAU  
SANCHEZ 
Peru 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HERCULANO  SOARES  
MARTINS 
Portugal 1987 CCEM 
Maj MB HENDY  MONTIEL  ARGUELLO Venezuela 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
GN ROSENDO  BAANERGER  
SANCHEZ 
Venezuela 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Bld VIRGILIO  ESTANGA  REQUENA Venezuela 1987 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf FERNANDO  ALBERTO  ISTURIZ Argentina 1988 CCEM 
Maj Inf LUIZ  HERMANDO  SALAS  
VILLAMIZAR 
Colômbia 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MAN-HEE  LEE Coréia do Sul 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  ANTONIO  ALMENDARIZ  
RIVAS 
El Salvador 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  ROBERTO  ZAMORA  
HERNANDEZ 
El Salvador 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
IM NEIL  PATRICK  KRUKAR EUA 1988 CCEM 
Maj Inf RODOLFO  ARTURO  FLORES  
ORTEGA 
Guatemala 1988 CCEM 
Maj Inf WATSON  BOUGHTON  
CAMPBELL  JOSEPH 
Guiana 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Int MELITON  VALLECILLO  RIERA Honduras 1988 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Art LUIGI  TARASCA Itália 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf RAMON  ALCIDES  NAVARRO  
BORDON 
Paraguai 1988 CCEM 
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Maj Inf DANIEL  ROJAS  GARCIA Peru 1988 CCEM 
Maj Inf JÚLIO  CESAR  JESUS  SALAS  
ZUMETA 
Venezuela 1988 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Com REINHARD  GERHARD  
WALTER  SCHOLZ 
Alemanha 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf FERNANDO  CALDERON  
TERAN 
Bolívia 1989 CCEM 
Maj Cav JOSÉ  HERNAN  HURTADO  
RODRIGUES 
Colômbia 1989 CCEM 
Maj Art YUN-CON  JOO Coréia do Sul 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JUAN  CAÑADAS  LORENZO Espanha 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
FAC JOSEPH  BOATWRIGHT  
CARLESS 
EUA 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav STEPHEN  CHARLES  STACEY EUA 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf JEAN  PIERRE  MARTI França 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf MAURÍCIO  ROJAS  FLORES Guatemala 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf PERRY  JAMES  FOO Guiana 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf PATRICK  NICHOLAS  
CHANNER 
Inglaterra 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf GIANCARLO  ROSSI Itália 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ANIBAL  SALVADOR  RIBAS  
OVELAR 
Paraguai 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MIGUEL  HENRIQUE  ROJAS  
GARCIA 
Peru 1989 CCEM 
Maj Eng CARLOS  MARTIN  PENALOSA  
BARRIENTOS 
Venezuela 1989 CCEM 
Maj GN GREGÓRIO  CASANOVA  Venezuela 1989 CCEM 
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VILLAMIZAR 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HUMBERTO  SIMON  JIMENEZ  
VILLARROEL 
Venezuela 1989 CCEM 
Maj Inf JOHNNY  FREDDY  MENDOZA  
TERAN 
Venezuela 1989 CCEM 
Maj Art RUBEN  DARIO  CALDERON  
MATHEUS 
Venezuela 1989 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf RAUL  HORÁCIO  GALLARDO Argentina 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf GUSTAVO  GANDARILLAS Bolívia 1990 CCEM 
Maj Cav ISMAEL  PLATA  VERA Colômbia 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf HA  JONG  KANG Coréia do Sul 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf OSCAR  EDUARDO  RODEZNO  
DUBON 
El Salvador 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CHARLES  ANTHONY  
ROWCLIFFE 
EUA 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art KEVIN  STUART  BROWN EUA 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JEAN  MARC  MERIALDO França 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf FITZ  RUY  IGNATIUS  GRIFFITH Guiana 1990 CCEM 
Maj Inf GUILHERMO  MONZON  
TALLEDO 
Peru 1990 CCEM 
Maj Inf HELDER  DOS  SANTOS  
CASTRO  RODRIGUES 
Portugal 1990 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Art AREVALO  MENDEZ  ROMERO Venezuela 1990 CCEM 
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Ten 
Cel 
Eng MANUEL  OLIVO  RUIZ  ZERPA Venezuela 1990 CCEM 
Maj Inf THOMAS  ROSCHE Alemanha 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JUAN  ORDONEZ  MEDINA Bolívia 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Cel Cav FROYLAN  PINZON  CURREA Colômbia 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
FN YONG  WOO  PARK Coréia do Sul 1991 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Vet ANTONIO  T.  CHAMORRO  
LANDAZURI 
Equador 1991 CCEMS/I
nt 
Cap Trnp DENNIS  JAY  DUGAN EUA 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf RUDOLPH  NICASIO  GARCIA EUA 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ARNAUD  GERARD França 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LE  ROY  ALEX  BENN Guiana 1991 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf DIEGO  GON Itália 1991 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf EZEQUIEL  C.  HERNANDEZ  
MENDOZA 
México 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art ANTONIO  E.  GALEANO  
LENGUAZA 
Paraguai 1991 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
QMB JOSÉ  A.  VISCONTI  OSÓRIO Venezuela 1991 CCEMS/I
nt 
Ten 
Cel 
Bld MELVIM  JOSÉ  LOPEZ  
HIDALGO 
Venezuela 1991 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten Eng RENE  LISANDRO  ALVAREZ  Venezuela 1991 CCEMS/I
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Cel CUMARE nt 
Maj Eng RAUL  ALEJANDRO  POGGI Argentina 1992 CCEM 
Maj Inf CARLOS  H.  LUCERO  LOAIZA Chile 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Eng FERNANDO  CERDA  VARGAS Chile 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JAVIER  ALFONSO  CALDERON  
REALPE 
Colômbia 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj IFC SANG  TAEK  PARK Coréia do Sul 1992 CCEM 
Maj Art JOSÉ  ANTONIO  LUZ EUA 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art JEAN-MARC  CAPO França 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf DAVID  IAN  AUBREY  
SPACKMAN 
Inglaterra 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ANGEL  PRIOR  VALENCIA México 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Cav DANIEL  MAZA  ESPINOSA México 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JUAN  ANDRES  ROA  GOMES Venezuela 1992 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
MB ROBERT  GONZALES  FERRER Venezuela 1992 CCEMS/I
nt 
Ten 
Cel 
Art MICHAEL  GREWEN Alemanha 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JULIO  ENRIQUE  BASCUR  
GAETE 
Chile 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf SIGFRIDO  A.  MERCADO  
ABARZUA 
Chile 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten Art CARLOS  ALBERTO  FRACICA  Colômbia 1993 CCEM/O
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Cel NARANJO NA 
Ten 
Cel 
FN SUNG-WOO  OH Coréia do Sul 1993 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Adm JOSÉ  ALFREDO  MEJIA  
IDROVO 
Equador 1993 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Inf ALEXANDER  DOMINIC  
PERWICH 
EUA 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JACQUES  ISNARD França 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LINDON  VERNON  ROSS Guiana 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf FRANK  O.  OMENKA Nigéria 1993 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav RICARDO  HOMERO  MONCADA  
NOVOA 
Paraguai 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav SIGILFREDO  L.  FERREIRA  
COSTA  R. 
Paraguai 1993 CCEM 
Maj Inf ARTUR  NEVES  PINA  
MONTEIRO 
Portugal 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf RUPERT  LAWRENCE  
CHRISTOPHER 
Suriname 1993 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JOSÉ  ANTONIO  DIAZ  SILVA Uruguai 1993 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng ANIBAL  JOSÉ  MIRENA  
CAMPOS 
Venezuela 1993 CCEM 
Maj Art HENRIQUE  J.  TONAZZI  
DIETRICH 
Argentina 1994 CCEM 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng JUAN  EMÍLIO  H.  ORTIZ  JARA Chile 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JÚLIO  FERNANDO  BRITO  
CORREAS 
Chile 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
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Ten 
Cel 
Eng DAGOBERTO  BARRIOS  
VASQUEZ 
Colômbia 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav FRANKLIN  G.  MEZA  
HERNANDEZ 
Equador 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av THOMAS  FLEET  WESTFALL EUA 1994 CCEM 
Maj Com PIERRE-JACQUES  TEISSEIRE França 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art JORGE  HUGO  FLORES  
ARANA 
Guatemala 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art RENE  ESTUARDO  TREJO  DE  
LEON 
Guatemala 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf LESLIE  BOBB Guiana 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf EDMUNDO  ADOLFO  JIMENEZ  
GALAN 
México 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JOSÉ  LEONIDO  GROPPI  
ITURBE 
Paraguai 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Int DOUGLAS  G.  LOAIZA  
MONTILLA 
Venezuela 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art WILFREDO  ANTONIO  VERAS  
SUAREZ 
Venezuela 1994 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf FERNANDO  CALUETE Angola 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LUCAS  HULIANE Angola 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JULIO  REINALDO  REINIKE  
AVILA 
Chile 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav R.  HENRY  DOMINGUEZ  
MONSALVE 
Colômbia 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf BYUNG  GI  CHUNG Coréia do Sul 1995 CCEM 
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Ten 
Cel 
Art CARLO  F.  MALDONADO  
MOSQUERA 
Equador 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Trnp DENNIS  JAY  DUGAN EUA 1995 CCEM  
(2º a) 
Ten 
Cel 
Art ROBERTO  A.  RIVERA  
MARTINEZ 
Guatemala 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav JULIO  ALVAREZ  ARELLANO México 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Int ANTENOR  SAIZ  SILVEIRA Paraguai 1995 CCEMS/I
nt 
Maj Cav MIGUEL  ANGEL  ESPINOLA  
ARECO 
Paraguai 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art AUGUSTO  MORENO  
O’PHELAN 
Peru 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Arm CARLOS  ENRIQUE  ACOSTA  
PEREZ 
Venezuela 1995 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Log PETER  KONRAD  LUDWIG  
HARLE 
Alemanha 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Cel Inf FELIX  YASACA  MUNDO Angola 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art ALEJANDRO  LUIS  PUCHETA Argentina 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art HERNANDO  NUNEZ  DEL  
PRADO  AYOROA 
Bolívia 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf VICTOR  SCHNEIDER  ARCE Chile 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav ORLANDO  GALINDO  
CIFUENTES 
Colômbia 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj FN HONG  KUY  SHIN Coréia do Sul 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Inf JULIO  ARMANDO  GARCIA  
OLIVA 
El Salvador 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Int PATRÍCIO  FERNANDO  NOVOA  
SALAZAR 
Equador 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav DWAYNE  CARMAN EUA 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av ROGES  JAMES  BARROS EUA 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav VINCENT  LAMAUVE França 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Adm WEDNA  CAMBRIDGE Guiana 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf CATALINO  LUIZ  ROY  ORTIZ Paraguai 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JOSÉ  IVAN  TORRES  
VERASTEGUI 
Peru 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Com JOSÉ  ARTUR  PAULA  
QUESADA  PASTOR 
Portugal 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf GUSTAVO  ALBERTO  OCHOA  
MENDEZ 
Venezuela 1996 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
MI GERHARDUS  JOHANES  
MATTHYS  BADENHORST 
África do Sul 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf EDUARDO  LUIS  DOVAL Argentina 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ATAUL  HAKIM  SARWAR  
HASAN 
Bangladesh 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf GUSTAVO  ARDAYA  SALINAS Bolívia 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JORGE  PARDO  LIZANA Chile 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
314 
 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng JAVIER  ALBERTO  FLOREZ  
ARISTIZABAL 
Colômbia 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf BONG-SOO  KYUNG Coréia do Sul 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf - FN JI-YOUNG  RYU Coréia do Sul 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ROMMEL  ALBERTO  AGUILAR  
NOCHEZ 
El Salvador 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Int MIGUEL  ANGEL  AVALOS  
ZAMBRANO 
Equador 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj MI ERIC  LYNN  LAMBERSON EUA 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av JAMES  HOWARD  GARNER EUA 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf CARLOS  SAAVEDRA  
CARRASCOSA 
Guatemala 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Inf MICHELE  CRESCENZI Itália 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JOSÉ  ALFREDO  GONZALES  
RODRIGUES 
México 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LEONOR  CABRERA  CABRERA Paraguai 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng CESAR  ALVA  BALCAZAR Peru 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf IMAMHOESEIN  HUSSAINALI Suriname 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ALEXANDER  ARAMBULO  
URDANETA 
Venezuela 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CECÍLIO  CALMÓN  HURTADO Venezuela 1997 CCEM/O
NA 
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Ten 
Cel 
Art ADÉLIO  JOSÉ  DE  CARVALHO Angola 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng MOISÉS  ANTÔNIO Angola 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art ALEJANDRO  JOSÉ  
SCARREMBERG 
Argentina 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf DARLOS  SEJAS  CALICHO Bolívia 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav ALEJANDRO  MOREL  CONCHA Chile 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf LUIS  ALFONSO  ZAPATA  
URIBE 
Colômbia 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ROBERTO  OSWALDO  MÉNDEZ  
SÁNCHEZ 
El Salvador 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj FE THOMAS  HAMILTON  EVANS  
IV 
EUA 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ODBER  ENRIQUE  ARGUETA  
MERIDA 
Guatemala 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf EDWIN  GIOVANNI  PACAY  
PAREDES 
Guatemala 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf BRASSINGTON  GRANVILLE  
REYNOLDS  JÚNIOR 
Guiana 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JOSÉ  MARTINEZ  ROCHA México 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf DAVID  AONDOVER  NYAM  
KORCHIA 
Nigéria 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com BENNETH  CHUKWUDI  
ODUNUKWE 
Nigéria 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art FÁBIO  RUPERTO  MARTINETTI  
GONZALEZ 
Paraguai 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Cav PRÓSPERO  OTONIEL  DÍAZ  
ARRUÉ 
Peru 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CARLOS  HENRIQUE  DE  
AGUIAR  SANTOS 
Portugal 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf HENK  JOZEF  MOHAMATSAID Suriname 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf WILSON  RICARDO  CASTILLHO  
FLORES 
Venezuela 1998 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Mnt JÜRGER MENNER Alemanha 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf HERNAN FREDERICO CORNUT Argentina 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng LUIS FELIPE PAREDES 
CADENA 
Colômbia 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art SANG-KI LEE Coréia do Sul 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf WILLIAM ARMANDO MEIJIA 
MARTINEZ 
El Salvador 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Av ROBERTO ENRIQUE 
VASCONEZ HURTADO 
Equador 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Intlg ROBERT FAGAN EUA 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av BRIAN STEWART 
McNAUGHTON 
EUA 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap FE THOMAS DAVID NEWMAN EUA 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JEAN BAUMSTARK França 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art SERGIO APARICIO LOPEZ 
RODRIGUES 
Guatemala 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Inf LUIS ALBERTO GONZALES 
PEREZ 
Guatemala 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav NESTOR ISACIO RAMIREZ 
RIVEROS 
Paraguai 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng LUIS SILVA CABREIO Peru 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf GEORGE ROBERT KRAK Suriname 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JOSE GREGORIO SUAREZ 
ROJAS 
Venezuela 1999 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Inf LUIS VALDEMIRO DE JESUS 
FRANCISCO 
Angola 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf  FERNANDO HORÁCIO GÓMEZ 
BERÓN 
Argentina 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MIGUEL ERNESTO PÉREZ 
GUARNIZO 
Colômbia 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj FN DONG CHAI CHOI Coréia do Sul 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com RAMÓN ARQUIMEDES PALOMO 
PIREDA 
El Salvador 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf SAMUEL HOUSTON PRUGH EUA 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Inf BRYAN PATRICK HERNANDEZ EUA 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Av ROBERT WILLIAM McGHEE EUA 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel  
Inf JOSÉ ISRAEL GUERRA 
CARDONA 
Guatemala 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf NICOLAS ANTÓNIO ALVAREZ 
ESPINOSA 
Nicarágua 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Inf FREIDE EMILIO AMARILLA 
ALARCON 
Paraguai 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf LEONARDO LONGA LOPEZ Peru 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf EUGÉNIO FRANCISCO NUNES 
HENRIQUES 
Portugal 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf JULMER ROMÁN YÉPEZ 
CASTRO 
Venezuela 2000 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf EUGÉNIO CAMBULO Angola 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art BERNARDO ALTAMIRO DOS 
SANTOS 
Angola 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Eng MARCELO TÁMER YAPUR Argentina 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MANUEL GERARDO GUZMÁN 
CARDOSO 
Colômbia 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf SEO GWOO LEE Coréia do Sul 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf BRETT ALLEN BARRACLOUGH EUA 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Intlg JOSEPH GRAAN IZAGUIRRE EUA 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Av LORENZO HARRIS EUA 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art OSCAR ESTUARDO COSSIO 
CÁMARA 
Guatemala 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art BERNABE BERNARDO CHAVEZ 
LIRA 
México 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj  Inf JUAN JOSÉ CASACCIA 
FURIASSE 
Paraguai 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj  Int JORGE LUIS YANAC CHAVEZ Peru 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Bld MIGUEL ANGEL RIVERO 
RODRIGUEZ 
Venezuela 2001 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav JÜLIO CÉSAR GARAY FLORES Paraguai 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art WOLFGANG ARGENIS 
MONTERO CAMACHO 
Venezuela 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav ALFREDO BOCANEGRA NAVIA Colômbia 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Bld MICHAEL DEAN BREUER Alemanha 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav HERMES MARIA GRENO 
PREFUMO 
Uruguai 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Log KEMRAJ PERSAUD Guiana 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf CARLOS GEOVANI MEJIA 
GIRÓN 
Guatemala 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Intlg FREDERICK STEPHEN 
BARRETT 
EUA 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav CARLOS ALBERTO RABANAL 
CALDERÓN 
Peru 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf MATTHEW DAVID ANDERSON EUA 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art MIGUEL CALDERÓN ALMERAYA México 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com HORÁCIO MARTIM SEÑORIÑO Argentina 2002 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf ALEXIS SANTANA ALMONTE República 
Dominicana 
2003 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Art GUILLERMO DARAC Argentina 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LEE JEOUNG SUN Coréia do Sul 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj AAAe HECTOR VALLE EUA 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj  Inf ERWIN MANUEL GARCIA 
CARAVANTES 
Guatemala 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ALONZO KEITH THEODORE 
HARTLEY 
Guiana 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ALFREDO ADAME CABRERA México 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj  Cav  WILSON MARQUEZ Uruguai 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj  Int MARIO HUGO VIZCARRA JAREZ Peru 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Intlg RICHARD TAYLOR EUA 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Cap Eng CHRISTOPHE SIMON França 2003 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art JOSE LUIS ARRECHEA Argentina 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf SOO YONG LEE Coréia do Sul 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf SEGUNDO FIDEL TAPIA VEGA Equador 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ANSELMO MARTIN SEGOVIA Espanha 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf ERICK SERVANDO CANO 
ZAMORA 
Guatemala 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
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Maj Eng MAURICIO ANTONIO FONSECA 
LOPEZ 
Nicarágua 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf HUERTAS PONCE VICTOR Peru 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf RICARDO FRANCHI Uruguai 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng ANGEL JESÚS MORENO 
GUDINHÕ 
Venezuela 2004 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JORGE ARSENIO BOBADILLA 
OZUNA 
Paraguai 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf SIMÃO FERNANDO NIOCA ANGOLA 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art SEBASTIÁN IGNACIO IBAÑEZ Argentina 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art MAURÍCIO EUGÊNIO 
VALDIVIESO CASTRO 
Chile 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf YE HONGCHAO CHINA 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel  
Art ANGEL GONZALEZ MONCAYO Equador 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Advoga
do 
Militar 
GARY CORN EUA 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art RONY ADOLFO ANLEU DEL 
AGUILA 
Guatemala 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JESUS VERA IPENSA Peru 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng JUAN MANUEL APONTE 
GUTIERREZ 
Venezuela 2005 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com MARIO ANTUNA Uruguai 2005 CCEM/O
322 
 
NA 
Maj Inf MANOEL RODRÍGUEZ SOZA Paraguai 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Cel Inf RAMON EMILIO VENTURA 
RODRÍGUEZ 
República 
Dominicana 
2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav SERGIO RODRIGO TORRES 
BROWN 
Chile 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng Freddy Bayardo Merizalde 
Heredia 
Equador 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com Luis Pablo Guimpel  Argentina 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav Sergio Carlos Orellana Centellas Bolívia 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf Junki Hong Coréia 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf Charles William Nolan EUA 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av Corey Michael Tejchma EUA 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav Epafrodito Obed López Meléndez Guatemala 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Com Ivan Loayza Abregu Peru 2006 CCEM/O
NA 
Cel Inf DARVIN M. MENDEZ PEREZ República 
Dominicana 
2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art RODOLFO PARDOW 
SAAVEDRA 
Chile 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf PABLO ALMEIDA CANIZARES Equador 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten Inf RONALD ARDON FRANCO Guatemala 2007 CCEM/O
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Cel NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JOSÉ IGNACIO GENTINI Uruguai 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JOSÉ LUIS MARCANO LECCIA Venezuela 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Int CHRISTOPH SCHLADT Alemanha 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art EDUADO MALDONADO Argentina 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj FE RICARDO BAUTISTA EUA 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art IDONGESIT UKO AKPAN Nigéria 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JUAN MENDOZA OTANO Paraguai 2007 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art ERNESTO ANTÔNIO TEJOS 
MENDEZ 
Chile 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf PAULO JORGE VARELA CURRO Portugal 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf IVÁN PATRÍCIO MEDINA 
JIMÉNEZ 
Equador 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art JOSÉ ALEXANDER DE FREITAS 
MÉNDEZ 
Venezuela 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CESAR BRIOLOS CAMARONE Peru 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Av MARCUS ALLEN GENGLER EUA 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav RICARDO DE PIEDAD ALCARAZ 
GALEANO 
Paraguai 2008 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Art RICARDO FELIPE FRESTA Argentina 2008 CCEM/O
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NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Intl JUAN CARLOS LOPEZ 
ANDRADE 
Equador 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Art CARLOS ARNALDO NOVOA 
VERGARA 
Chile 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Mat ARLINDO NEVES LUCAS Portugal 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Eng IVÁN SAÚL AGREDA ALVAREZ Guatemala 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf SEUNGRAE KIM Coréia 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav DIEGO IGNACIO BERRA Argentina 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf DIRK BORG Alemanha 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Bld JAMES EDWARD WINLAND EUA 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf LUIS PRANTL Uruguai 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Log LEE JOHNSON EUA 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav GERARDO DANIEL GONZALEZ 
ROJAS 
Paraguai 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CESAR A. ANDALUZ 
SALAVERRY 
Peru 2009 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Log CRISTIAN JACQUES THOMAS 
SIMON 
EUA 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
QMB GALO XAVIER MALDONADO 
VIERA  
Equador 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten Int ANTONIO MANUEL PEREIRA Portugal 2010 CCEM/O
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Cel BAPTISTA NA 
Maj Int ALFREDO GABRIEL GRANCE 
LEZCANO 
Paraguai 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JULIO CESAR BUONICONTO Argentina 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf OVIDIO HUMBERTO GIL 
CORDON 
Guatemala 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Com JORGE ANDRÉS MORALES 
FERNÁNDEZ 
Chile 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Eng LUIS NICOLAS CUEVA 
CARBAJAL 
Peru 2010 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf LUIS WEBER ORELLANA Chile 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf  NOEL EDUARDO MONTES 
FUENMAYOR 
Venezuela 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf CLAUDE ARTHUR FRASER Guiana 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
  
JIMENEZ ALARCÓN ÁNGEL 
VINICIO 
Equador 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj FE MATTHEW  WILLIAM HEIM EUA 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav CHIKE T. WILLIAMS EUA 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Inf JOSÉ GIOVANI MARTINEZ 
MILIAN 
Guatemala 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj   FRANCISCO ESTEBAN 
RODRIGUEZ PATIÑO 
Paraguai 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav EDUARDO ANDRÉS FERREIRA 
GALVÁN 
Uruguai 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Eng NSIKAN EZEKIEL UDOFIA Nigéria 2011 CCEM/O
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NA 
Maj Inf ESTEBAN ANDRÉS RAVAIOLI Argentina 2011 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JOSÉ CLAVERIA GUSMÁN Chile 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Inf MUSTANSAR MAHMOOD Paquistão 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Int AURELIO JESÚS BARAHONA 
SANDOVAL 
Equador 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav JUAN CARLOS INSFRÁN 
TORALES 
Paraguai 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Ten 
Cel 
Cav DOMÉNICO LUIZ MANUEL 
MAGUIÑA LA TORRE 
Peru 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj OI JONG WOO WEE Coréia do Sul 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav  DIRK JOACHIM SCHURARD Alemanha 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj Cav ÁLVARO RUBÉN COSTANZO Uruguai 2012 CCEM/O
NA 
Maj OI DAVID PAUL WILIAM DAVID EUA 2012 CCEM/O
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